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Stadtstruktur und Umwelt
(2011)
Staatliche Belastungen von Nutzfahrzeugen in Europa im Lichte der ökologischen Zielkonformität
(2006)
Inhalt: Abgaben auf Nutzfahrzeuge in Europa -Abgaben auf den Erwerb und das Inverkehrbringen: Zulassungssteuer, Zulassungsgebühren -Abgaben auf den Besitz: Kraftfahrzeugsteuer, Versicherungssteuer -Abgaben auf die Nutzung: Mineralölsteuer, Straßenbenutzungsabgaben -Gesamtabgaben im europäischen Vergleich Anforderungen an ökologisch motivierte Abgaben im Verkehrssektor -Die Sonderstellung des Verkehrssektors: Verkehrsinfrastruktur als öffentliches Gut, Bereitstellung von Straßeninfrastruktur als natürliches Monopol, das Phänomen externer Effekte -Kosten und Externalitäten im Verkehrssektor: Infrastrukturkosten, Umweltkosten, Unfallkosten, Staukosten -Die Pigou-Steuer als "first best" Lösung -Anwendbarkeit der Pigou-Steuer im Straßengüterverkehr: Abgabenerhebung auf Grenzkostenbasis – pro und contra, Messbarkeit externer Effekte, Ausgestaltung einer Abgabe auf Grenzkostenbasis -Rechtlicher europäischer Rahmen: die Eurovignettenrichtlinie, Vorschlag zur Änderung der Eurovignettenrichtlinie, Bewertung der Eurovignettenrichtlinie und des Änderungsvorschlags Die ökologische Zielkonformität der bestehenden Abgabensysteme -Zulassungsabgaben -Kfz-Steuer: die österreichische Kraftfahrzeugsteuer, die Motorfahrzeugsteuern in der Schweiz, die deutsche Kfz-Steuer -Mineralölsteuer -Straßenbenutzungsabgaben: die Lkw Maut in Österreich, die leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe in der Schweiz, die deutsche Lkw Maut, Vergleich der entfernungsabhängigen Straßenbenutzungsabgaben
Usually, in monocentric city models, the spatial patterns of segregated ethnic groups are assumed to be ring-shaped, whereas in the 1930ies Hoyt showed that empirically wedge-shaped areas predominate. In contrast to Rose-Ackerman.s discussion of the in.uence within a ring-shaped pattern which the aversion which different households in the context of racism have, Yinger showed that, depending on the population mix, a wedge-shaped pattern may arise if it is border length which causes the spatial pattern. In this contribution, a simulation based on a monocentric city model with two or more different household groups is used to derive spatial patterns. Wedge-shaped segregation is shown to be the result of positive externalities among similar households. Differences between households only lead to ring-shaped patterns if the e¤ect of a city center on spatial structure dominates neighborhood e¤ects. If more than two groups of households are being considered, mixed patterns of concentric and wedge-shaped areas arise.
In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyze the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this framework the large country benefits from free trade and the small country may be hurt by opening to trade. This finding is contrary to the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan and Thisse (2002), who use related models to analyze size effects in international trade, where the small country usually gains from trade and the large country may lose.
Revisiting public investment
(2004)
The consumption equivalence method is the theoretical basis of public cost-benefit analysis. Consumption equivalence public capital prices are explicitly introduces in order to sufficiently care for the opportunity cost of public expenditure. This can solve the dispute about the social rate of discount within public cost-benefit analysis witch was generated on a criterion looking similar to the capital value formula, known as Lind’s approach. The social rate of discount is liberated from opportunity costs considerations and the discounting away of the effects for future welfare vanishes. The corresponding question whether one should accept a positive value of the pure rate of social time preference is an old issue. Its current state between the prescriptive and descriptive view can also be interpreted as a consequence of the oversimplification of standard cost– benefit analysis. But apart from an economic self-process the pure rate of social time preference is also defined as a business-as-usual value of social distance discounting. Hence, a political choice has to be made about this rate which is free in principal.
Looking at smoking-behavior it can be shown that there are differences concerning the time-preference-rate. Therefore this has an effect on the optimal schooling decision in the way that we appear a lower average human capital level for smokers. According to a higher time-preference-rate additionally we suppose a higher return to education for smokers who go further on education. With our empirical findings we can confirm the presumptions. We use interactions-terms to regress the average rate of return with IV. Therefore we obtain that smokers have a significantly higher average return to education than non-smokers.
Inhalt 1 Ausgangslage 2 Regional- und industriepolitische Maßnahmen 2.1 Begriffliche Vorbemerkungen 2.2 Wichtige Maßnahmenbereiche 2.3 Brutto- und Nettotransfers 3 Auswirkungen 4 Regional- und industriepolitische Reformalternativen 4.1 Fortführung der Solidarpakts 4.2 Sonderwirtschaftszone Ost 4.3 Förderung der Infrastruktur 5 Fazit
We examine the effects of regionalising the budget of unemployment insurance (UI) on wages, employment, and on UI parameters, which, for their part, determine the agents’ preferences concerning such a reform. A numerical example shows that, under reasonable assumptions, the intuition that the reform would enhance efficiency and improve the economic situation of agents from the low- unemployment region to the disadvantage of agents from the high- unemployment region is not valid in general.