@article{BruttelStolley2020, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian}, title = {Getting a yes}, series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, volume = {86}, journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {New York}, issn = {2214-8043}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2020.101550}, pages = {10}, year = {2020}, abstract = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{HaaseMatthiesenSchueffleretal.2020, author = {Haase, Jennifer and Matthiesen, Julia and Sch{\"u}ffler, Arnulf and Kluge, Annette}, title = {Retentivity beats prior knowledge as predictor for the acquisition and adaptation of new production processes}, series = {Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences}, volume = {53}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences}, publisher = {Western Periodicals Co.}, address = {North Hollywood, Calif.}, doi = {10125/64331}, pages = {4797 -- 4805}, year = {2020}, abstract = {In the time of digitalization the demand for organizational change is rising and demands ways to cope with fundamental changes on the organizational as well as individual level. As a basis, learning and forgetting mechanisms need to be understood in order to guide a change process efficiently and successfully. Our research aims to get a better understanding of individual differences and mechanisms in the change context by performing an experiment where individuals learn and later re-learn a complex production process using a simulation setting. The individual's performance, as well as retentivity and prior knowledge is assessed. Our results show that higher retentivity goes along with better learning and forgetting performances. Prior knowledge did not reveal such relation to the learning and forgetting performances. The influence of age and gender is discussed in detail.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Mueller2020, author = {M{\"u}ller, Jirka}, title = {Untersuchungen zum flow-Erleben bei Experimenten als physikalische Lerngelegenheit}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-48287}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-482879}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {150}, year = {2020}, abstract = {In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird untersucht, in wie weit physikalische Experimente ein flow-Erleben bei Lernenden hervorrufen. Flow-Erleben wird als Motivationsursache gesehen und soll den Weg zu Freude und Gl{\"u}ck darstellen. Insbesondere wegen dem oft zitierten Fachkr{\"a}ftemangel in naturwissenschaftlichen und technischen Berufen ist eine Motivationssteigerung in naturwissenschaftlichen Unterrichtsf{\"a}chern wichtig. Denn trotz Leistungssteigerungen in internationalen Vergleichstests m{\"o}chten in Deutschland deutlich weniger Sch{\"u}ler*innen einen solchen Beruf ergreifen als in anderen Industriestaaten. Daher gilt es, m{\"o}glichst fr{\"u}h Sch{\"u}ler*innen f{\"u}r naturwissenschaftlich-technische F{\"a}cher zu begeistern und insbesondere im regelrecht verhassten Physikunterricht flow-Erleben zu erzeugen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird das flow-Erleben von Studierenden in klassischen Laborexperimenten und FELS (Forschend-Entdeckendes Lernen mit dem Smartphone) als Lernumgebung untersucht. FELS ist eine an die Lebenswelt der Sch{\"u}ler*innen angepasste Lernumgebung, in der sie mit Smartphones ihre eigene Lebenswelt experimentell untersuchen. Es zeigt sich, dass sowohl klassische Laborexperimente als auch in der Lebenswelt durchgef{\"u}hrte, smartphonebasierte Experimente flow-Erleben erzeugen. Allerdings verursachen die smartphonebasierten Experimente kaum Stressgef{\"u}hle. Die in dieser Arbeit herausgefundenen Ergebnisse liefern einen ersten Ansatz, der durch Folgestudien erweitert werden sollte.}, language = {de} } @techreport{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas}, title = {Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {20}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-47550}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).}, language = {en} } @techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana}, title = {Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion - An experiment}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {19}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-47388}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885}, pages = {55}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms' communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelGuethHertwigetal.2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph and Orland, Andreas}, title = {Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {17}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-44446}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444463}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people's payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person's payoff, an individual's envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people's payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13\% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant's payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.}, language = {en} }