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Back to bureaucracy?
(2024)
In this contribution, the emergence of the neo-Weberian state (NWS) is analyzed with regard to German public administration. Drawing on the concept of a governance space, which consists of a hierarchy, markets, and networks, we distinguish between four empirical manifestations of the NWS, namely, the NWS as (1) come back of the public/ re-municipalization; (2) re-hierarchization; (3) de-agencification; (4) de-escalation in performance management. These movements can, on the one hand, be interpreted as a (partial) reversal of New Public Management (NPM) approaches and a “swinging back of the pendulum” (see Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2019) toward public and classical Weberian principles (e.g., hierarchy, regulation, institutional re-aggregation). This reversal re-strengthened the hierarchy within the overall governance space to the detriment of, but without completely replacing, market mechanisms and networks. NPM’s failure to deliver what it promised and its inappropriateness as a response to more recent challenges connected to crises and wicked problems have engendered a partial return of the public and a move away from the economization logic of NPM. On the other hand, post-NPM reversals and managerial de-escalation gave rise to hybrid models that merge NPM and classic Weberian administration. While some well-functioning combinations of NPM and Weberianism exist, the hybridization of “old” and “neo” elements has also provoked ambivalent and negative assessments regarding the actual functioning of the NWS in Germany. Our analysis suggests that the NWS is only partially suitable as a model for reform and future administrative modernization, largely depending on the context surrounding reform and implementation practices.
A new challenger seeks to enter the German party system: Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW). With her new party, former Die Linke politician Sahra Wagenknecht combines a left-authoritarian profile (economically left-leaning, but culturally conservative) with anti-US, pro-Russia and anti-elitist stances. This article provides the first large-n academic study of the voter potential of this new party by using a quasi-representative sample (n = 6,000) drawn from a Voting Advice Application-like dataset that comes from a website designed to explore the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht’s positions. The results show that congruence with foreign policy positions and anti-elitism are strong predictors of the propensity to vote for the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht. In contrast, social/welfare and immigration policies are less predictive for assessing the party’s potential. Among the different socio-demographic groups, the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht has a strong potential among baby boomers, the less educated and East Germans. Regarding party voters, the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht is favoured by supporters of some minor parties like dieBasis, Freie Wähler and Die PARTEI, but also non-voters. Among the established parties, the party’s potential is high among Die Linke voters and, to a lesser extent, voters of the Social democrats (SPD) and Alternative for Germany (AfD). A potential below the average is reported for the supporters of the Liberals (FDP) and Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and most clearly for Green and Volt voters.
This article analyses the institutional design variants of local crisis governance responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and their entanglement with other locally impactful crises from a cross-country comparative perspective (France, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the UK/England). The pandemic offers an excellent empirical lens for scrutinizing the phenomenon of polycrises governance because it occurred while European countries were struggling with the impacts of several prior, ongoing, or newly arrived crises. Our major focus is on institutional design variants of crisis governance (dependent variable) and the influence of different administrative cultures on it (independent variable). Furthermore, we analyze the entanglement and interaction of institutional responses to other (previous or parallel) crises (polycrisis dynamics). Our findings reveal a huge variance of institutional designs, largely evoked by country-specific administrative cultures and profiles. The degree of de-/centralization and the intensity of coordination or decoupling across levels of government differs significantly by country. Simultaneously, all countries were affected by interrelated and entangled crises, resulting in various patterns of polycrisis dynamics. While policy failures and “fatal remedies” from previous crises have partially impaired the resilience and crisis preparedness of local governments, we have also found some learning effects from previous crises.
