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Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion

  • This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.

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Author details:Samuel de HaasORCiDGND, Johannes PahaORCiDGND
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y
ISSN:0889-938X
ISSN:1573-7160
Title of parent work (English):Review of industrial organization
Publisher:Springer
Place of publishing:Dordrecht
Publication type:Article
Language:English
Date of first publication:2020/05/09
Publication year:2020
Release date:2023/07/07
Tag:collusion; common ownership; cross ownership; minority shareholdings
Volume:58
Issue:3
Number of pages:24
First page:431
Last Page:454
Funding institution:Projekt DEAL
Organizational units:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Peer review:Referiert
Publishing method:Open Access / Hybrid Open-Access
License (German):License LogoCC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
External remark:Zweitveröffentlichung in der Schriftenreihe Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe ; 166
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