10 Philosophie
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In Quest of Subjectivity
(2009)
Happy Days
(2009)
Lebenswissen nach Cavell
(2009)
The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise ‘neutral’ democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus’s own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.
For Charles Goodwin, Chuck
(2018)
This appreciation will not be a testimonial to Chuck’s numerous publications and research achievements – I am sure that others will have a lot to say about those. Instead, I will say something about how I personally experienced and think of him, as a researcher personality, based on the limited time and the few occasions that we have had together.
Terrain de je
(2018)