Berlin Potsdam Research Group "The International Rule of Law - Rise or Decline?"
Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (45)
- Journal/Publication series (1)
Keywords
- United Nations (2)
- international law (2)
- rule of law (2)
- Agenda 2030 (1)
- CARICOM (1)
- Caribbean (1)
- Colonialism (1)
- Compensation (1)
- International Court of Justice (1)
- International Law Commission (1)
- Law of State Responsibility (1)
- OWG (1)
- Reparation (1)
- SDG 16 (1)
- SDGs (1)
- Special Rapporteur (1)
- customary international law (1)
- decline (1)
- international criminal law (1)
- international humanitarian law (1)
- international rule of law (1)
- non-state actors (1)
- non-state armed actors (1)
- opinio juris (1)
- rise (1)
- state practice (1)
- sustainable development goals (1)
Populism has fatally weakened the world’s ability to respond to COVID-19, by undermining the capacity of the structures and mechanisms of international law to address the pandemic. The pandemic has exposed as a fallacy a key tenet of populism – to protect the ‘people’ of a nation from external forces, including international law. In fact international law, through the principle of self-determination, enshrines the ability of peoples to determine their own political organization. But this does not preclude agreement at the international level on matters of common interest to humanity as a whole that require community action. The prevention of infectious disease is just such a case, which states have long agreed could not remain solely the preserve of national polities, but requires a common international response. This paper, placing the current crisis in light of the development of international health law, critically examines the response of key populist governments to COVID-19 in order to address the larger issue of the implications of populism for the fate of international law.
Current contestations of the liberal international order stand in notable contrast with the earlier rise of international law during the post-cold war period. As Krieger and Liese argue, this situation calls for assessment of the type of change that is currently observed, i.e. norm change (Wandel) or a more fundamental transformation of international law – a metamorphosis (Verwandlung)? To address this question, this paper details the bi-focal approach to norms in order to reflect and take account of the complex interrelation between fact-based and value-based conceptions of norms. The paper is organised in three sections. The first section presents three axioms underlying the conceptual framework to study norm(ative) change which are visualised by a triangular operation to analyse this change in relation with practices and norms. The second section recalls three key interests that have guided IR norms research after the return to norms in the late 1980s. They include, first, allocating change in and through practice, second, identifying behavioural change with reference to norm- following, and third, identifying norm(ative) change with reference to discursive practice. The third section presents the two analytical tools of the conceptual frame, namely, the norm-typology and the cycle-grid model. It also indicates how to apply these tools with reference to illustrative case scenarios. The conclusion recalls the key elements of the conceptual framework for research on norm(ative) change in international relations in light of the challenge of establishing sustainable normativity in the global order.
For the United States the ‘international law of global security’ is, in a unique sense, synonymous with the entire project of constructing global legal order. Uniquely preponderant power enjoyed since the end of the Second World War has allowed US preferences to manifest not merely in specific rules and regimes, but in purposive development of the entire structure of global legal order to favour American security interests. Perceptions of a recent decline in this order now find expression in advocacy for a ‘liberal’ or ‘rules-based’ international order, as the claimed foundation for global prosperity and security. This working paper seeks to map out the parameters of US contributions to the global security order by uncovering the strategic and political foundations of its engagement with the international law of global security. The paper begins by reflecting on competing US conceptions of the relationship between national security and global order as they evolved across the twentieth century. The focus then turns to three significant trends defining the contemporary field. First are US attitudes toward multilateral institutions and global security, and the ongoing contest between beliefs that they are mutually reinforcing versus beliefs that US security and global institutions sit in zero-sum opposition. Second is the impact of the generational ‘War on Terror’, which has yielded more permissive interpretation and development of laws governing the global use of violence. The final trend is that towards competitive geopolitical interests restructuring international law, which are evident across diverse areas ranging from global economics, to cybersecurity, to the fragmentation of global order into spheres of influence. Looking ahead, a confluence of rising geopolitical competitors with divergent legal conceptions, and conflicted domestic support for the legitimacy and desirability of US global leadership, emerge as leading forces already reshaping the global security order.