Germany’s relatively stable party system faces a new left-authoritarian challenger: Sahra Wagenknecht’s Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) party. First polls indicate that for the BSW, election results above 10% are within reach. While Wagenknecht’s positions in economic and cultural terms have already been discussed, this article elaborates on another highly relevant feature of Wagenknecht, namely her populist communication. Exploring Wagenknecht’s and BSW’s populist appeal helps us to understand why the party is said to also have potential among seemingly different voter groups coming from the far right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and far left Die Linke, which share high levels of populist attitudes. To analyse the role that populist communication plays for Wagenknecht and the BSW, this article combines quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative analysis covers all speeches (10,000) and press releases (19,000) published by Die Linke members of Parliament (MPs; 2005–2023). The results show that Wagenknecht is the (former) Die Linke MP with the highest share of populist communication. Furthermore, she was also able to convince a group of populist MPs to join the BSW. The article closes with a qualitative analysis of BSW’s manifesto that reveals how populist framing plays a major role in this document, in which the political and economic elites are accused of working against the interest of “the majority”. Based on this analysis, the classification of the BSW as a populist party seems to be appropriate.
Der Semi-Parlamentarismus beschreibt das Regierungssystem, in dem die Regierung von einem Teil des Parlaments gewählt wird und abberufen werden kann, von einem anderen Teil des Parlaments aber unabhängig ist. Beide Kammern müssen dabei der Gesetzgebung zustimmen. Dieses von Steffen Ganghof klassifizierte System ergänzt gängige Regierungssystemtypologien, wie sie beispielsweise von David Samuels und Matthew Shugart genutzt werden. Der Semi-Parlamentarismus ist der logische Gegenpart zum Semi-Präsidentialismus, bei dem nur ein Teil der Exekutive von der Legislative abhängt, während im Semi-Parlamentarismus die Exekutive von nur einem Teil der Legislative abhängt. Der Semi-Parlamentarismus verkörpert so ein System der Gewaltenteilung ohne einen exekutiven Personalismus, wie er durch die Direktwahl und Unabhängigkeit der Regierungchef:in im Präsidentialismus hervorgerufen wird. Dadurch ist der Semi-Parlamentarismus geeignet, Unterschiede zwischen Parlamentarismus und Präsidentialismus auf den separaten Einfluss der Gewaltenteilung und des exekutiven Personalismus zurückzuführen. Die Untersuchung des Semi-Parlamentarismus ist daher für die Regierungssystemliteratur insgesamt von Bedeutung. Der Semi-Parlamentarismus ist dabei kein rein theoretisches Konstrukt, sondern existiert im australischen Bundesstaat, den australischen Substaaten und Japan.
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht erstmals umfassend die Gesetzgebung der semi-parlamentarischen Staaten als solchen. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf den zweiten Kammern, da diese durch die Unabhängigkeit von der Regierung der eigentliche Ort der Gesetzgebung sind. Die Gesetzgebung in Parlamentarismus und Präsidentialismus unterscheidet sich insbesondere in der Geschlossenheit der Parteien, der Koalitionsbildung und dem legislativen Erfolg der Regierungen. Diese Punkte sind daher auch von besonderem Interesse bei der Analyse des Semi-Parlamentarismus. Die semi-parlamentarischen Staaten unterscheiden sich auch untereinander teilweise erheblich in der institutionellen Ausgestaltung wie den Wahlsystemen oder den verfügbaren Mitteln zur Überwindung von Blockadesituationen. Die Darstellung und die Analyse der Auswirkungen dieser Unterschiede auf die Gesetzgebung ist neben dem Vergleich des Semi-Parlamentarismus mit anderen Systemen das zweite wesentliche Ziel dieser Arbeit.
Als Fundament der Analyse habe ich einen umfangreichen Datensatz erhoben, der alle Legislaturperioden der australischen Staaten zwischen 1997 und 2019 umfasst. Wesentliche Bestandteile des Datensatzes sind alle namentlichen Abstimmungen beider Kammern, alle
eingebrachten und verabschiedeten Gesetzen der Regierung sowie die mit Hilfe eines Expert-Surveys erhobenen Parteipositionen in den relevanten Politikfeldern auf substaatlicher Ebene.
