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Dieser Beitrag erläutert, wie die im Teilprojekt entstandenen Selbstlernangebote (Schreibberatung, Vortragscoaching, Sprachtutorien) über die Laufzeit des Teilprojekts (weiter-)entwickelt wurden und wie Studierende durch die Einführung von neuen, flexibleren Lernformaten (z. B. Einzelberatungen) unterstützt werden. Zudem wird aufgezeigt, wie sich wissenschaftlichen Hilfskräften die Möglichkeit bietet, sich als Schreibberater/ in, Vortragscoach oder Sprachtutor/in weiterzubilden. Somit wird an der Universität Potsdam nicht nur das Selbstlernen, sondern auch Peer Learning gefördert.
A Little Piece of the Shire
(2014)
Sprache der Hände
(2021)
Why animals can't act
(2009)
Given the many marvelous things animals can do and moreover the success we have in employing the intentional stance towards animals, it seems to be almost unthinkable to say that animals could not act at all. Nonetheless, this is exactly what I argue for. I claim that strictly speaking there is no animal action, only behaviour. I defend this claim in three steps. Firstly, I recapitulate some of the weighty grounds that speak in favour of animal agency. Secondly, I explain why I still doubt that animals act. The argument is that the account of agency that I take to be the most attractive one entails that animals can't act. Since this account of agency is non-standard, I spend the bulk of the paper with providing a sketch of what, according to it, actions are. Finally, I explain why it is still so natural and promising to regard animals as agents, although in fact they aren't. As one might put it: of course they act, only strictly speaking they don't.
By 'by'
(2005)
Intervention und Einmischung
(2004)
The topic of this essay is akrasia in its most paradoxical kind, as it appears to us in the emblem of Medea. The argument starts with the claim that the problem with akrasia is especially a problem of rational potentiality: to understand it philosophically, we are forced to embrace the idea that its possibility is immanent to the rational capacity of action. By discussing elements of Plato's, Aristotle's, and Davidson's explanations of practical irrationality, the argument proceeds to demonstrate that the reasons a practical capacity provides exist as "forces", that rational forces are structurally in excess with respect to their normative statuses, and that Medea is the mythical figure par excellence of such an immanent excess of rational agency. On account of these insights, we can begin to understand that akrasia is not only a kind of failure, or incapacity, but entails the very possibility of a "metamorphosis" of the subject.
Zur Interpretation in der mikrosoziologischen und sozialpsychologischen Wissenschaftsforschung
(1995)
Vorwort
(1995)
Our aim in this paper is to explicate some unexpected and striking similarities and equally important differences, which have not been discussed in the literature, between Wittgenstein's methodology and the approach of Chinese Chan or Japanese Zen Buddhism. We say 'unexpected' similarities because it is not a common practice, especially in the analytic tradition, to invest very much in comparative philosophy. The peculiarity of this study will be further accentuated in the view of those of the 'old school' who see Wittgenstein as a logical positivist, and Zen as a religious excuse for militarism or sadomasochism. If the second claim were true, the following investigation would not only be futile but also impossible. That the first claim, concerning the 'old school' perspective on Wittgenstein, si incorrect, we will demonstrate in the ensuing discussion. By now more experts have come to accept hits claim and we hope that our comparative perspective will add even more momentum