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German-Polish border region
(2017)
To ensure political survival, autocrats must prevent popular rebellion, and political repression is a means to that end. However, autocrats face threats from both the inside and the outside of the center of power. They must avoid popular rebellion and at the same time share power with strategic actors who enjoy incentive to challenge established power-sharing arrangements whenever repression is ordered. Can autocrats turn repression in a way that allows trading one threat off against the other? This chapter first argues that prior research offers scant insight on that question because it relies on umbrella concepts and questionable measurements of repression. Next, the chapter disaggregates repression into restrictions and violence and reflects on their drawbacks. Citizens adapt to the restriction of political civil liberties, and violence backfires against its originators. Hence, restrictions require enforcement, and violence requires moderation. When interpreted as complements, it becomes clear that restrictions and violence have the potential to compensate for their respective weaknesses. The complementarity between violence and restrictions turns political repression into a valuable addition to the authoritarian toolkit. The chapter concludes with an application of these ideas to the twin problems of authoritarian control and power-sharing.
Conclusion
(2020)
Does political repression work for authoritarian rule? On the one hand, repression is a hallmark of authoritarian governance. It denotes any action governments take to increase the costs of collective action. Autocrats consciously apply repression to curb popular opposition within their territorial jurisdiction. They repress in order to protect their policies, personnel, or other interests against challenges from below. Repression is, thus, a means to the end of political survival in non-democratic contexts. A useful means lives up to its promises. Does repression do that? This project started on the suspicion that we do not yet know the answer. This concluding chapter recalls the key theoretical ideas developed along the way, highlights the main findings of the book, and concludes with opportunities for future research.
Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) offers flexible and decarbonised power generation and is one of the few switchable renewable technologies that can generate renewable power on demand. Today (2018), CSP only contributes 5 TWh to European electricity generation but has the potential to become an important generation asset for decarbonising the electricity sector within Europe as well as globally. This chapter examines how factors and key political decisions lead to different futures and the associated CSP use in Europe in the years up to 2050. In a second step, we characterise the scenarios with the associated system costs and the costs of the support policy. We show that the role of CSP in Europe depends crucially on political decisions and the success or failure of policies outside of renewable energies. In particular, the introduction of CSP depends on the general ambitions for decarbonisation, the level of cross-border trade in electricity from renewable sources and is made possible by the existence of a strong grid connection between the southern and northern European Member States and by future growth in electricity demand. The presence of other baseload technologies, particularly nuclear energy in France, diminishes the role and need for CSP. Assuming a favourable technological development, we find a strong role for CSP in Europe in all modelled scenarios: Contribution of 100 TWh to 300 TWh of electricity to a future European electricity system. The current European CSP fleet would have to be increased by a factor of 20 to 60 over the next 30 years. To achieve this, stable financial support for CSP would be required. Depending on framework conditions and assumptions, the amount of support ranges at the EU level from € 0.4 to 2 billion per year, which represents only a small proportion of the total support requirement for the energy system transformation. Cooperation between the Member States could further help reduce these costs.
Das Verhältnis von Gemeinwohl und Gleichheit ist kein spannungsfreies. Soziale Gleichheit ist ein Grundwert liberal-demokratischer Gemeinwesen. Um diese Gleichheit zu bewahren, entwickelten sich im 20. Jahrhundert Konzeptionen von Gemeinwohl, die versuchten, das Gemeinwohl eher prozedural und pluralistisch zu verstehen. Eine zu spezifische, vorher festgelegte Definition des Gemeinwohls sei letzten Endes undemokratisch und ideologisch und somit der sozialen Gleichheit abträglich. In den letzten Jahren haben sich unter dem Oberbegriff des sozialen Egalitarismus jedoch auch die Vorstellungen der sozialen Gleichheit verändert, hin zu einem substanzielleren Verständnis, was die Frage aufwirft, ob prozedurale Gemeinwohlverständnisse ihrer Rolle als Wächter der Gleichheit immer noch gerecht werden können.
Vorwort
(2023)
Region ohne Richtung
(2023)
Welche Auswirkungen wird die aufziehende Großmächtekonkurrenz also auf die regionale Sicherheitsordnung haben? Der Beitrag nähert sich dieser Frage über die regionalen Bedingungsfaktoren, die den Rahmen für jegliche Ingerenz extraregionaler Mächte bilden: Die regionalen Sicherheitskomplexe in Lateinamerika und der Karibik, einschließlich der Regionalorganisationen und Regionalmächte, sowie der Einflusssphären und Anreizsysteme der Großmächte. Am Ende wagt der Beitrag einen Ausblick auf die Entwicklung der lateinamerikanischen Sicherheitspolitik im Angesicht der Geopolitik der Großmächte. Die hier vorgestellte Kernthese wagt ein strukturelles und deshalb wenig alarmistisches Argument: Die Großmächtekonkurrenz wird die bestehende Fragmentierung der regionalen Sicherheitsordnung weiter vertiefen, doch wird die Region gleichzeitig nicht substanziell an Agency gegenüber den Großmächten verlieren. Der Schlüssel hierzu ist die außenpolitische Maxime der „gebundenen Äquidistanz“, die Dependenzen diversifiziert und damit nicht als Widerspruch, sondern als Positivsummenspiel versteht.
In die Ecke Besen, Besen ...
(2017)