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This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.
This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.
This paper compares police reforms during democratization in Poland, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It analyses the changes to the structure of the democratic control of the police in each reform, paying special attention to the decentralization versus centralization aspect of it. The research question of this paper is: Why are some states decentralizing the democratic control of the police, while others are centralizing it, both with the aim of democratization? The theoretical background of this study are theories about policy diffusion and policy transfer. Therefore this study can be categorized as part of two different research areas. On the one hand, it is a paper from the discipline of International Relations. On the other hand, it is a paper from the discipline of Comparative Politics. The combined attention to international and national factors influencing police reform is reflected by the structure of this paper. Chapter 3 examines police structures and police reforms in established democracies as possible role models for new democracies. Chapter 4 looks at international and transnational actors that actively try to influence police reform. After having examined these external factors, three cases of police reform in new democracies are examined in chapter 5.
The intention of this master-thesis is a critical assessment of the European Union´s (EU) approach to external democracy promotion in Morocco. The study follows a comparative approach and compares the approach pursued by the EU within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), incepted in 2004, with the approach that it had developed up until then under the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The comparison is done with the intention to analyse, to what degree it is justified to speak of a new impetus for democratisation through the ENP in partner countries. The analysis takes into consideration the range of possible instruments for external democracy promotion in the categories „diplomacy“, „conditionality“ and „positive instruments“. For the comparison of democracy promotion under the EMP and the ENP it is suggested to compare the implemented measures in respect to three distinct dimensions: As a first dimension, instruments of democracy promotion are analysed with respect to the focus on indirect vs. direct instruments, e.g. those which aim at establishing socio-economic preconditions favourable to successful democratisation, vs. those which immediately intervene in the processes of political reform. As a second dimension, it is asked whether there has been a shift in the democracy promotion approach on a continuum between consensual cooptation and coercive intervention. As a third dimension, finally, it is analysed whether the approach has undergone a general intensification of efforts, e.g. whether the approach to democracy promotion has become a more active one. The analysis in this master-thesis comes to the conclusion that since the inception of the ENP the EU is indeed pursuing a slightly more direct and certainly a more active approach to democracy promotion in Morocco, while no significant change can be observed in comparison to the strictly partnership-oriented and consensual approach of the EMP. It can be argued that, under the ENP, relations to Morocco have indeed become somewhat more “political”, although at the same time they are still not pro-actively oriented at a political liberalisation of the political regime. Reforms promoted by the EU in Morocco are modest and largely in line with the reform agenda of the Morrocan government itself – e.g. a still largely authoritarian monarchy. Concrete reform steps directed at an opening of the political space, which is largely reserved to the king and its administration, are neither demanded nor supported by democracy promotion instruments, also under the ENP.
International organizations (IOs) experience significant variation in their decision-making performance, or the extent to which they produce policy output. While some IOs are efficient decision-making machineries, others are plagued by deadlock. How can such variation be explained? Examining this question, the article makes three central contributions. First, we approach performance by looking at IO decision-making in terms of policy output and introduce an original measure of decision-making performance that captures annual growth rates in IO output. Second, we offer a novel theoretical explanation for decision-making performance. This account highlights the role of institutional design, pointing to how majoritarian decision rules, delegation of authority to supranational institutions, and access for transnational actors (TNAs) interact to affect decision-making. Third, we offer the first comparative assessment of the decision-making performance of IOs. While previous literature addresses single IOs, we explore decision-making across a broad spectrum of 30 IOs from 1980 to 2011. Our analysis indicates that IO decision-making performance varies across and within IOs. We find broad support for our theoretical account, showing the combined effect of institutional design features in shaping decision-making performance. Notably, TNA access has a positive effect on decision-making performance when pooling is greater, and delegation has a positive effect when TNA access is higher. We also find that pooling has an independent, positive effect on decision-making performance. All-in-all, these findings suggest that the institutional design of IOs matters for their decision-making performance, primarily in more complex ways than expected in earlier research.
Emmanuel Kant asked three important questions which will always be with us: What can we know? What should we do? What may we hope for? These three key existentialist questions are, of course, also relevant for a reflection on the future of Public Administration: What can we know, as researchers in the field of Public Administration, about our object of public administration? What should we do as researchers and teachers to make sure we remain part of a solution and to guarantee that we are ahead of reality and its future problems? What kind of improvement (or not) may we hope for a public sector in an increasingly complex society? This chapter tries to explore some possible answers to these three important questions for our field of Public Administration. The background is our common project about ‘European Perspectives for Public Administration’ (EPPA), which we hope to establish as a continuous dialogue and discourse in the context of European Public Administration and the ‘European Group for Public Administration’ (EGPA).
The thesis focuses on the inter-departmental coordination of adaptation and mitigation of demographic change in East Germany. All Eastern German States (Länder) have set up inter-departmental committees (IDCs) that are expected to deliver joint strategies to tackle demographic change. IDCs provide an organizational setting for potential positive coordination, i.e. a joint approach to problem solving that pools and utilizes the expertise of many departments in a constructive manner from the very beginning. Whether they actually achieve positive coordination is contested within the academic debate. This motivates the first research question of this thesis: Do IDCs achieve positive coordination?