The WTO’s Crisis
(2020)
The perception of the WTO is currently one of an organisation in crisis. Yet, appraisal varies regarding its extent and seriousness: Is it merely a rough time or are we standing on the edge of destruction? The article will trace developments inside as well as outside the WTO in order to assess the magnitude of the crisis. It will be argued that while certain developments inside the organisation, when seen in accumulation would already warrant serious attention, only together with developments taking place outside of the WTO, the two strands of developments unfold their full potential for the crisis. The overall situation renders the WTO in a difficult position, as it is currently unable to adapt to these challenges, while keeping calm and carrying on might similarly further the crisis. While States might improve and further develop their trade relations in bi- and plurilateral agreements, it is only the WTO that reflects and stands for the multilateral post (cold) war order.
The guarantee of judicial independence is undoubtedly one of the most important institutional design features of international courts and tribunals. An independence deficit can adversely impact a court’s authority, create a crisis of legitimacy, and undermine the very effectiveness of an international court or tribunal. It can hardly be denied that for an international court to be considered legitimate, a basic degree of independence is a must. An independent judiciary is a precondition to the fair and just resolution of legal disputes. In the context of interstate dispute settlement where the jurisdiction of courts is based on the principle of consent, in the absence of a basic degree of judicial independence, states may not be willing to submit to the jurisdiction of international courts. Comparing and contrasting the International Court of Justice and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation, I assess whether those international judicial mechanisms possess the basic degree of independence required for a court to be able to maintain its credibility so that it can continue to perform its core function of adjudicating interstate disputes. With both those interstate adjudicative bodies constituting the two leading international courts in terms of participation and the sheer number of cases decided, much may be learned from comparing them. I argue there is a case for bolstering the independence of the ICJ; and without immediate reforms to the Appellate Body’s institutional design, its recent demise may become permanent. I conclude that if a basic degree of judicial independence cannot be guaranteed, it is preferable to let a court vanish for a while than to maintain a significantly deficient one.
While some pronouncements of expert treaty bodies have been considered ‘key catalysts’ for the development of international human rights law, others are only selectively referred to in legal practice. This article argues that the varying normative impact is due to the informal character of pronouncements. In the absence of treaty provisions specifying their legal effect, practitioners tend to rely on different factors and arguments when either drawing on or rejecting certain pronouncements. Scholars in turn face difficulties when trying to identify explanatory patterns within this diverging practice as the informal character confronts both international lawyers and international relations scholars with their respective methodological ‘blind spots’. In light of these intradisciplinary challenges, this article explores the extent as to which an interdisciplinary approach helps to assess the reasons for the varying impact of pronouncements. After analysing the factors determining their legal significance on the basis of State practice and the academic debate, this article identifies the drafting process as a factor which promises to be particularly insightful when explored from an interdisciplinary perspective and sketches out a framework for future research.
A growing demand for natural resources embedded in current changes of the international order will put pressure on states to secure the future availability of these resources. Some political discourses suggest that states might respond by challenging the foundations of international law. Whereas the UN Charter was inter alia aimed at eliminating uses of force for economic reasons, one may observe an on-going trend of securitization of matters of resource supply resulting into the revival of self-preservation doctrines. The chapter will show that those claims lack a normative foundation in the current framework of the prohibition of the use of force. Moreover, international law has sufficient instruments to cope with disputes over access to resources by other means than the use of force. The international community, therefore, must oppose claims that may contribute to normative uncertainties and strengthen already existing instruments of pacific settlement of disputes.
This paper assesses the rise and decline of international rule of law in the case of non-state armed actors. Both signs of rise and signs of decline of international rule of law show in the case of non- state armed actors. Signs of rise include the expansion of coverage of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law, as well as international legal argumentation and rhetoric made by non-state armed groups. Some non-state armed actors express that they are governed by IHL in public statements or bilateral agreements with international actors, partly acknowledging universality of international humanitarian norms, and sometimes act as such. Signs of decline in the international rule of law also show – although some of them can be seen as business-as-usual – privileging of military advantage, instrumental use of international law (as justification and local interpretations), as well as conflicting understanding of IHL between local and global norms. The multiplicity of non-state actors also portends the decline of international rule of law, with the proliferation of many non-organized groups without legitimacy-seeking motivations.
Modern rule of law and post-war constitutionalism are both anchored in rights-based limitations on state authority. Rule-of-law norms and principles, at both domestic and international levels, are designed to protect the freedom and dignity of the person. Given this “thick” conception of the rule of law, authoritarian practices that remove constraints on domestic political leaders and weaken mechanisms for holding them accountable necessarily erode both domestic and international rule of law. Drawing on political science research on authoritarian politics, this study identifies three core elements of authoritarian political strategies: subordination of the judiciary, suppression of independent news media and freedom of expression, and restrictions on the ability of civil society groups to organize and participate in public life. According to available data, each of these three practices has become increasingly common in recent years. This study offers a composite measure of the core authoritarian practices and uses it to identify the countries that have shown the most marked increases in authoritarianism. The spread and deepening of these authoritarian practices in diverse regimes around the world diminishes international rule of law. The conclusion argues that resurgent authoritarianism degrades international rule of law even if this is defined as the specifically post-Cold War international legal order.
How to identify customary international law is an important question of international law. The International Law Commission has in 2018 adopted a set of sixteen conclusions, together with commentaries, on this topic. The paper consists of three parts: First, the reasons are discussed why the Commission came to work on the topic “Identification of customary international law”. Then, some of its conclusions are highlighted. Finally, the outcome of the work of the Commission is placed in a general context, before concluding.
This article explores, whether domestic judges might be held accountable under international criminal law (ICL). To date, international criminal justice has almost entirely focused on prosecuting political or military leaders. The Justice Case tried before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in 1946 marks the most prominent exception. Prior to it, the judiciary – otherwise considered the epitome of justice – had mutated into a murderous machinery under Nazi rule. Judicial decisions do have far-reaching implications possibly constituting or contributing to international crimes. This holds true in a wide range of cases, for instance on practices of warfare and torture, on the use of certain weapon technologies, or on policies relating to minorities or racial segregation. I argue that domestic judges are accountable when engaging in international crimes. The article delves into technical aspects of criminal law; as well as the notions of judicial independence and immunity. While guaranteeing the rule of law, these two notions challenge the core idea of ICL: its equal application vis-à-vis all perpetrators of international crimes irrespective of official capacity. In order to differentiate due judicial conduct and its abuse in violation of ICL, I suggest a threshold a judicial act needs to exceed for entailing accountability for an international crime.
International courts regularly cite each other, in part as a means of building legitimacy. Such international, cross-court use of precedent (or “judicial dialogue”) among the regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee has an additional purpose and effect: the construction of a rights-based global constitutionalism. Judicial dialogue among the human rights courts is purposeful in that the courts see themselves as embedded in, and contributing to, a global human rights legal system. Cross-citation among the human rights courts advances the construction of rights-based global constitutionalism in that it provides a basic degree of coordination among the regional courts. The jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), as an authoritative interpreter of core international human rights norms, plays the role of a central focal point for the decentralized coordination of jurisprudence. The network of regional courts and the HRC is building an emergent institutional structure for global rights-based constitutionalism.
This paper – which is based on the Thomas Franck Lecture held by the author at Humboldt University Berlin on 13 May 2019 – argues that the most likely development of international to be expected will be the coexistence of two “legal worlds”. On the one hand, an inter-State law brutally regulating political relations between human groups whitewashed by nationalism; on the other hand, a transnational or “a-national” law regulating economic relations between private as well as public interests. Further, the paper argues that there are two obvious victims – of very different nature – of this foreseeable evolution: the human being on the one hand, the certainty and effectiveness of the rule of law itself on the other hand.
Once the “popular plaything of Realpolitiker” the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus post the 1969 VCLT is often described as an objective rule by which, on grounds of equity and justice, a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for termination. Yet recent practice from States such as Ecuador, Russia, Denmark and the United Kingdom suggests that it is returning with a new livery. They point to an understanding based on vital States’ interests––a view popular among scholars such as Erich Kaufmann at the beginning of the last century.
This paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of the problematic features of the appointment of arbitrators in ISDS.
