New perspectives on issue analysis
- Researchers have shown that structuring issues and organizing an agenda before a negotiation lead to improved negotiation performance. By using issue analysis, negotiators become aware of their own and their opponents' preferences on negotiation issues and are able to use this knowledge to optimize their degree of success. Following research on asymmetrical preferences in negotiations, we introduce a new approach for issue analysis that considers the identification of one-sided preferences, specifically a 0-preference for issues from one party. We conducted an experimental study to test if this type of preference for an issue (chance issue) yields strategic potential for a negotiator. We also examined whether the identification of these chance issues could be particularly relevant for a low-power party in negotiations with a power imbalance, to overcome the lower scope of action due to the weaker negotiating position. The results indicate initial verification that no preference at all for one issue could lead to higher individualResearchers have shown that structuring issues and organizing an agenda before a negotiation lead to improved negotiation performance. By using issue analysis, negotiators become aware of their own and their opponents' preferences on negotiation issues and are able to use this knowledge to optimize their degree of success. Following research on asymmetrical preferences in negotiations, we introduce a new approach for issue analysis that considers the identification of one-sided preferences, specifically a 0-preference for issues from one party. We conducted an experimental study to test if this type of preference for an issue (chance issue) yields strategic potential for a negotiator. We also examined whether the identification of these chance issues could be particularly relevant for a low-power party in negotiations with a power imbalance, to overcome the lower scope of action due to the weaker negotiating position. The results indicate initial verification that no preference at all for one issue could lead to higher individual performance and noneconomic outcomes. Joint performance was positively affected by 0-preference, even in unbalanced power situations.…
| Verfasserangaben: | Ernestine Cathérine SiebertORCiDGND, Uta HerbstORCiDGND |
|---|---|
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12379 |
| ISSN: | 0748-4526 |
| ISSN: | 1571-9979 |
| Titel des übergeordneten Werks (Englisch): | Negotiation journal |
| Untertitel (Englisch): | one-sided preferences as a strategic source in multi-issue negotiations |
| Verlag: | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Verlagsort: | Oxford |
| Publikationstyp: | Wissenschaftlicher Artikel |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Datum der Erstveröffentlichung: | 16.11.2021 |
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2021 |
| Datum der Freischaltung: | 08.06.2023 |
| Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | issue analysis; multi-issue negotiation; negotiation preparation; negotiation strategy; power imbalance; preference differences |
| Band: | 37 |
| Ausgabe: | 4 |
| Seitenanzahl: | 34 |
| Erste Seite: | 485 |
| Letzte Seite: | 518 |
| Fördernde Institution: | Projekt DEAL |
| Organisationseinheiten: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| DDC-Klassifikation: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Peer Review: | Referiert |
| Publikationsweg: | Open Access / Hybrid Open-Access |
| Lizenz (Deutsch): |  CC-BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung, nicht kommerziell, keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International |
