100 Philosophie und Psychologie
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Critical anthropology? On the relation between philosophical anthropology and critical theory
(2022)
This article compares Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adorno's foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner's foundation of Philosophical Anthropology.
While Horkheimer's and Plessner's paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno's << negative dialectics >> and Plessner's << negative anthropology >> (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another.
Jurgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner's philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the << life power >> in << high capitalism >> (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a << critical anthropology >> (H. Schnädelbach).
The aim of the paper is to defend the project of transforming philosophy carried out in my book 'Vernunft und Temperament. Eine Philosophie der Philosophie'.
In section 1, I distinguish between five philosophical genres in which transformation plays a role: 1. academic texts in which transformation is simply a topic; 2. texts meant to adequately articulate through their form the transformative experiences of their authors; 3. texts aiming to enable the reader to transform herself; 4. texts on other texts; 5. manifestos defending the project of transforming philosophy.
Section 2 is such a manifesto. Its main thesis is: "What makes somebody - anybody - a good philosopher is that she is a real human being. " Many of the remaining 16 theses of the manifesto are elaborations on this main thesis. One example is the thesis that the philosophical activity is essentially a becoming - the development of an individual human being.
Skepticism
(2022)
This dissertation offers new and original readings of three major texts in the history of Western philosophy: Descartes’s “First Meditation,” Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction,” and his “Refutation of Idealism.” The book argues that each text addresses the problem of skepticism and posits that they have a hitherto underappreciated, organic relationship to one another. The dissertation begins with an analysis of Descartes’ “First Meditation,” which I argue offers two distinct and independent skeptical arguments that differ in both aim and scope. I call these arguments the “veil of ideas” argument and the “author of my origin” argument. My reading counters the standard interpretation of the text, which sees it as offering three stages of doubt, namely the occasional fallibility of the senses, the dream hypothesis, and the evil demon hypothesis. Building on this, the central argument of the dissertation is that Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction” actually transforms and radicalizes Descartes’s Author of My Origin argument, reconceiving its meaning within the framework of Kant’s own transcendental idealist philosophy. Finally, I argue that the Refutation of Idealism offers a similarly radicalized version of Descartes’s Veil of Ideas argument, albeit translated into the framework of transcendental idealism.
Jewish Studies and Postcolonial Studies are often thought to be at odds. Both disciplines intensively debate modernity, troubling its universalist claims and showing the contradictory nature of its promises. The call to provincialize Europe allows scholars from both disciplines to think, articulate and represent modern experiences beyond Europe and engage critically with traditions of modernity across disciplines, temporalities and geographies. Mapping Sephardi and other minor perspectives on modernity from across the globe in this volume, we are presenting fascinating cases and exploring new terrain where a fruitful encounter between Jewish and Postcolonial Studies can happen.
In this introductory article to the special issue, we ask what role sexuality plays in the reproduction and contestation of border regimes and think sexuality towards its various entanglements with border control. As borders have been understood as a method for reproducing racialized distinctions, we argue that sexuality is also a method of bordering and illustrate how sexuality works as a key strategy for the capture, containment and regulation of mobility and movement. Taking a transnational approach, we bring together queer scholarship on borders and migration with the rich archive of feminist, Black, Indigenous and critical border perspectives to suggest that these strategies need to be understood in close relation to the (I) intersecting dynamics of colonial histories of racialization, (II) national regimes of reproductive control and (III) the containment of contagion, disease and sexual deviance.
Wem wird geglaubt und wem nicht? Wessen Wissen wird weitergegeben und wessen nicht? Wer hat eine Stimme und wer nicht? Theorien der epistemischen Ungerechtigkeit befassen sich mit dem breiten Feld der ungerechten oder unfairen Behandlung, die mit Fragen des Wissens, Verstehens und Kommunizierens zusammenhängen, wie z.B. die Möglichkeit, vom Wissen oder von kommunikativen Praktiken ausgeschlossen zu werden oder zum Schweigen gebracht zu werden, aber auch Kontexte, in denen die Bedeutungen mancher systematisch verzerrt oder falsch gehört und falsch dargestellt werden, in denen manchen misstraut wird oder es an epistemischer Handlungsfähigkeit mangelt. In diesem Buch wird eine Übersicht über die breite Debatte epistemischer Ungerechtigkeit, epistemischer Unterdrückung und epistemischer Gewalt gegeben, in dem unterschiedliche Theorien, die sich auf der Schnittstelle von Gerechtigkeitstheorie und epistemischen Fragen befinden, systematisch und kritisch diskutiert sowie theoretische Vorgänger dieser Theorien beleuchtet werden.
Reviewed Publications:
Garcia Manon. Wir werden nicht unterwürfig geboren. Wie das Patriarchat das Leben von Frauen bestimmt. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2021, 235 S.
Hay Carol. Think like a Feminist. The Philosophy behind the Revolution. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2020, 222 S.
Manne Kate. Entitled. How Male Privilege Hurts Women. London: Allen Lane, 2020, 270 S.
Srinivasan Amia. The Right to Sex. London: Bloomsbury, 2021, 279 S.
In Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic zielt Serene Khader auf eine Neuausrichtung der feministischen Perspektive, welche es schafft, dekolonial und anti-imperialistisch zu sein, ohne gleichzeitig dem Universalismus komplett abzuschwören. Die Motivation hinter dieser Neuorientierung ist die Einsicht, dass der liberale moralische Universalismus oftmals kulturelle Vorherrschaft und Imperialismus verstärkt. In diesem Kommentar wollen wir (a) uns mit der Frage beschäftigen, was genau unter Geschlechtergerechtigkeit verstanden werden soll und welcher Maßstab zur Beantwortung der Frage nach Gerechtigkeit angebracht ist und (b) einige Ideen zum Unterschied zwischen idealer und nicht-idealer Theorie liefern.
