Being fully excused for wrongdoing
- On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction.
| Author details: | Daniele BrunoORCiDGND |
|---|---|
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12425 |
| ISSN: | 0279-0750 |
| ISSN: | 1468-0114 |
| Title of parent work (English): | Pacific philosophical quarterly |
| Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Place of publishing: | Hoboken, NJ |
| Publication type: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Date of first publication: | 2022/08/26 |
| Publication year: | 2022 |
| Release date: | 2023/11/27 |
| Volume: | 104 |
| Issue: | 2 |
| Number of pages: | 24 |
| First page: | 324 |
| Last Page: | 347 |
| Funding institution: | Projekt DEAL |
| Organizational units: | Philosophische Fakultät / Institut für Philosophie |
| DDC classification: | 1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie |
| Peer review: | Referiert |
| Publishing method: | Open Access / Hybrid Open-Access |
| License (German): |  CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International |
