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Structural duration conveys stability but also resilience in central government and is therefore a key issue in the debate on the structure and organization of government. This paper discusses three core variants of structural duration to study the explanatory relevance of politics. We compare these durations across ministerialunits in four European democracies (Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Norway) from 1980 to 2013, totaling over 17,000 units. Our empirical analyses show that cabinets’ ideological turnover and extremism are the most significant predictors of all variants of duration, whereas polarization in parliament as well as new prime ministers without office experience yield the predicted significant negative effects for most models. We discuss these findings and avenues for futureresearch that acknowledge the definition and measures for structural change as well as temporal aspects of the empirical phenomenon more explicitly.
In this article, we examine the effects of political change on name changes of units within central government ministries. We expect that changes regarding the policy position of a government will cause changes in the names of ministerial units. To this end we formulate hypotheses combining the politics of structural choice and theories of portfolio allocation to examine the effects of political changes at the cabinet level on the names of intra-ministerial units. We constructed a dataset containing more than 17,000 observations on name changes of ministerial units between 1980 and 2013 from the central governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and France. We regress a series of generalized estimating equations (GEE) with population averaging models for binary outcomes. Finding variations across the three political-bureaucratic systems, we overall report positive effects of governmental change and ideological positions on name changes within ministries.
Creativity is a crucial part of policy capacity in governments. Existing studies on creative behavior in the public sector assess employees' openness to new ideas and creative solutions, and they confirm the relevance of organizational and individual determinants for pro-creativity attitudes. Yet we lack systemic evidence on the explicit level of work-related creativity among policy officials in government organizations. At the same time, novel technologies and particularly social networking services change the working environment of policy officials radically, alter organizational features, and may also yield crucial individual effects. Our study analyses “policy creativity” of policy officials in three European governments. We demonstrate the importance of organizational and individual features, including the stress triggered by using social networking services. Our study captures officials' creativity explicitly and adds to debates on creativity and innovation in the public sector as well as the micro-level foundations of the digital transformation in the public sector.
This chapter analyses the creation of novel cross-sectoral and multi-level coordination arrangements inside the German federal bureaucracy during the recent refugee crisis. We argue that the refugee crisis can be considered as an administrative crisis that challenged organisational legitimacy. Various novel coordination actors and arenas were set up in order to enhance governance capacity. Yet, all of them have been selected from a well-known pool of administrative arrangements. As a consequence, those novel coordination arrangements did not replace but rather complement pre-existing patterns of executive coordination. Hence, the recent refugee crisis exemplifies how bureaucracies effectively adapt to changes in their surroundings via limited and temporary adjustments that coexist with existing organisational arrangements. Thus, the observed changes in coordination structures contribute to repairing organisational legitimacy by increasing governance capacity.
This study follows the debate in comparative public administration research on the role of advisory arrangements in central governments. The aim of this study is to explain the mechanisms by which these actors gain their alleged role in government decision-making. Hence, it analyses advisory arrangements that are proactively involved in executive decision-making and may compete with the permanent bureaucracy by offering policy advice to political executives. The study argues that these advisory arrangements influence government policy-making by "institutional politics", i.e. by shaping the institutional underpinnings to govern or rather the "rules of the executive game" in order to strengthen their own position or that of their clients. The theoretical argument of this study follows the neo-institutionalist turn in organization theory and defines institutional politics as gradual institutionalization processes between institutions and organizational actors. It applies a broader definition of institutions as sets of regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. Following the "power-distributional approach" such gradual institutionalization processes are influenced by structure-oriented characteristics, i.e. the nature of the objects of institutional politics, in particular the freedom of interpretation in their application, as well as the distinct constraints of the institutional context. In addition, institutional politics are influenced by agency-oriented characteristics, i.e. the ambitions of actors to act as "would-be change agents". These two explanatory dimensions result in four ideal-typical mechanisms of institutional politics: layering, displacement, drift, and conversion, which correspond to four ideal-types of would-be change agents. The study examines the ambitions of advisory arrangements in institutional politics in an exploratory manner, the relevance of the institutional context is analyzed via expectation hypotheses on the effects of four institutional context features that are regarded as relevant in the scholarly debate: (1) the party composition of governments, (2) the structuring principles in cabinet, (3) the administrative tradition, and (4) the formal politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy. The study follows a "most similar systems design" and conducts qualitative case studies on the role of advisory arrangements at the center of German and British governments, i.e. the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, for a longer period (1969/1970-2005). Three time periods are scrutinized per country; the British case studies examine the role of advisory arrangements at the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Finance under Prime Ministers Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) and Blair (1997-2005). The German case studies study the role of advisory arrangements at the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Finance during the Brandt government (1969-74), the Kohl government (1982-1987) and the Schröder government (1998-2005). For the empirical analysis, the results of a document analysis and the findings of 75 semi-structured expert interviews have been triangulated. The comparative analysis reveals different patterns of institutional politics. The German advisory arrangements engaged initially in displacement but turned soon towards layering and drift, i.e. after an initial displacement of the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern they laid increasingly new elements onto existing ones and took the non-deliberative decision to neglect the adaption of existing rules of the executive game towards changing environmental demands. The British advisory arrangements were mostly involved in displacement and conversion, despite occasional layering, i.e. they displaced the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern with new rules of the executive game and transformed and realigned them, sometimes also layering new elements onto pre-existing ones. The structure- and agency-oriented characteristics explain these patterns of institutional politics. First, the study shows that the institutional context limits the institutional politics in Germany and facilitates the institutional politics in the UK. Second, the freedom of interpreting the application of institutional targets is relevant and could be observed via the different ambitions of advisory arrangements across countries and over time, confirming, third, that the interests of such would-be change agents are likewise important to understand the patterns of institutional politics. The study concludes that the role of advisory arrangements in government policy-making rests not only upon their policy-related, party-political or media-advisory role for political executives, but especially upon their activities in institutional politics, resulting in distinct institutional constraints on all actors in government policy-making – including their own role in these processes.