Influence in the face of impunity
- We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the rejection option. This threat psychologically influences proposers. Some proposers avoid rejection by offering nothing. Others raise offers, but only when they receive feedback from responders. Responders lose this influence in the absence of feedback. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Author details: | Alexander KritikosORCiDGND, Jonathan H. W. Tan |
|---|---|
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.020 |
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
| ISSN: | 1873-7374 |
| Title of parent work (English): | Economics letters |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| Place of publishing: | Lausanne |
| Publication type: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Year of first publication: | 2016 |
| Publication year: | 2016 |
| Release date: | 2020/03/22 |
| Tag: | Dictator; Experiment; Guilt; Impunity; Psychological influence |
| Volume: | 141 |
| Number of pages: | 3 |
| First page: | 119 |
| Last Page: | 121 |
| Funding institution: | DFG [BO-747/8-1] |
| Organizational units: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| Peer review: | Referiert |
