10 Philosophie
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In Quest of Subjectivity
(2009)
Happy Days
(2009)
Lebenswissen nach Cavell
(2009)
The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise ‘neutral’ democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus’s own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.
For Charles Goodwin, Chuck
(2018)
This appreciation will not be a testimonial to Chuck’s numerous publications and research achievements – I am sure that others will have a lot to say about those. Instead, I will say something about how I personally experienced and think of him, as a researcher personality, based on the limited time and the few occasions that we have had together.
Terrain de je
(2018)
Wird Metaphysik realistisch verstanden, so ist sie mit dem Anspruch verbunden, in objektiver Weise von der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt (oder Realität, Wirklichkeit etc.) zu handeln. Damit beansprucht sie die Möglichkeit von Objektivität, d. h. die Möglichkeit der Repräsentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung einer Welt, die von uns und unserer Repräsentation verschieden ist.
Realistisch verstandene Metaphysik verfährt dogmatisch, wenn sie ihre eigene Möglichkeit einfach voraussetzt. Eine dogmatische Metaphysik ist unkritisch, weil sie ohne eine Untersuchung der Frage betrieben wird, wie eine objektive und adäquate Repräsentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt überhaupt möglich ist. Im Unterschied dazu nennen wir eine realistische Metaphysik in einem vorläufigen Sinne kritisch, sofern sie ihren Ausgang von einer Untersuchung dieser Möglichkeit nimmt und erst auf der Grundlage positiver Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung einen – vor diesem Hintergrund nunmehr gerechtfertigten – Objektivitätsanspruch erhebt.
Der vorliegende Beitrag erörtert das Verhältnis einer Philo-sophie der Person zur Religionsphilosophie bzw. einer Philosophie religiöser Phänomene. Dabei soll die These vertreten werden, dass der personale Lebenszusammenhang bestimmte Phänomene aufweist, die nur in einem religiösen Kontext adäquat verstanden werden können. Die Interpretation dieser Phänomene kann einen Zugang zu bestimmten Aspekten von Personalität ermöglichen, die von den meisten Persontheorien der Gegenwart kaum beachtet werden.
Material und Begriff
(2019)
Hat für Personen eine ethische Auseinandersetzung mit ihrem Leiden an Problemen und Konflikten gegenüber strategischen und technischen Lösungen eine Bedeutung? Diese Abhandlung zeigt, dass Ansätze philosophischer Ethik, die von formalen Prinzipien, menschlichen Lebensformen oder sozialen Praktiken ausgehen, diese Frage unzureichend beantworten. Zu deren Beantwortung werden stattdessen ethische Subjektivität in der Klage über Leid, ethische Überlegungen als Negation von Leid und ethischer Dialog als Überwindung von Leid erörtert.
A particularly dark chapter in the history of European-Jewish relations during the "Third Reich" involves the cooperation of individual Jewish Community leaders and functionaries with Nazi authorities, in particular the cooperation between a few single Jewish Community leaders and the Gestapo. This "cooperation" was partially born of the overall coercion, but in some cases was also marked by denunciation and betrayal. In order to avoid being deported themselves and to save their own skins, there were isolated cases of Jewish men and women who agreed to track down other Jews and hand them over to the authorities, knowing full well what they were doing.
Fiktion und Wirklichkeit
(2020)
The aim of this paper is to discuss the relation between our experience in everyday life and ontological reflection. While many accounts in contemporary ontology still defend the idea that the world consists only of material objects, some new views on everyday metaphysics or social ontology which try to articulate the specific properties of the objects used and found in ordinary life have been established during the last years. In the critical ontology of Nicolai Hartmann, the social and cultural dimension of our life is situated in the sphere of spiritual being [Geistiges Sein]. By investigating the methodical relation of phenomenology and critical ontology as well as specific entities (objective spirit, cultural objects), it is established that Hartmann offers a wide and methodologically reflected view which could be able to satisfy the practical significance of these entities.
According to Plessner, both adaptation and selection can be conceived not just as requested by the environment but also as actively proceeding from the organism. In this respect, Plessner finds in Uexküll’s new biology a powerful counterweight to the constraints of Darwinism. However, despite all the points in common in their respective understanding of the problem, Plessner reproaches to Uexküll to have entirely missed the intermediate layer of the lived body [Leib] between the organism and its environment. Unlike Uexküll, concerning the more developed animals, Plessner took up elements of animal psychology from Wolfgang Köhler and Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk. Finally, Plessner finds insufficiencies also in Uexküll’s distinction between the notion of world and the notion of environment, which would lead to the parallel positing of different environments. In reaction to Uexküll’s leveling of all environments, Plessner drafted a philosophical-anthropological spectrum between the intelligent way of living observed in the great apes, whose intelligence had been demonstrated, and the co-wordly life of the symbolic mind as seen in the personal sphere of human life.
Cave canem
(2021)
So far, animals in fables have almost exclusively been studied as symbolic representatives of human behaviour. New perspectives are opened up by Human-Animal Studies which focus on the animals themselves and human-animal relationships. Inspired by this approach, this article examines five fables of Graeco-Roman antiquity which are connected by the motif of the vicious dog. On the basis of philological interpretation it is shown to what extent and with which intention the dogs are anthropomorphised and at the same time represented as real animals. Interestingly, the human protagonists usually don´t blame the dogs and draw a clear borderline between animals and humans. It seems that successful communication is possible only within the same species.