Interdepartmental committees and their role in horizontal coordination within the core executive triggered interest among scholars already more than fifty years ago. However, we don’t know much about their actual importance for the inter-departmental preparation of cross-cutting policies. Until now, few studies can be found that analyzes inter-departmental committees in a comparative way trying to identify whether they achieve positive coordination and what factors shape the coordination process and output of IDCs.
Each IDC has a chair organization that is responsible for managing the interactions within the IDCs. The chair organization is important, because it organizes and structures the overall process of coordination in the IDC. Consequently, the chair of an IDC serves as the main boundary-spanner and therefore has remarkable influence by arranging meetings and the work schedule or by distributing internal roles. Interestingly, in the German context we find two organizational approaches: while some states decided to put a line department (e.g. Department of Infrastructure) in charge of managing the IDC, others rely on the State Chancelleries, i.e. the center of government.
This situation allows for comparative research design that can address the role of the State Chancellery in inter-departmental coordination of cross-cutting policies. This is relevant, because the role of the center is crucial when studying coordination within central government. The academic debate on the center of government in the German politico-administrative system is essentially divided into two camps. One camp claims that the center can improve horizontal coordination and steer cross-cutting policy-making more effectively, while the other camp points to limits to central coordination due to departmental autonomy. This debate motivates the second research question of this thesis: Does the State Chancellery as chair organization achieve positive coordination in IDCs?
The center of government and its role in the German politic-administrative system has attracted academic attention already in the 1960s and 1970s. There is a research desiderate regarding the center’s role during the inter-departmental coordination process. There are only few studies that explicitly analyze centers of government and their role in coordination of cross-cutting policies, although some single case studies have been published. This gap in the academic debate will be addressed by the answer to the second research question.
The dependent variable of this study is the chair organization of IDCs. The value of this variable is dichotomous: either an IDC is chaired by a Line department or by a State Chancellery. We are interested whether this variable has an effect on two dependent variables. First, we will analyze the coordination process, i.e. interaction among bureaucrats within the IDC. Second, the focus of this thesis will be on the coordination result, i.e. the demography strategies that are produced by the respective IDCs.
In terms of the methodological approach, this thesis applies a comparative case study design based on a most-similar-systems logic. The German Federalism is quite suitable for such designs. Since the institutional framework largely is the same across all states, individual variables and their effect can be isolated and plausibly analyzed. To further control for potential intervening variables, we will limit our case selection to states located in East Germany, because the demographic situation is most problematic in the Eastern part of Germany, i.e. there is a equal problem pressure. Consequently, we will analyze five cases: Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt (line department) and Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony (State Chancellery).
There is no grand coordination theory that is ready to be applied to our case studies. Therefore, we need to tailor our own approach. Our assumption is that the individual chair organization has an effect on the coordination process and output of IDCs, although all cases are embedded in the same institutional setting, i.e. the German politico-administrative system. Therefore, we need an analytical approach than incorporates institutionalist and agency-based arguments. Therefore, this thesis will utilize Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI). Broadly speaking, ACI conceptualizes actors’ behavior as influenced - but not fully determined - by institutions. Since ACI is rather abstract we need to adapt it for the purpose of this thesis. Line Departments and State Chancelleries will be modeled as distinct actors with different action orientations and capabilities to steer the coordination process. However, their action is embedded within the institutional context of governments, which we will conceptualize as being comprised of regulative (formal rules) and normative (social norms) elements.
The recent debate on administrative bodies in international organizations has brought forward multiple theoretical perspectives, analytical frameworks, and methodological approaches. Despite these efforts to advance knowledge on these actors, the research program on international public administrations (IPAs) has missed out on two important opportunities: reflection on scholarship in international relations (IR) and public administration and synergies between these disciplinary perspectives. Against this backdrop, the essay is a discussion of the literature on IPAs in IR and public administration. We found influence, authority, and autonomy of international bureaucracies have been widely addressed and helped to better understand the agency of such non-state actors in global policy-making. Less attention has been given to the crucial macro-level context of politics for administrative bodies, despite the importance in IR and public administration scholarship. We propose a focus on agency and politics as future avenues for a comprehensive, joint research agenda for international bureaucracies.
Conclusion
(2020)
Does political repression work for authoritarian rule? On the one hand, repression is a hallmark of authoritarian governance. It denotes any action governments take to increase the costs of collective action. Autocrats consciously apply repression to curb popular opposition within their territorial jurisdiction. They repress in order to protect their policies, personnel, or other interests against challenges from below. Repression is, thus, a means to the end of political survival in non-democratic contexts. A useful means lives up to its promises. Does repression do that? This project started on the suspicion that we do not yet know the answer. This concluding chapter recalls the key theoretical ideas developed along the way, highlights the main findings of the book, and concludes with opportunities for future research.
Conclusion
(2019)