Das Medea-Prinzip : vom Problem der Akrasia zu einer Theorie des Un-Vermoegens
- The topic of this essay is akrasia in its most paradoxical kind, as it appears to us in the emblem of Medea. The argument starts with the claim that the problem with akrasia is especially a problem of rational potentiality: to understand it philosophically, we are forced to embrace the idea that its possibility is immanent to the rational capacity of action. By discussing elements of Plato's, Aristotle's, and Davidson's explanations of practical irrationality, the argument proceeds to demonstrate that the reasons a practical capacity provides exist as "forces", that rational forces are structurally in excess with respect to their normative statuses, and that Medea is the mythical figure par excellence of such an immanent excess of rational agency. On account of these insights, we can begin to understand that akrasia is not only a kind of failure, or incapacity, but entails the very possibility of a "metamorphosis" of the subject.
