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(2020)
This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility.
In the time of digitalization the demand for organizational change is rising and demands ways to cope with fundamental changes on the organizational as well as individual level. As a basis, learning and forgetting mechanisms need to be understood in order to guide a change process efficiently and successfully. Our research aims to get a better understanding of individual differences and mechanisms in the change context by performing an experiment where individuals learn and later re-learn a complex production process using a simulation setting. The individual’s performance, as well as retentivity and prior knowledge is assessed. Our results show that higher retentivity goes along with better learning and forgetting performances. Prior knowledge did not reveal such relation to the learning and forgetting performances. The influence of age and gender is discussed in detail.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird untersucht, in wie weit physikalische Experimente ein flow-Erleben bei Lernenden hervorrufen. Flow-Erleben wird als Motivationsursache gesehen und soll den Weg zu Freude und Glück darstellen. Insbesondere wegen dem oft zitierten Fachkräftemangel in naturwissenschaftlichen und technischen Berufen ist eine Motivationssteigerung in naturwissenschaftlichen Unterrichtsfächern wichtig. Denn trotz Leistungssteigerungen in internationalen Vergleichstests möchten in Deutschland deutlich weniger Schüler*innen einen solchen Beruf ergreifen als in anderen Industriestaaten. Daher gilt es, möglichst früh Schüler*innen für naturwissenschaftlich-technische Fächer zu begeistern und insbesondere im regelrecht verhassten Physikunterricht flow-Erleben zu erzeugen.
Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird das flow-Erleben von Studierenden in klassischen Laborexperimenten und FELS (Forschend-Entdeckendes Lernen mit dem Smartphone) als Lernumgebung untersucht. FELS ist eine an die Lebenswelt der Schüler*innen angepasste Lernumgebung, in der sie mit Smartphones ihre eigene Lebenswelt experimentell untersuchen.
Es zeigt sich, dass sowohl klassische Laborexperimente als auch in der Lebenswelt durchgeführte, smartphonebasierte Experimente flow-Erleben erzeugen. Allerdings verursachen die smartphonebasierten Experimente kaum Stressgefühle.
Die in dieser Arbeit herausgefundenen Ergebnisse liefern einen ersten Ansatz, der durch Folgestudien erweitert werden sollte.
Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).
Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.
Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people’s payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person’s payoff, an individual’s envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people’s payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant’s payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.