Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?
- In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.
Metadaten| Verfasserangaben: | Stefanie Grüne |
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| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2011.595196 |
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| ISSN: | 0967-2559 |
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| Titel des übergeordneten Werks (Englisch): | International journal of philosophical studies |
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| Verlag: | Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |
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| Verlagsort: | Abingdon |
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| Publikationstyp: | Wissenschaftlicher Artikel |
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| Sprache: | Englisch |
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| Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung: | 2011 |
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| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2011 |
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| Datum der Freischaltung: | 26.03.2017 |
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| Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | Kant; concepts; intuition; non-conceptualism; synthesis |
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| Band: | 19 |
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| Ausgabe: | 3 |
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| Seitenanzahl: | 26 |
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| Erste Seite: | 465 |
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| Letzte Seite: | 490 |
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| Organisationseinheiten: | Philosophische Fakultät |
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| Peer Review: | Referiert |
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