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Perhaps like no other country, Germany has radically changed its policies towards regulating air pollution in the European context. Acting originally as a dragger in the 1970s to regulate transboundary air pollutants due to pessimism about the relationship between causes and effects, Germany responded very decisively to its own damage assessment in the early 1980s. In particular the adverse effects to forests (Waldsterben" or forest decline) led to the formulation of strict air pollution regulations in the domestic context, efforts to spread the regulatory system within the European Union, and activities within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe to foster stronger, continent-wide emission reductions. Using three conceptual models (rational actor, domestic politics, and social learning), we show that Germany deviated strongly from the ideal policy cycle consisting of (i) domestic policy formulation, (ii) international negotiations, as well as (iii) implementation and compliance with the provisions of international environmental agreements. Both national policy-making as well as partial implementation have been well on the way towards compliance even before Germany entered international negotiations on substantive protocols. Therefore, one may conclude from this country study that push countries may use the results of their national policy processes to influence the policy of other countries.
Political Science research encounters inferences across levels of analysis; however, they are fraught with challenges. After introducing voting examples of aggregation bias, problems posed by aggregation bias are summarized more generally. Subsequently, the article reviews the major methodological approaches to overcome aggregation bias and to solve the ecological inference (disaggregation) problem. The article highlights the possibility that aggregation bias may lead governments to accept (or reject) international climate agreements when negotiating as blocs of countries as compared to the distribution of the preferences of all countries involved in the negotiations.
Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international gover-nance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measure-ment concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the measurement concept is demonstrated by way of two international treaties regu-lating transboundary air pollution in Europe. The results demonstrate that the regimes indeed show positive effects;but fall substantially short of the collective optima.
Social Organization
(2001)
Managing parliaments in the 21st Century : from Policy-Making and Public Management to Governance
(2001)
Germany
(2002)
State, administration and governance in Germany: competing traditions and dominant narratives
(2003)
The nation-state in question
(2004)
Weï re here, weï re queer, and weï re not going shopping! : queering space : Interventionen im Raum
(2004)
Introduction and Preview
(2004)
Confounding is one of the major types of bias encountered in observational epidemiologic surveys designed to study the relation between an exposure factor and a health event. A common way to remove confounding bias during the statistical analysis phase is to adjust for the confounders in a regression model. If a confounding factor is assessed as a continuous variable, it is necessary to define how the variable is entered into the regression model. In the case of logistic regression, we illustrate through simulation that coding by a binary variable or a categorical variable with broad categories may lead to substantial residual confounding. Specific approaches can be used to define a coding method that limits residual confounding. Among these, we briefly present nonparametric approaches and describe in detail several semiparametric approaches (generalised partial linear models, spline regression and fractional polynomials). These can be used to estimate the relation between a continuous factor and the health event of interest by a smooth non pre-specified function. In semiparametric models, the effect of certain covariates is coded by a parametric function, whereas the coding of one or two continuous variables is represented by a nonparametric function. These models can be used in exploratory analyses to describe dose-effect relations between the confounder and the health event, and thus help to define a relevant coding for the confounder
While the notion of governance has received considerable scholarly attention, much less is known about change, and its sources, across modes of governance within respective policy domains. This article explores these neglected issues in two policy domains characterized by multi-level governance characteristics: Land (state)- local relationships in the domain of building administration and relationships governing the prisons domain in Germany. It does so in three steps. First, the article explores governance and considers endogenous and exogenous sources of change. Second, it discusses the institutional arrangements in the two domains and analyses modes of governance and their change. Third, the article compares the different dynamics of change and links these findings to wider debates regarding change across and within modes of governance. The analysis of the two domains suggests that 'hunting around' effects (i.e. permanent instability) are less prominent than suggested by cultural theory, while external pressures for change are filtered by the preferences of the actors within the respective domains
The era of public management change is said to challenge traditional "command and control" modes of governance, encouraging a move toward either more informal forms of (co-) governance or market-type incentives and competition. Regardless of whether these claims are made by reform advocates or by more sceptical observers within the wider governance debate, less attention has been paid by either side on the mechanisms that are supposed to facilitate the spread of new forms of control. This article seeks to advance this state of affairs in two ways. First, it utilizes the notion of institutional isomorphism to explore the nature of change of modes of control. In particular, it assesses the mechanisms for change, whether control mechanisms are changing due to coercive, mimetic, or professional mechanisms. Second, it explores the impact of these mechanisms in the federal context of Germany in two policy domains, prison and local government supervision (in the field of building administration). Finally, this article suggests that cultural theory offers considerable insights for the study of institutional isomorphism by emphasizing conflicting worldviews and the diversity of related policy ideas as driving forces of change in modes of governance
The article structually estimates an on-the-job search model of job separations. Given each employer pays observably equivalent workers the same but wages are dispersed across employers, an employer's separation flow is the sum of an exogenous outflow unrelated to the wage and a job-to-job flow that decreases with the employer's wage. Using data from the Danish Integrated Database for Labour Market Research, the empirical results imply, as predicted by theory, that search effort declines with the wage. Furthermore, the estimates explain the employment effect, defined as the horizontal difference between the distribution of wages earned and the wage offer distribution
Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target's misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument