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The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows developed countries to meet part of their obligational emission reductions by carrying out emission reduction projects in developing countries. China imposed a price floor to the CDM carbon credits produced in China through its price review policy. Scholars have not agreed on the purpose of China’s price review policy. With a theoretical model and a coherent empirical study, the present study shows that the price floor imposed by China’s price review is more likely to protect those domestic project owners against price discrimination, rather than to distort the CDM market. Nevertheless, China’s price review has its own flaws. Although a regression study shows month of approval, types of projects and location of project can explain 55% of price floor designation, the operation of price review remains quite random and unpredictable in individual cases. This would bring extra bureaucratically uncertainty on its way to curb market uncertainty. Its function can be fulfilled by alternative policy tools with better economic efficiency and legal legitimacy, such as mandatory price disclosure and trading forum, which doesn’t have such drawback, but still be able to alleviate possible price discrimination in individual cases.
Christoph Sebastian Widdau leistet mit seinem Buch einen innovativen Beitrag zur Cassirer-Forschung, zu den Leibniz-Studien und zur Begründung der Menschenrechte. Er wirft ein ideengeschichtlich und philosophisch neues Licht auf die 'Natur' im Naturrecht, die kulturelle Bedeutung des Individuums und den Pluralismus politischer Ordnungen. Mit 'Cassirers Leibniz' zeigt Widdau auf, dass Menschenrechte kein beliebiger Zusatz zur Kultur, sondern vielmehr kulturkonstitutiv sind.
Wissensmanagement
(2019)
A large literature exists examining the functions of legislatures and the behaviour of MPs in established democracies. But little efforts have been made to observe how MPs behave in new democratic assemblies. This article seeks to address this shortcoming through an exploration of the use of parliamentary questions in two new democracies: Kenya and Zambia. Analysing an innovative dataset we offer one of the few attempts to directly measure legislative behaviour in new democracies. We examine how the factors found in the literature on parliamentary questions in liberal democracies react to this shift of context and to what degree legislatures in these countries fulfil their core functions. Results show that opposition MPs are not necessarily among the most active but that electoral incentives such as the margin by which MPs have won their seats or the number of voters they represent explain the use and content of parliamentary questions.
The organisation of legislative chambers and the consequences of parliamentary procedures have been among the most prominent research questions in legislative studies. Even though democratic elections not only lead to the formation of a government but also result in an opposition, the literature has mostly neglected oppositions and their role in legislative chambers. This paper proposes to fill this gap by looking at the legislative organisation from the perspective of opposition players. The paper focuses on the potential influence of opposition players in the policy-making process and presents data on more than 50 legislative chambers. The paper shows considerable variance of the formal power granted to opposition players. Furthermore, the degree of institutionalisation of opposition rights is connected to electoral systems and not necessarily correlated with other institutional characteristics such as regime type or the size of legislative chambers.
The organisation of legislative chambers and the consequences of parliamentary procedures have been among the most prominent research questions in legislative studies. Even though democratic elections not only lead to the formation of a government but also result in an opposition, the literature has mostly neglected oppositions and their role in legislative chambers. This paper proposes to fill this gap by looking at the legislative organisation from the perspective of opposition players. The paper focuses on the potential influence of opposition players in the policy-making process and presents data on more than 50 legislative chambers. The paper shows considerable variance of the formal power granted to opposition players. Furthermore, the degree of institutionalisation of opposition rights is connected to electoral systems and not necessarily correlated with other institutional characteristics such as regime type or the size of legislative chambers.
Personalmanagement
(2017)
Bad governance causes economic, social, developmental and environmental problems in many developing countries. Developing countries have adopted a number of reforms that have assisted in achieving good governance. The success of governance reform depends on the starting point of each country – what institutional arrangements exist at the out-set and who the people implementing reforms within the existing institutional framework are. This dissertation focuses on how formal institutions (laws and regulations) and informal institutions (culture, habit and conception) impact on good governance. Three characteristics central to good governance - transparency, participation and accountability are studied in the research.