How does the international Rule of Law apply to constrain the conduct of the Executive within a constitutional State that adopts a dualist approach to the reception of international law? This paper argues that, so far from being inconsistent with the concept of the Rule of Law, the Executive within a dualist constitution has a self-enforcing obligation to abide by the obligations of the State under international law. This is not dependent on Parliament’s incorporation of treaty obligations into domestic law. It is the correlative consequence of the allocation to the Executive of the power to conduct foreign relations. The paper develops this argument in response to recent debate in the United Kingdom on whether Ministers have an obligation to comply with international law–a reference that the Government removed from the Ministerial Code. It shows that such an obligation is consistent with both four centuries of the practice of the British State and with principle.
The worldwide populist wave has contributed to a perception that international law is currently in a state of crisis. This article examines in how far populist governments have challenged prevailing interpretations of international law. The article links structural features of populism with an analysis of populist governmental strategies and argumentative practices. It demonstrates that, in their rhetoric, populist governments promote an understanding of international law as a mere law of coordination. This is, however, not entirely reflected in their legal practices where an instrumental, cherry-picking approach prevails. The article concludes that policies of populist governments affect the current state of international law on two different levels: In the political sphere their practices alter the general environment in which legal rules are interpreted. In the legal sphere populist governments push for changes in the interpretation of established international legal rules. The article substantiates these propositions by focusing on the principle of nonintervention and foreign funding for NGOs.
International adjudication is currently under assault, encouraging a number of States to withdraw, or to consider withdrawing, from treaties providing for international dispute settlement. This Working Paper argues that the act of treaty withdrawal is not merely as the unilateral executive exercise of the individual sovereign prerogative of a State. International law places checks upon the exercise of withdrawal, recognising that it is an act that of its nature affects the interests of other States parties, which have a collective interest in constraining withdrawal. National courts have a complementary function in restraining unilateral withdrawal in order to support the domestic constitution. The arguments advanced against international adjudication in the name of popular democracy at the national level can serve as a cloak for the exercise of executive power unrestrained by law. The submission by States of their disputes to peaceful settlement through international adjudication is central, not incidental, to the successful operation of the international legal system.
The paper aims to lay out a framework for evaluating value shifts in the international legal order for the purposes of a forthcoming book. In view of current contestations it asks whether we are observing yet another period of norm change (Wandel) or even a more fundamental transformation of international law – a metamorphosis (Verwandlung). For this purpose it suggests to look into the mechanisms of how norms change from the perspective of legal and political science and also to approximate a reference point where change turns into metamorphosis. It submits that such a point may be reached where specific legally protected values are indeed changing (change of legal values) or where the very idea of protecting certain values through law is renounced (delegalizing of values). The paper discusses the benefits of such an interdisciplinary exchange and tries to identify differences and commonalities among both disciplinary perspectives.
International women’s rights
(2019)
This paper explores current contestations of women’s rights and the implications thereof for international legislation. While contestation over women’s rights is a far from new phenomenon, over the past two decades opposition to gender equality has become better organized at the transnational level, mobilizing a dispersed set of state and non-state actors, and is becoming more successful in halting the progress of women’s rights. I argue that the position of oppositional actors vis-à-vis women rights activism appears to be strengthened by two recent political developments: democratic backsliding and the closure of civic space. Some preliminary findings show how these interrelated developments lead to an erosion of women’s rights at the national level. Governments use low key tactics to dismantle institutional and implementation arrangements and sideline women’s organisations. Next, I explore the implications of these developments for gender equality norms at the national and international level. The active strategy of counter norming adopted by conservative and religious state and non-state actors, designed to circumvent and also undermine Western norms, is increasingly successful. In addition to this, the threatened position of domestic actors monitoring compliance of international treaties, makes the chances of backsliding on international commitments much higher.
