100 Philosophie und Psychologie
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Article (100)
- Doctoral Thesis (83)
- Monograph/Edited Volume (32)
- Part of a Book (29)
- Postprint (9)
- Review (5)
- Lecture (4)
- Master's Thesis (3)
- Other (3)
- Bachelor Thesis (1)
Keywords
- Philosophie (25)
- philosophy (23)
- Anthropologie (11)
- anthropology (11)
- Dialektik (8)
- Ästhetik (5)
- Jaspers (4)
- Kant (4)
- Metaphysik (4)
- Philosophische Anthropologie (4)
Institute
- Institut für Philosophie (103)
- Extern (27)
- Institut für Künste und Medien (22)
- Historisches Institut (18)
- Institut für Romanistik (18)
- Institut für Jüdische Studien und Religionswissenschaft (17)
- Department Psychologie (12)
- Institut für Germanistik (10)
- Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik (5)
- Philosophische Fakultät (5)
Más allá de la oscuridad
(2020)
En los últimos años, la crítica ha vuelto a enfatizar el vínculo de la escritura gongorina la épica y los subgéneros denominados “heroicos” (Mercedes Blanco, Jesús Ponce Cárdenas). Esta nueva perspectiva significa un cambio importante respecto a la recepción del poeta instaurada por la Generación del 27 y en particular por Dámaso Alonso. Limitándose a las Soledades de Góngora, el presente artículo explora las consecuencias de este nuevo paradigma, más allá de un Góngora puramente lírico. Metodológicamente, proponemos dejar atrás la dialéctica idealista o marxista de forma-contenido (la ideología de la forma de Fredric Jameson), por considerarla un enfoque anacrónico en el caso de Góngora. Sin embargo, encontramos un acercamiento filológico viable en el compromiso de la forma del temprano Barthes, que trata de esquivar la dialéctica de forma-contenido y volver a un gesto de escritura (écriture). La hipótesis del presente artículo sería, pues, que no se ha reflexionado suficientemente sobre el gesto de la escritura gongorina en las Soledades: una escritura que piratea el lenguaje épico.
Der geistig-kulturelle Umgang mit der Covid-19-Pandemie und ihrer Wirtschaftskrise als Testfall
(2021)
Why has the global West (North America, Europe) handled the covid-19 pandemic and the corresponding economic crisis so much worse than the global East (East Asia)? The crises demonstrate the degree to which the West is shaped by its forms of competition and the East by its forms of cooperation. In the West, we have become habitualised to American neoliberalism over the last two generations. In the East, varieties of neo-Confucianism and neo-Buddhism have been transformed into national cultures. The way humans understand their position in the world intellectually and react to crises according to corresponding habit makes an effective difference. The present comparison between global East and West makes use of Hannah Arendt's conception of politics and the shared world as well as of Helmuth Plessner's conception of mediated immediacy in forms of modern biopower. The pandemic is a catalyst within the decline of the West and the rise of the East.
Taking up some of W.'s paradoxical remarks about the existence of 'mental things' the paper investigates, what exactly he is criticizing. After a discussion of the mistaken idea of a private baptizing of one's own 'mental events' W.'s general criticism of the 'object-and-name model' is treated with a view on the consequences it has for our understanding of the mental. This treatment includes a discussion of figurative kinds of language use as well as a discussion of the difference between 'things' and 'objects of reference': With respect to figurative uses of language it often makes no sense to treat constituent expressions as names of objects, and not all objects of reference are things in an unproblematic ordinary-life sense. So what at first sight appears to be a limitation of our understanding of the nature of an object and consequently seems to ask for more empirical research often turns out to be a limitation of our understanding of how we use our language. The paper concludes that one important aspect of what the later W. opposes is dualism: The mental cannot be conceived of as an additional 'something' a description of which could be just added to a description of a person as a physical being. Thus W.'s anti-dualism can also be read as turning against a dualism in his Tractatus: The mental realm as well as other provinces of `the higher' are no longer seen as areas of entities about which we have to be silent.
What is it that we encountered with in our aesthetic experience of natural beauty? Does nature "figuratively speaks to us in its beautiful forms", 2 to use Kant's phrasing in the third Critique, or is it merely our way of interpreting nature whether this be its purpose or not? Kant does not answer these questions directly. Rather, he leaves the ambiguity around them by his repeated use of terminology of ciphers when it comes to our aesthetic experience in nature. This paper examines Kant's terminology of ciphers in the Critique of Judgment and demonstrate through it the intimate link aesthetic experience in natural beauty has with human morality. A link whose culmination point is embodied in the representation of beauty as a symbol of morality.
For the longest time historians have treated the infamous Libelo de Sevilla (1480) as an authentic document of the heresy of "Judaizing" allegedly wide spread among the so-called marrano or converso population. However, a closer look however reveals that the pamphlet is much more likely to be the fabrication of Old Christian agitators aiming to discredit both converts from Judaism and their allies.
In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life.