350 Öffentliche Verwaltung, Militärwissenschaft
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Lately, first implementation approaches of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies penetrate industrial value-adding processes. Within this, the competence requirements for employees are changing. Employees’ organization, process, and interaction competences are of crucial importance in this new IoT environment, however, in students and vocational training not sufficiently considered yet. On the other hand, conventional learning factories evolve and transform to digital learning factories. Nevertheless, the integration of IoT technology and its usage for training in digital learning factories has been largely neglected thus far. Existing learning factories do not explicitly and properly consider IoT technology, which leads to deficiencies regarding an appropriate development of employees’ Industrial IoT competences. The goal of this contribution is to point out a didactic concept that enables development and training of these new demanded competences by using an IoT laboratory. For this purpose, a design science approach is applied. The result of this contribution is a didactic concept for the development of Industrial IoT competences in an IoT laboratory.
The background of civil service reform in Indonesia reveals the emergence of the reformation movement in 1998, following the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime. The reformation movement has seen the introduction of reforms in Indonesia's various governmental institutions, including the civil service. The civil service reforms were marked by the revision of Act 8/ 74 with Act 43 of 1999 on Civil Service Administration. The implementation of the civil service reform program, which was carried out by both central and local governments, required cooperation between the actors (in particular, Ministries, agencies and local governments), known as coordination.
Currently, the coordination that occurs between actors tends to be rigid and hierarchical. As a result, targets are not efficiently and effectively met. Hierarchical coordination, without a strong public sector infrastructure, tends to have a negative impact on achieving the desired outcomes of the civil service reform program. As an intrinsic part of the New Order regime, hierarchical coordination resulted in inefficiency and lack of efficacy. Despite these inefficiencies, the administration and the political environment have changed significantly as a result of the reform process.
Obvious examples of the reforms are changes in recruitment patterns, placement and remuneration policies. However, in the case of Indonesia, it appears that every state institution has its own policy. Thus, it appears that there has not been policy coherence in the civil service reform program, resulting in the lack of a sustainable program. The important thing to examine is how the coordination mechanisms of the civil service reform program in the central government have developed during the reform era in Indonesia
The purpose of this study is to analyse the linkages between coordination mechanisms and the actual implementation of civil service reform programs. This is undertaken as a basis for intervention based on the structures and patterns of coordination mechanisms in the implementation of civil service reform programs. The next step is to formulate the development coordination mechanisms, particularly to create structures and patterns of civil service reforms which are more sustainable to the specific characteristics of public sector organisations in Indonesia.
The benefits of this research are a stronger understanding of the linkages between the mechanisms of coordination and implementation of civil service reform programs. Through this analysis, the findings can then be applied as a basic consideration in planning a sustainable civil service reform program. In the basis of theoretical issues concerning the linkages between coordination mechanisms and implementation of civil service reform program sustainability, this book explores the type of coordination, which is needed to test the proportional and sustainable concept of the intended civil service reform program in Indonesia.
Research conducted through studies, surveys and donors has shown that poor coordination is the major hindrance to the civil service program reform in Indonesia. This research employs a qualitative approach. In this study, the coordination mechanisms and implementations of civil service reform programs are demonstrated by means of case studies of the State Ministry for Administrative Reform, the National Civil Service Agency and the National Public Administration Institute. The coordination mechanisms in these Ministries and agencies were analysed using indicators of effective and efficient coordination. The analysis of the coordination mechanisms shows a tendency towards rigid hierarchical coordination. This raises concerns about fragmentation among departments and agencies at the central government level and calls for integrated civil service reform both at central and local governmental levels. In the context of implementation programs, a hierarchical mechanism of coordination leverages on various aspects, such as the program formulation, implementation flow of the program, the impact of policies, and achievement targets. In particular, there was a shift process of the mainstream civil service reform in the Ministries and agencies which are marked by the emergence of sectoral interest and inefficiencies in the civil service reform program. The primary result of successful civil service reform is increased professionalism in the civil service.
The findings on hierarchical mechanisms and the prescriptions which will follow show that the professionalism of Indonesia’s civil service is at stake. The implementation of the program through coordination mechanisms in Ministries and agencies is measured in various dimensions: the centre of coordination, integration of coordination, sustainability of coordination and multidimensionality of coordination.
The results of this analysis show that coordination mechanisms and the implementation of civil service reform are more successful when they are integration rather than hierarchical mechanisms. For a successful implementation of the reform program, it is crucial to intervene and change the type of coordination at the central government through the integration approach (hierarchy, market, and network). Furthermore, in order to move towards the integration type mechanism of coordination the separation of the administration and politics in the practice of good governance needs to be carried out immediately and simultaneously. Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that the integration type mechanism of coordination is a suitable for Indonesia for a sustainable civil service reform program. Finally, to achieve coherent civil service reforms, national policies developed according to the central government's priorities are indispensable, establishing a coordination mechanism that can be adhered to throughout all reform sectors.
Local Government in Germany
(2016)
Governments at central and sub-national levels are increasingly pursuing participatory mechanisms in a bid to improve governance and service delivery. This has been largely in the context of decentralization reforms in which central governments transfer (share) political, administrative, fiscal and economic powers and functions to sub-national units. Despite the great international support and advocacy for participatory governance where citizen’s voice plays a key role in decision making of decentralized service delivery, there is a notable dearth of empirical evidence as to the effect of such participation. This is the question this study sought to answer based on a case study of direct citizen participation in Local Authorities (LAs) in Kenya. This is as formally provided for by the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) framework that was established to ensure citizens play a central role in planning and budgeting, implementation and monitoring of locally identified services towards improving livelihoods and reducing poverty. Influence of participation was assessed in terms of how it affected five key determinants of effective service delivery namely: efficient allocation of resources; equity in service delivery; accountability and reduction of corruption; quality of services; and, cost recovery. It finds that the participation of citizens is minimal and the resulting influence on the decentralized service delivery negligible. It concludes that despite the dismal performance of citizen participation, LASDAP has played a key role towards institutionalizing citizen participation that future structures will build on. It recommends that an effective framework of citizen participation should be one that is not directly linked to politicians; one that is founded on a legal framework and where citizens have a legal recourse opportunity; and, one that obliges LA officials both to implement what citizen’s proposals which meet the set criteria as well as to account for their actions in the management of public resources.