Underpinning a legal system with certain values and helping to resolve norm conflicts is in domestic legal systems usually achieved through hierarchical superiority of certain norms of a constitutional nature. The present paper examines the question whether jus cogens can discharge this function within the traditionally horizontal and decentralized international legal order. In so doing, it commences with an overview of the historical origins of peremptory norms in legal scholarship, followed by its endorsement by positive law and courts and tribunals. This analysis illustrates that there are lingering uncertainties pertaining to the process of identification of peremptory norms. Even so, the concept has been invoked in State executive practice (although infrequently) and has been endorsed by various courts. However, such invocation thus far has had a limited impact from a legal perspective. It was mainly confined to a strengthened moral appeal and did in particular not facilitate the resolution of norm conflicts. The contribution further suggests that this limited impact results from the fact that the content of peremptory obligations is either very narrow or very vague. This, in turn, implies a lack of consensus amongst States regarding the content (scope) of jus cogens, including the values underlying these norms. As a result, it is questionable whether the construct of jus cogens is able to provide meaningful legal protection against the erosion of legal norms. It is too rudimentary in character to entrench and stabilize core human rights values as the moral foundation of the international legal order.
Matters of Interpretation
(2018)
This article analyses, from a methodological and theoretical perspective, how international legal method deals with change. Section 2 sets the stage, develops a legal perspective on change of norms and values in the international legal order and distinguishes between structural change and norm change. This is followed in sections 3 and 4 by an examination of doctrinal categories that provide techniques to process change in international legal practice. International legal method is equipped with several techniques to process—and to conceptualize and evaluate—change: ‘Formal’ norm change is a matter of the doctrine of sources. International law can also change ‘informally’ through the shifting meaning of norm texts. Both formal and informal change is a matter of interpretation. Therefore, section 5 aims at theorizing interpretive change. It examines the relationship between the sources of law and legal interpretation as categories of change and analyses theoretical perceptions of interpretive change.
This paper assesses, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the work of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) with respect to peace support operations. It seeks to know whether the establishment of the PSC in 2002 is leading or has led to a rise or a decline of collective security in Africa. It is demonstrated that in regard to its relative legal and institutional robustness, the PSC can be perceived as a rise of collective security compared with its predecessor, the Central Organ of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). However, it stagnates in terms of quantity and quality of actions on the ground. The main problem lies in the lack of sufficient operational autonomy from member states and international partners, such as the United Nations. Therefore, the PSC’s contribution to the maintenance of peace and security, and so the rise of the international rule of law in Africa is limited. The continent is still a war-torn region, affected by political crises and the expansion of terrorism in many countries. To solve this problem, AU member states should strengthen the PSC’s capacity, starting with the quick operationalisation of the African Standby Force. The implementation of the 2016 decision on alternative sources of financing AU’s institutions and activities is also a priority. In this regard, the political will of African states that may show that they want to take their organisation more seriously is required. This can further the AU self-reliance policy in collective security though the promotion of African solutions to African problems, and reduce the burden of the United Nations and other non-African actors’ interventions in the continent.
The author discusses the question of authority when determining the content of an international legal rule. Taking Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute as a point of departure, he determines through meticolous analysis what ranks as judicial decisions as well as teachings within the meaning of the norm. The author then proceeds to a number of factors to determine authoritativeness: objectivity, knowledgeability, depth of analysis, and the presence or otherwise of reasoning and, in particular, the persuasiveness of an opinion. In the case of judicial pronouncements, the author points out that the paradox between Article 59 and Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute is only an apparent one. While judgments of the Court are binding only between the parties, it is merely the underlying reasoning that can be taken into account in the context of Article 38(1)(d) if considered persuasive. Without central authority, authoritativenes in international law must always be earned which is also the reason for the lack of an hierarchical order between as well as within judicial pronouncements and learned writings though the former are usually more likely to fulfil the criteria of authoritativeness. In both cases, however, previously acquired reputation of a court or even an individual judge as well as of a learned writer can create a presumption of authoritativeness. On a more general level, the author concludes with a call for a more careful differentiation between the determination of law and its application. Putting the issue discussed into perspective, the author argues that situations of law determination arise, contrary to common understanding, in fact far less often than situations of law application.