Analyzing social wrongs
(2023)
In the debate on epistemic injustice, it is generally assumed that testimonial injustice as one form of epistemic injustice cannot be committed (fully) deliberately or intentionally because it involves unconscious identity prejudices. Drawing on the case of sexual violence against refugees in European refugee camps, this paper argues that there is a form of testimonial injustice—willful testimonial injustice—that is deliberate. To do so, the paper argues (a) that the hearer intentionally utilizes negative identity prejudices for a particular purpose and (b) that the hearer is aware of the fact that the intentionally used prejudices are in fact prejudices. Furthermore, the paper shows how testimonial injustice relates to recognition failures both in terms of a causal as well as a constitutive claim. In fact, introducing willful testimonial injustice can support the constitutive claim of such a relation that has so far received little attention. Besides arguing for a novel form of testimonial injustice and contributing to the recent debate on the relation between epistemic injustice and recognition failures, this paper is also motivated by the attempt to draw attention to the inhumane conditions for refugees at the border of Europe as well as elsewhere.
(Moralisch) guter Sex
(2023)
In einem kürzlich erschienenen Artikel argumentiert Almut v. Wedelstaedt überzeugend, warum Zustimmung zwar „die Bedingung für die Legitimation von Sex“ ist (2020, 127), dass die moralische Güte von Sex aber nur dann einzuschätzen ist, wenn wir darauf achten, ob die Beteiligten der Handlung sich auf Augenhöhe begegnen. Die Idee ist: Es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch gut sind, und es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch besser sind. Hier möchte ich die Idee des besseren Sexes genauer ausloten. Während v. Wedelstaedt von moralisch gelungenem Sex spricht und somit auf der Ebene der moralischen Bewertung von Sex bleibt, möchte ich die Frage danach stellen, was Sex qualitativ gut macht. Tatsächlich wird in der Zustimmungsdebatte meist davon ausgegangen, dass diese zwei Fragen wenig gemeinsam haben; ob eine sexuelle Handlung legitim ist, hat zunächst nichts damit zu tun, ob diese auch gut ist. Ich werde drei Argumente liefern, warum wir legitimen Sex und qualitativ guten Sex zusammen betrachten sollten – und es wird sich zeigen, dass die gegenwärtige philosophische und rechtstheoretische Debatte Zustimmung verkürzt diskutiert und daher alleingenommen wenig hilfreich ist, stattdessen benötigt die Zustimmungsdebatte auch eine Untersuchung von qualitativ gutem Sex.
Potentially disabled?
(2022)
Ten years ago, I was diagnosed with a rare illness called Myasthenia Gravis. Myasthenia Gravis is a long-term neuromuscular autoimmune disease where antibodies block or destroy specific receptors at the junction between nerve and muscle; hence, nerve impulses fail to trigger muscle contractions. The disease leads to varying degrees of muscle weakness. Currently, I have only minor symptoms, I am not seriously impaired, and I do not suffer from any social disadvantage because of my illness. Yet, my life and my body since my diagnosis feel different than before. In this paper I aim to make this feeling intelligible and propose that it is a state of what I call ‘latent impairment’. Latent impairment is a state of being ‘in between’, different from being actually impaired and also different from being abled-bodied. The theory takes its cues both from social constructionist theories of disability as well as theories of (chronic) illness and their focus on the importance of subjectivity. Furthermore, I suggest that a phenomenological understanding of latent impairment can show possible ways of becoming an ally to the DRM.
Die Debatte um epistemische Ungerechtigkeit verbindet normative Gerechtigkeitstheorien mit erkenntnistheoretischen Theorien und stellt somit die Art von wichtigen Fragen, die in den letzten Jahren sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb der Wissenschaft internationale Aufmerksamkeit erfahren haben. Verwiesen sei hier etwa auf soziale Bewegungen wie #MeToo und #BlackLivesMatter zeigen. Theorien der epistemischen Ungerechtigkeit (sowie verwandte Theorien wie Epistemologie des Unwissens, feministische Erkenntnistheorie und Standpunkttheorie) können sowohl epistemische Praktiken analysieren und einen Beitrag zu Gerechtigkeitstheorien und sozialer Epistemologie liefern, als auch zu adäquateren Verständnissen von existierenden Ungerechtigkeiten beitragen. In dem hier vorliegenden Schwerpunkt werden Beiträge zu eben solchen bislang wenig erforschten Ungerechtigkeiten sowie neue Diskussionsbeiträge zur Debatte um epistemische Ungerechtigkeiten geliefert.
Local laws on urban policy, i.e., ordinances directly affect our daily life in various ways (health, business etc.), yet in practice, for many citizens they remain impervious and complex. This article focuses on an approach to make urban policy more accessible and comprehensible to the general public and to government officials, while also addressing pertinent social media postings. Due to the intricacies of the natural language, ranging from complex legalese in ordinances to informal lingo in tweets, it is practical to harness human judgment here. To this end, we mine ordinances and tweets via reasoning based on commonsense knowledge so as to better account for pragmatics and semantics in the text. Ours is pioneering work in ordinance mining, and thus there is no prior labeled training data available for learning. This gap is filled by commonsense knowledge, a prudent choice in situations involving a lack of adequate training data. The ordinance mining can be beneficial to the public in fathoming policies and to officials in assessing policy effectiveness based on public reactions. This work contributes to smart governance, leveraging transparency in governing processes via public involvement. We focus significantly on ordinances contributing to smart cities, hence an important goal is to assess how well an urban region heads towards a smart city as per its policies mapping with smart city characteristics, and the corresponding public satisfaction.