The dissertation examines the use of performance information by public managers. “Use” is conceptualized as purposeful utilization in order to steer, learn, and improve public services. The main research question is: Why do public managers use performance information? To answer this question, I systematically review the existing literature, identify research gaps and introduce the approach of my dissertation. The first part deals with manager-related variables that might affect performance information use but which have thus far been disregarded. The second part models performance data use by applying a theory from social psychology which is based on the assumption that this management behavior is conscious and reasoned. The third part examines the extent to which explanations of performance information use vary if we include others sources of “unsystematic” feedback in our analysis. The empirical results are based on survey data from 2011. I surveyed middle managers from eight selected divisions of all German cities with county status (n=954). To analyze the data, I used factor analysis, multiple regression analysis, and structural equation modeling. My research resulted in four major findings: 1) The use of performance information can be modeled as a reasoned behavior which is determined by the attitude of the managers and of their immediate peers. 2) Regular users of performance data surprisingly are not generally inclined to analyze abstract data but rather prefer gathering information through personal interaction. 3) Managers who take on ownership of performance information at an early stage in the measurement process are also more likely to use this data when it is reported to them. 4) Performance reports are only one source of information among many. Public managers prefer verbal feedback from insiders and feedback from external stakeholders over systematic performance reports. The dissertation explains these findings using a deductive approach and discusses their implications for theory and practice.
Switches between political and administrative positions seem to be quite common in today’s politics, or at least not so unusual any longer. Nevertheless, up-to-date empirical studies on this issue are lacking. This paper investigates the presumption, that in recent years top bureaucrats have become more politicised, while at the same time more politicians stem from a bureaucratic background, by looking at the career paths of both. For this purpose, we present new empirical evidence on career patterns of top bureaucrats and executive politicians both at Federal and at Länder level. The data was collected from authorized biographies published at the websites of the Federal and Länder ministries for all Ministers, Parliamentary State Secretaries and Administrative State Secretaries who held office in June 2009.
Whether the results of fiscal transfers have positive or negative implications depends upon the incentives that transfer systems create for both central and local governments. The complexity and ambiguity of the relationship between fiscal transfers and tax revenues of local governments is one of the main causes why research projects, even in the same country, come to different results. This investigation is seriously questioning the often stated substitution effect based only on an analysis of aggregated data and finally rejects in the qualitative part of this research (using survey techniques) a substitution effect in the majority of the assessed municipalities. While most theories are modeling governments as tax-maximizers (Leviathan) or as being prone to fiscal laziness, this investigation shows that mayors react to a whole set of incentives. Most mayors react rational and rather pragmatically in respect to the incentives and constraints which are established by the particular context of a municipality, the central government and their own personality/identity/interests. While the yield on property tax in Peru is low, there are no signs that increases in transfers have had, on average, a negative impact on their revenue generation. On an individual basis there exist mayors who are revenue maximizers, others who are substituting revenues and others who show apathy. Many engage in property tax. While rural or small municipalities have limited potential, property taxes are the main revenue sources for the Peruvian urban municipalities, rising on average 10% during the last five years. The property tax in Peru accounts for less than 0.2% of GDP, which compared to the Latin American average, is extremely low. In 2002, property tax was collecting nationwide about 10% of the overall budget of local governments. In 2006, the share was closer to 6% due to windfall transfers. The property tax can enhance accountability at the local level and has important impacts on urban spatial development. It is also important considering that most charges or transfers are earmarked such that property tax yields can cover discretionary finances. The intergovernmental fiscal transfers can be described as a patchwork of political liabilities of the past rather than connected with thorough compensation or service improvement functions. The fiscal base of local governments in Peru remains small for the municipalities and the incentive structure to enhance property tax revenues is far from optimal. The central government and sector institutions, which are in the Peruvian institutional design of the property tax responsible for the enablement environment, can reinforce local tax efforts. In the past the central government permanently changed the rules of the game, giving municipalities reduced predictability of policy choices. There are no relevant signs that a stronger property tax is captured by Peruvian interest groups. Since the central government has responsibility for tax regulation and partly valuation there has been little debate about financial issues on the local political agenda. Most council members are therefore not familiar with tax issues. If the central government did not set the tax rate and valuation then there would probably be a more vigorous public debate and an electorate that was better informed about local politics. Elected mayors (as political and administrative leaders) are not counterbalanced and held in check by an active council and/or by vigorous local political parties. Local politics are concentrated on the mayor, electoral rules, the institutional design and political culture – all of which are not helpful in increasing the degree of influence that citizens and associations have upon collective decision-making at the local level. The many alternations between democracy and autocracy have not been helpful in building strong institutions at the local level. Property tax revenues react slowly and the institutional context matters because an effective tax system as a public good can only be created if actors have long time horizons. The property tax has a substantial revenue potential, however, since municipalities are going through a transfer bonanza, it is especially difficult to make a plea for increasing their own revenue base. Local governments should be the proponents of property tax reform, but they have, in Peru, little policy clout because the municipal associations are dispersed and there exists little relevant information concerning important local policy issues.