This article compares Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adorno's foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner's foundation of Philosophical Anthropology. While Horkheimer's and Plessner's paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno's << negative dialectics >> and Plessner's << negative anthropology >> (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another. Jurgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner's philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the << life power >> in << high capitalism >> (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a << critical anthropology >> (H. Schnädelbach).

The aim of the paper is to defend the project of transforming philosophy carried out in my book 'Vernunft und Temperament. Eine Philosophie der Philosophie'. In section 1, I distinguish between five philosophical genres in which transformation plays a role: 1. academic texts in which transformation is simply a topic; 2. texts meant to adequately articulate through their form the transformative experiences of their authors; 3. texts aiming to enable the reader to transform herself; 4. texts on other texts; 5. manifestos defending the project of transforming philosophy. Section 2 is such a manifesto. Its main thesis is: "What makes somebody - anybody - a good philosopher is that she is a real human being. " Many of the remaining 16 theses of the manifesto are elaborations on this main thesis. One example is the thesis that the philosophical activity is essentially a becoming - the development of an individual human being.

This dissertation offers new and original readings of three major texts in the history of Western philosophy: Descartes’s “First Meditation,” Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction,” and his “Refutation of Idealism.” The book argues that each text addresses the problem of skepticism and posits that they have a hitherto underappreciated, organic relationship to one another. The dissertation begins with an analysis of Descartes’ “First Meditation,” which I argue offers two distinct and independent skeptical arguments that differ in both aim and scope. I call these arguments the “veil of ideas” argument and the “author of my origin” argument. My reading counters the standard interpretation of the text, which sees it as offering three stages of doubt, namely the occasional fallibility of the senses, the dream hypothesis, and the evil demon hypothesis. Building on this, the central argument of the dissertation is that Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction” actually transforms and radicalizes Descartes’s Author of My Origin argument, reconceiving its meaning within the framework of Kant’s own transcendental idealist philosophy. Finally, I argue that the Refutation of Idealism offers a similarly radicalized version of Descartes’s Veil of Ideas argument, albeit translated into the framework of transcendental idealism.

The conception of property at the basis of Hegel’s conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of “possessive individualism.” It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the “true right” that life possesses against the “formal” and “abstract right” of property. Ultimately, Hegel’s account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right.