100 Philosophie und Psychologie
Refine
Has Fulltext
- no (9)
Year of publication
- 2017 (9) (remove)
Document Type
- Article (5)
- Doctoral Thesis (3)
- Part of a Book (1)
Language
- English (9) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- yes (9)
Keywords
- Experience (2)
- Kant (2)
- Meditation (2)
- Mood (2)
- Mysticism (2)
- Rationality (2)
- William James (2)
- Highest Good (1)
- McDowell (1)
- Sellars (1)
Welterleben/Weiterleben
(2017)
Welterleben and Weiterleben are what determine the second globalization (of four previously explored) whose constantly accelerating dynamic, vectorization, this essay explores. On the basis of selected writings of Georg Forster, Alexander von Humboldt, and Adelbert von Chamisso, the author highlights the increasing speed with which knowledge, especially in the experiential sciences, is produced and disseminated following the routes of ever-widening trade speeded along by globalization. The notion of ‘vectopia’ stands for the connection of utopia and uchronia in space and time in such a way that the experience of the world, expanded worldwide, contains within it a Weiter-Leben, a ‘living-further’ that is to be understood first in a spatial, and not yet temporal, sense, of what Forster called Erfahrungswissen, or ‘experiential knowledge.’ Vectopia, as elaborated here, has a material dimension that relates to the physical person, the body, the experience of the world that cannot occur without the constant changing of place, without a journeying that is again and again recommenced. Vectopia develops the projection of a life not from space or from time alone, but by their combination. Vectopia is more than a concept, it is a thought-figure: it is vitally connected to life, and thus a life-figure. It opens itself to a type of knowledge that stands almost at the threshold of a further life, indeed, of a Weiterleben that, opening itself to a ‘living-onward,’ resides beyond space, time, and movement.
The final end of imagination
(2017)
One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant’s moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively.
On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.
Analytic Kantianism
(2017)
Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars’s account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars’s position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy.
On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.
Romance and Irony
(2017)
Bisherige Studien zur Demokratieförderung analysierten „erfolgreiche“ Beispiele. Das ist teilweise eine Reflektion der politischen Ökonomie von Demokratieförderung, in der sie Beispielen im Inland erzeugter demokratischer Durchbrüche folgt. Dennoch kann eine wissenschaftliche Analyse externer Einflüsse auf interne Veränderungen sich nicht nur auf Fälle erfolgreicher Demokratieentwicklung beziehen, sondern muss Beispiele von Regimeveränderungen, die nicht in einer Demokratie resultierten, berücksichtigen, um Selektionsvorurteile zu vermeiden und die kausalen Mechanismen zu isolieren, die für einen demokratischen Wandel notwendig sind, neben dem Zusammenbruch eines autoritären Regimes und einer Liberalisierung.
In dieser Studie dienen Marokko und Tunesien als Fallbeispiele, Länder, die nach langjähriger Diktaturerfahrung versuchen demokratische Strukturen aufzubauen und sich anderen Herausforderungen stellen müssen als sich demokratisierende Regime, die über einen relativ effektiven Staat verfügen.
Da es wenig Austausch zwischen Analysten von demokratischen Übergängen, Konsolidierung und Post-Konflikt Staatenbildung gab, überrascht, dass diese radikal unterschiedliche Situation von demokratischem Wandel und variierenden Rollen externer Akteure in jeder Kategorie bisher nicht differenziert wurde. Die Studie widmet sich den hieraus resultierenden Kernfragen: „Wie, Warum und durch Was wird Demokratieförderung durch externe Akteure funktionieren?“
Die Frage nach dem „Wie“ ist hier die schwierigste, es ist eine Frage nach den Methoden und Strategien des Demokratisierungsprozesses sowie der Unterstützung, die sorgfältig durchdachte Techniken und ihre breite Akzeptanz durch eine Vielzahl von Partner erfordert. Antwort auf die Frage nach dem „Was“ und „Warum“ hingegen findet sich in der Grundlage schlechter Regierungsarbeit und schlechter Wirtschaftsleistung, die zu Aufständen der Bevölkerung führen. Die Resultate der Studie tragen zum Fortschritt in der Demokratieförderung bei.