Das Suchergebnis hat sich seit Ihrer Suchanfrage verändert. Eventuell werden Dokumente in anderer Reihenfolge angezeigt.
  • Treffer 100 von 130
Zurück zur Trefferliste

Measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes

  • Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the purposeful behavior of other players in an interactive decision situation. Our paper develops a new method for measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes and distinguishing them from risk and ambiguity attitudes. We vary the source of uncertainty (whether strategic or not) across conditions in a ceteris paribus manner. We elicit certainty equivalents of participating in two strategic 2x2 games (a stag-hunt and a market-entry game) as well as certainty equivalents of related lotteries that yield the same possible payoffs with exogenously given probabilities (risk) and lotteries with unknown probabilities (ambiguity). We provide a structural model of uncertainty attitudes that allows us to measure a preference for or an aversion against the source of uncertainty, as well as optimism or pessimism regarding the desired outcome. We document systematic attitudes towards strategic uncertainty that vary across contexts. Under strategic complementarityStrategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the purposeful behavior of other players in an interactive decision situation. Our paper develops a new method for measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes and distinguishing them from risk and ambiguity attitudes. We vary the source of uncertainty (whether strategic or not) across conditions in a ceteris paribus manner. We elicit certainty equivalents of participating in two strategic 2x2 games (a stag-hunt and a market-entry game) as well as certainty equivalents of related lotteries that yield the same possible payoffs with exogenously given probabilities (risk) and lotteries with unknown probabilities (ambiguity). We provide a structural model of uncertainty attitudes that allows us to measure a preference for or an aversion against the source of uncertainty, as well as optimism or pessimism regarding the desired outcome. We document systematic attitudes towards strategic uncertainty that vary across contexts. Under strategic complementarity [substitutability], the majority of participants tend to be pessimistic [optimistic] regarding the desired outcome. However, preferences for the source of uncertainty are distributed around zero.zeige mehrzeige weniger

Volltext Dateien herunterladen

  • cepa54.pdfeng
    (952KB)

    SHA-512:cb01d8d534c30972350868ee3651fe39ff0336d022d66b7e796030e464226bd25cab1a8afe7e2318f6e6f62480c40edebc044e6670d5cdf72050b74a99141e2d

Metadaten exportieren

Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:Lisa Verena BruttelORCiDGND, Muhammed BulutayORCiD, Camille CornandORCiD, Frank HeinemannORCiDGND, Adam ZylbersztejnORCiD
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562340
DOI:https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-56234
ISSN:2628-653X
Titel des übergeordneten Werks (Englisch):CEPA Discussion Papers
Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer):CEPA Discussion Papers (54)
Publikationstyp:Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Datum der Erstveröffentlichung:07.10.2022
Erscheinungsjahr:2022
Veröffentlichende Institution:Universität Potsdam
Datum der Freischaltung:07.10.2022
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:ambiguity attitudes; market-entry game; risk attitudes; stag-hunt game; strategic-uncertainty attitudes
Ausgabe:54
Seitenanzahl:40
RVK - Regensburger Verbundklassifikation:QH 435, QC 020, QC 010
Organisationseinheiten:Extern / Extern
Zentrale und wissenschaftliche Einrichtungen / Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA)
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Fachgruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre
DDC-Klassifikation:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
JEL-Klassifikation:C Mathematical and Quantitative Methods / C7 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory / C72 Noncooperative Games
C Mathematical and Quantitative Methods / C9 Design of Experiments / C91 Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C Mathematical and Quantitative Methods / C9 Design of Experiments / C92 Laboratory, Group Behavior
D Microeconomics / D8 Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty / D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Peer Review:Nicht referiert
Lizenz (Deutsch):License LogoKeine öffentliche Lizenz: Unter Urheberrechtsschutz
Verstanden ✔
Diese Webseite verwendet technisch erforderliche Session-Cookies. Durch die weitere Nutzung der Webseite stimmen Sie diesem zu. Unsere Datenschutzerklärung finden Sie hier.