Hauptsächlich mit der Hilfe von Mixed-Effects- und Fractional-Response-Analysen kann ich so zeigen, dass der Semi-Parlamentarismus in vielen Aspekten eher parlamentarischen als präsidentiellen Systemen gleicht. Nur die Koalitionsbildung erfolgt deutlich flexibler und unterscheidet sich daher von der typischen parlamentarischen Koalitionsbildung. Die Analysen legen nahe, dass wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen Parlamentarismus und Präsidentialismus eher auf den exekutiven Personalismus als auf die Gewaltenteilung zurückzuführen sind.
Zwischen den semi-parlamentarischen Staaten scheinen vor allem die Kontrolle des Medians beider Parlamentskammern durch die Regierung und die Möglichkeit der Regierung, die zweite Kammer mitaufzulösen, zu entscheidenden Unterschieden in der Gesetzgebung zu führen. Die Kontrolle des Medians ermöglicht eine flexible Koalitionsbildung und führt zu höheren legislativen Erfolgsraten. Ebenso führt eine möglichst leichte Auflösungsmöglichkeit der zweiten Kammern zu höheren legislativen Erfolgsraten. Die Parteigeschlossenheit ist unabhängig von diesen Aspekten in beiden Kammern der semi-parlamentarischen Parlamente sehr hoch.
This cross-country comparison of administrative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in France, Germany and Sweden is aimed at exploring how institutional contexts and administrative cultures have shaped strategies of problem-solving and governance modes during the pandemic, and to what extent the crisis has been used for opportunity management. The article shows that in France, the central government reacted determinedly and hierarchically, with tough containment measures. By contrast, the response in Germany was characterized by an initial bottom-up approach that gave way to remarkable federal unity in the further course of the crisis, followed again by a return to regional variance and local discretion. In Sweden, there was a continuation of 'normal governance' and a strategy of relying on voluntary compliance largely based on recommendations and less - as in Germany and France - on a strategy of imposing legally binding regulations. The comparative analysis also reveals that relevant stakeholders in all three countries have used the crisis as an opportunity for changes in the institutional settings and administrative procedures.
Points for practitioners
COVID-19 has shown that national political and administrative standard operating procedures in preparation for crises are, at best, partially helpful. Notwithstanding the fact that dealing with the unpredictable is a necessary part of crisis management, a need to further improve the institutional preparedness for pandemic crises in all three countries examined here has also become clear. This should be done particularly by way of shifting resources to the health and care sectors, strengthening the decentralized management of health emergencies, stocking and/or self-producing protection material, assessing the effects of crisis measures, and opening the scientific discourse to broader arenas of experts.
„Gender-Ideologie“ und „Gender-Wahn“– diese Begriffe entstammen einem antifeministischen Diskurs, der ohne Bedrohungsszenarien nicht funktioniert. Feministische Errungenschaften – wie die Ehe für alle – werden zur Ursache persönlicher Nachteile umgedeutet. Seine Vertreter*innen verbreiten ihre (oft gewaltvollen) Narrative sowohl auf der Straße als auch im Internet. Antifeministische Bewegungen weisen zudem vielfältige Querverbindungen mit konservativen, nationalistischen, fundamentalreligiösen und faschistischen Diskursen auf.
Over the last few decades, a network of misogynist blogs, websites, wikis, and forums has developed, where users share their bigoted, sexist, and toxic views of society in general and masculinity and femininity in particular. This chapter outlines conceptual framework of hegemonic and hybrid masculinity. It provides a brief overview of the historical development of the manosphere and its various configurations and present our analysis of the masculinities performed by the five groups of the manosphere. The concept of hegemonic masculinity was articulated by Connell and colleagues in the 1980s as “the pattern of practice that allowed men’s dominance over women to continue.” Prior to the advent of the manosphere, an online iteration of male supremacist mobilizations, both Men’s Rights Activists and Pick-up artists developed as offline movements in the 1970s. MRAs perceive their respective societies as inherently stacked against men. This chapter analyses the masculinities of the manosphere and how they “repudiat[e] and reif[y]” hegemonic masculinity and male supremacism.