A number of key findings were: Good governance in Hanoi and Berlin represent the two extremes of the scale, while governance in Berlin is almost at the top of the scale, governance in Hanoi is at the bottom. Good governance in Hanoi is still far from achieved. In Berlin, information about public policies, administrative services and public finance is available, reliable and understandable. People do not encounter any problems accessing public information. In Hanoi, however, public information is not easy to access. There are big differences between Hanoi and Berlin in the three forms of participation. While voting in Hanoi to elect local deputies is formal and forced, elections in Berlin are fair and free. The candidates in local elections in Berlin come from different parties, whereas the candidacy of local deputies in Hanoi is thoroughly controlled by the Fatherland Front. Even though the turnout of voters in local deputy elections is close to 90 percent in Hanoi, the legitimacy of both the elections and the process of representation is non-existent because the local deputy candidates are decided by the Communist Party.
The involvement of people in solving local problems is encouraged by the government in Berlin. The different initiatives include citizenry budget, citizen activity, citizen initiatives, etc. Individual citizens are free to participate either individually or through an association.
Lacking transparency and participation, the quality of public service in Hanoi is poor. Citizens seldom get their services on time as required by the regulations. Citizens who want to receive public services can bribe officials directly, use the power of relationships, or pay a third person – the mediator ("Cò" - in Vietnamese).
In contrast, public service delivery in Berlin follows the customer-orientated principle. The quality of service is high in relation to time and cost. Paying speed money, bribery and using relationships to gain preferential public service do not exist in Berlin.
Using the examples of Berlin and Hanoi, it is clear to see how transparency, participation and accountability are interconnected and influence each other. Without a free and fair election as well as participation of non-governmental organisations, civil organisations, and the media in political decision-making and public actions, it is hard to hold the Hanoi local government accountable.
The key differences in formal institutions (regulative and cognitive) between Berlin and Hanoi reflect the three main principles: rule of law vs. rule by law, pluralism vs. monopoly Party in politics and social market economy vs. market economy with socialist orientation.
In Berlin the logic of appropriateness and codes of conduct are respect for laws, respect of individual freedom and ideas and awareness of community development. People in Berlin take for granted that public services are delivered to them fairly. Ideas such as using money or relationships to shorten public administrative procedures do not exist in the mind of either public officials or citizens.
In Hanoi, under a weak formal framework of good governance, new values and norms (prosperity, achievement) generated in the economic transition interact with the habits of the centrally-planned economy (lying, dependence, passivity) and traditional values (hierarchy, harmony, family, collectivism) influence behaviours of those involved.
In Hanoi “doing the right thing” such as compliance with law doesn’t become “the way it is”.
The unintended consequence of the deliberate reform actions of the Party is the prevalence of corruption. The socialist orientation seems not to have been achieved as the gap between the rich and the poor has widened.
Good governance is not achievable if citizens and officials are concerned only with their self-interest. State and society depend on each other. Theoretically to achieve good governance in Hanoi, institutions (formal and informal) able to create good citizens, officials and deputies should be generated. Good citizens are good by habit rather than by nature.
The rule of law principle is necessary for the professional performance of local administrations and People’s Councils. When the rule of law is applied consistently, the room for informal institutions to function will be reduced.
Promoting good governance in Hanoi is dependent on the need and desire to change the government and people themselves. Good governance in Berlin can be seen to be the result of the efforts of the local government and citizens after a long period of development and continuous adjustment.
Institutional transformation is always a long and complicated process because the change in formal regulations as well as in the way they are implemented may meet strong resistance from the established practice. This study has attempted to point out the weaknesses of the institutions of Hanoi and has identified factors affecting future development towards good governance. But it is not easy to determine how long it will take to change the institutional setting of Hanoi in order to achieve good governance.
Neben der vorherrschenden Unternehmenskultur existieren innerhalb der Organisationen unterschiedliche Subkulturen. Eine solche Subkultur - die berufliche - ist im Kontext dieser Arbeit von Bedeutung. Ihr Einfluss auf das Individuum in Form einer sekundären Sozialisation fängt in der Regel noch vor dem Eintritt im Unternehmen an und kann je nach Dauer der Einflussnahme und Stärke der Unternehmens- und der Subkulturen unterschiedlich sein. Im Mittelpunkt des Buches steht die Untersuchung der Abhängigkeiten zwischen der beruflichen kulturellen Prägung der Mitarbeiter und dem Umgang mit Wissen im Unternehmenskontext. Das Buch bietet einen theoretischen Überblick über die relevanten Themenfelder, stellt die Entwicklung eines Modells der Interdependenzen zwischen Wissensmanagement, Unternehmenskultur und beruflicher Subkultur vor und diskutiert erste Ergebnisse zur empirischen Untersuchung der Interdependenzen sowie das hierzu entwickelte Instrument.