Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion
- This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.
Author details: | Samuel de HaasORCiDGND, Johannes PahaORCiDGND |
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DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y |
ISSN: | 0889-938X |
ISSN: | 1573-7160 |
Title of parent work (English): | Review of industrial organization |
Publisher: | Springer |
Place of publishing: | Dordrecht |
Publication type: | Article |
Language: | English |
Date of first publication: | 2020/05/09 |
Publication year: | 2020 |
Release date: | 2023/07/07 |
Tag: | collusion; common ownership; cross ownership; minority shareholdings |
Volume: | 58 |
Issue: | 3 |
Number of pages: | 24 |
First page: | 431 |
Last Page: | 454 |
Funding institution: | Projekt DEAL |
Organizational units: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
DDC classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Peer review: | Referiert |
Publishing method: | Open Access / Hybrid Open-Access |
License (German): | CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International |
External remark: | Zweitveröffentlichung in der Schriftenreihe Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe ; 166 |