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- Berlin Potsdam Research Group "The International Rule of Law - Rise or Decline?" (16) (remove)
This paper assesses the rise and decline of international rule of law in the case of non-state armed actors. Both signs of rise and signs of decline of international rule of law show in the case of non- state armed actors. Signs of rise include the expansion of coverage of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law, as well as international legal argumentation and rhetoric made by non-state armed groups. Some non-state armed actors express that they are governed by IHL in public statements or bilateral agreements with international actors, partly acknowledging universality of international humanitarian norms, and sometimes act as such. Signs of decline in the international rule of law also show – although some of them can be seen as business-as-usual – privileging of military advantage, instrumental use of international law (as justification and local interpretations), as well as conflicting understanding of IHL between local and global norms. The multiplicity of non-state actors also portends the decline of international rule of law, with the proliferation of many non-organized groups without legitimacy-seeking motivations.
A growing demand for natural resources embedded in current changes of the international order will put pressure on states to secure the future availability of these resources. Some political discourses suggest that states might respond by challenging the foundations of international law. Whereas the UN Charter was inter alia aimed at eliminating uses of force for economic reasons, one may observe an on-going trend of securitization of matters of resource supply resulting into the revival of self-preservation doctrines. The chapter will show that those claims lack a normative foundation in the current framework of the prohibition of the use of force. Moreover, international law has sufficient instruments to cope with disputes over access to resources by other means than the use of force. The international community, therefore, must oppose claims that may contribute to normative uncertainties and strengthen already existing instruments of pacific settlement of disputes.
This paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of the problematic features of the appointment of arbitrators in ISDS.
International adjudication is currently under assault, encouraging a number of States to withdraw, or to consider withdrawing, from treaties providing for international dispute settlement. This Working Paper argues that the act of treaty withdrawal is not merely as the unilateral executive exercise of the individual sovereign prerogative of a State. International law places checks upon the exercise of withdrawal, recognising that it is an act that of its nature affects the interests of other States parties, which have a collective interest in constraining withdrawal. National courts have a complementary function in restraining unilateral withdrawal in order to support the domestic constitution. The arguments advanced against international adjudication in the name of popular democracy at the national level can serve as a cloak for the exercise of executive power unrestrained by law. The submission by States of their disputes to peaceful settlement through international adjudication is central, not incidental, to the successful operation of the international legal system.
How does the international Rule of Law apply to constrain the conduct of the Executive within a constitutional State that adopts a dualist approach to the reception of international law? This paper argues that, so far from being inconsistent with the concept of the Rule of Law, the Executive within a dualist constitution has a self-enforcing obligation to abide by the obligations of the State under international law. This is not dependent on Parliament’s incorporation of treaty obligations into domestic law. It is the correlative consequence of the allocation to the Executive of the power to conduct foreign relations. The paper develops this argument in response to recent debate in the United Kingdom on whether Ministers have an obligation to comply with international law–a reference that the Government removed from the Ministerial Code. It shows that such an obligation is consistent with both four centuries of the practice of the British State and with principle.
This paper – which is based on the Thomas Franck Lecture held by the author at Humboldt University Berlin on 13 May 2019 – argues that the most likely development of international to be expected will be the coexistence of two “legal worlds”. On the one hand, an inter-State law brutally regulating political relations between human groups whitewashed by nationalism; on the other hand, a transnational or “a-national” law regulating economic relations between private as well as public interests. Further, the paper argues that there are two obvious victims – of very different nature – of this foreseeable evolution: the human being on the one hand, the certainty and effectiveness of the rule of law itself on the other hand.