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In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores ‘semi-parliamentary government’ as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.
The authors argue that the public opinion and the discourse of political elites differ significantly within the Franco-German debate on the Constitutional Treaty of the EU. Moreover, the article shows that the discussion reflects different conceptions of European politics. These differences lead to the claim that the co-operation and the leading role of Germany and France in the EU have to be re-defined. This has to occur in the context of a politicisation of European politics, which is crucial for the future of the enlarged European Union.
German international legal scholarship has been known for its practice-oriented, doctrinal approach to international law. On the basis of archival material, this article tracks how this methodological take on international law developed in Germany between the 1920s and the 1980s. In 1924, as a reaction to the establishment of judicial institutions in the Treaty of Versailles, the German Reich founded the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. Director Viktor Bruns institutionalized the practice-oriented method to advance the idea of international law as a legal order as well as to safeguard the interests of the Weimar government before the various courts. Under National Socialism, members of the Institute provided legal justifications for Hitler’s increasingly radical foreign policy. At the same time, some of them did not engage with völkisch-racist theories, but systematized the existing ius in bello. After 1945, Hermann Mosler, as director of the renamed Max Planck Institute, took the view that the practice-oriented approach was not as discredited as the more theoretical approach of völkisch international law. Furthermore, he regarded the method as a promising vehicle to support the policy of Westintegration of Konrad Adenauer. Also, he tried to promote the idea of ‘international society as a legal community’ by analysing international practice.
Die deutschen Interessen werden in Berlin definiert, nicht in Washington oder Paris. Darin waren sich Angela Merkel und ihr Vorgänger schon 2003 einig. Und sie werden im Kanzleramt festgelegt, nicht auf Oppositionsbänken, in Thinktanks oder gar Talkshows. Da helfen auch mediale Empörungsinszenierungen nicht. Isolierungsängste belasten nur kleine Staaten. Die Zeiten kleiner Politik sind allerdings vorbei.
Mit diesem Heft wird die Diskussion über eine neue deutsche Ostpolitik fortgesetzt und abgeschlossen. Diese hatte im Heft Nr. 49 mit Thesen von Jochen Franzke begonnen, im nächsten Heft wurden erste Beiträge publiziert. Insgesamt haben sich Wissenschaftler und Politiker aus Deutschland, Österreich, Polen, Finnland und Tschechien beteiligt. Die Debatte schließt mit Schlussbemerkungen des Initiators. Ulrich Best, Katrin Böttger, Vladimir Handl, Heinz Timmermann, Christian Wipperfürth, Sabina Wölkner, Gesine Schwan, Dieter Segert, Beata Wilga, Markus Löning und Ole Diehl, Angelica Schwall-Düren, Wolfgang Gehrcke und Jochen Franzke
Berlin : look to the world!
(2004)
In the spring 2004 issue of WeltTrends, Professor Gunther Hellmann made a „plea for offensive idealism“ and „against the power political resocialization of German foreign policy“. To a long-time outside observer of that foreign policy, this plea is unsurprising, but depressing. In keeping with Professor Hellmann’s own willingness, „notwendige Differenzierungen [zu] vernachlässigen zugunsten einer bewussten Zuspitzung“ I will comment on the aspects of his argument that strike an American colleague as particularly disturbing.
Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Menschenrechtsausschusses der Vereinten Nationen im Jahre 2014
(2015)
This article deals with the explanation of failed democratisation as caused by political culture. Against the background of the Belarus’ autocracy, the author questions that political culture can be considered a reason for failed democratisation. The Belarus’ paternalistic political culture does not essentially differ from that of successfully democratising neighbouring states. A weak national conscience is the only specific characteristic of the Belarus autocracy, but it lacks a convincing theoretical link with democratisation. Nevertheless, in paternalistic political cultures, successful democratisation seems to need more incentives for people, due to higher adaptation costs.