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Previous studies have indicated a higher risk of disordered eating in certain types of elite sports such as aesthetic sports (e.g., rhythmical gymnastics, figure skating). But even though some studies on risk factors for disordered eating in sports exist, most research on this topic is based on cross-sectional data with limitations on causal inferences. We examined sports-related risk factors for disordered eating in a 1-year longitudinal study with two assessment points. The participants were 65 adolescent athletes from aesthetic sports (mean age 14.0 +/- 2.2years) who completed measures of disordered eating, social pressure from the sports environment, sports-related body dissatisfaction, desire to be leaner to improve sports performance, and emotional distress resulting from missed exercise sessions. All variables were relatively stable in the mean. Individual changes in the desire to be leaner to improve sports performance were associated with individual changes in disordered eating. Furthermore, a cross-lagged partial correlation analysis showed that the desire to be leaner to improve sports performance was predictive of disordered eating and not vice versa. The results of our study indicate that athletes are more at risk for disordered eating if they believe it is possible to enhance their sports performance through weight regulation.
Prosodic information is crucial for spoken language comprehension and especially for syntactic parsing, because prosodic cues guide the hearer's syntactic analysis. The time course and mechanisms of this interplay of prosody and syntax are not yet well-understood. In particular, there is an ongoing debate whether local prosodic cues are taken into account automatically or whether they are processed in relation to the global prosodic context in which they appear. The present study explores whether the perception of a prosodic boundary is affected by its position within an utterance. In an event-related potential (PRP) study we tested if the brain response evoked by the prosodic boundary differs when the boundary occurs early in a list of three names connected by conjunctions (i.e., after the first name) as compared to later in the utterance (i.e., after the second name). A closure positive shift (CPS)-marking the processing of a prosodic phrase boundary-was elicited for stimuli with a late boundary, but not for stimuli with an early boundary. This result is further evidence for an immediate integration of prosodic information into the parsing of an utterance. In addition, it shows that the processing of prosodic boundary cues depends on the previously processed information from the preceding prosodic context.
Kant und die Farben
(2007)
Editorial
(2009)
Why animals can't act
(2009)
Given the many marvelous things animals can do and moreover the success we have in employing the intentional stance towards animals, it seems to be almost unthinkable to say that animals could not act at all. Nonetheless, this is exactly what I argue for. I claim that strictly speaking there is no animal action, only behaviour. I defend this claim in three steps. Firstly, I recapitulate some of the weighty grounds that speak in favour of animal agency. Secondly, I explain why I still doubt that animals act. The argument is that the account of agency that I take to be the most attractive one entails that animals can't act. Since this account of agency is non-standard, I spend the bulk of the paper with providing a sketch of what, according to it, actions are. Finally, I explain why it is still so natural and promising to regard animals as agents, although in fact they aren't. As one might put it: of course they act, only strictly speaking they don't.
The topic of this essay is akrasia in its most paradoxical kind, as it appears to us in the emblem of Medea. The argument starts with the claim that the problem with akrasia is especially a problem of rational potentiality: to understand it philosophically, we are forced to embrace the idea that its possibility is immanent to the rational capacity of action. By discussing elements of Plato's, Aristotle's, and Davidson's explanations of practical irrationality, the argument proceeds to demonstrate that the reasons a practical capacity provides exist as "forces", that rational forces are structurally in excess with respect to their normative statuses, and that Medea is the mythical figure par excellence of such an immanent excess of rational agency. On account of these insights, we can begin to understand that akrasia is not only a kind of failure, or incapacity, but entails the very possibility of a "metamorphosis" of the subject.
Whereas Plato's Protagoras rejects the notion that someone who knows what is good for him can nonetheless do something else of his own free volition, his Republic names the particular conditions under which such an act, an act of weakness of the will, can take place: the conditions of democracy. Because democracy, Plato writes, places an excessive freedom at its centre, it fosters desires, weakening the force of reason, destabilizing the will, and thus engendering an unprincipled human being. This paper defends the democratic conception of freedom against this portrayal by advocating a concept of freedom of the will that does not unilaterally identify it with willpower.
Informatik und Bildung
(1993)
Zukunft durch Grenzen
(1993)