Seeming consensus has formed among legal scholars and practitioners that a rising China seeks changes in rules and institutions of international law. Yet, attendant accounts of how such changes may and already do restructure global legal order remain relatively underdeveloped. An observed rise in the international rule of law during immediate post-Cold War years has now been disrupted by a confluence of regional shifts in geopolitical power and contestation of law’s normative foundations by newly empowered states. In these circumstances, advocates for stability and continuity in variations of the “liberal international order” or “rules-based order” have sought to defend the authority and resilience of universally defined international legal norms against various regional challenges to the boundary between law and politics. Yet, as both global power and universal conceptions of law fragment, so too will the presumed equilibrium between international law’s political and normative foundations. Signs of fragmentation are now conspicuously playing out in East and Southeast Asia, where the relative rise of China is amplified by alternative Chinese conceptions of foundations and purposes of global legal order. This working paper introduces the concept of “geolegal power” to describe the competitive logic of a territorially bounded leading state restructuring interpretation and development of legal rules and institutions, which is emerging more explicitly within regional subsystems. Fragmentation of the international rule of law by a rising Chinese “geolegal order” is demonstrated by contested maritime rules in three key areas: freedom of navigation; third-party and judicial settlement; and, territorial claims under UNCLOS. Evidence that China is carving out an effective subsystem of rules designated as “law” in the most consequential of security and geopolitical domains poses a critical challenge to the structure of a unified and universal system of international law. Legal scholars and practitioners must better grasp reconfiguring foundations of international law in order to address rising orders of “geolegal power”, in which the regional meaning and operation of law is no longer reconcilable within the terms of an “international” rule of law.
The present study aims at identifying the main trends in Italian international legal scholarship from 1990 onward. After a brief appraisal of the current situation within the Italian community of international law scholars, it will first focus on the methods and fields of interest of the most recent scholarship. Then, an attempt at contextualization will be made, by offering a brief overview of some current trends in international legal scholarship outside Italy and comparing these trends with the recent developments in Italian scholarship. In conclusion, it will be argued that, despite the greater fluidity of national identities, the persistence of common features still appears to characterize the Italian scholarship of international law. A long, deeply rooted and culturally rich tradition of studies in international law, the use of the Italian language, the dimension of the community as well as the presence of lively scientific institutions, are factors that, taken together, appear to favor a phenomenon of reproduction and perpetuation of certain common patterns of thought, thereby preserving the existence of a national perspective.
Challenging the Paris Peace Treaties, State Sovereignty, and Western-Dominated International Law
(2018)
The genesis of the jus cogens doctrine in international law for long has been associated with a turn to a more value-laden international law after the Second World War promoted by British rapporteurs in the International Law Commission. This paper builds on this narrative but adds two seemingly contradictory story lines. In the 1920s and 1930s German-speaking international legal scholars like Alfred Verdross developed the concept as a tool to renounce the disliked Paris Peace Treaties in the context of more and more aggressive German revision policies. Furthermore, after 1945 Soviet thinkers of the Khrushchev era used jus cogens to criticize Western economic and military integration, while newly independent states regarded the concept as a promising vehicle for distancing themselves from traditional Western international legal notions in the era of decolonization. Hence, instead of embracing a progress narrative, a dark sides-account or a contributionist reading of the history of international law, this paper highlights the multifaceted origins of the jus cogens doctrine.
In light of current efforts at addressing the dangers of fake news, this article will revisit the international law relevant to the phenomenon, in particular the prohibition of intervention, the 1936 International Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, and the 1953 Convention on the International Right of Correction. It will be argued that important lessons can be learned from the League of Nations’ (LON) efforts in the interwar period and the UN’s activities in the immediate post-WWII era, while taking into account the new challenges that arise from modern communication technology.
Taking up the LON’s and UN’s distinction between false and distorted news, the international legal framework will be tested, in particular, against the coverage of the 2016 ‘Lisa case’ by Russian Government-funded media. This coverage is widely considered to be fake news aimed at destabilizing Germany’s society and institutions.
The article argues that false news can be subject to repressive regulation in a sensible manner. Distorted news, however, will have to be tolerated legally, since prohibitions in this regard would be too prone to abuse. A free and pluralist media, complemented by an appropriate governmental information policy, remains the best answer to fake news in all its forms. Due diligence obligations to fact-check, transparency, and remedies that are effective despite difficulties in attribution, and despite a lack of universal acceptance, could likewise be conducive.
This paper illustrates the functional and conceptual variances of law in different contexts. Whereas legal actors on the international level might normatively aim for law to have a similar effect to that of domestic law, the way in which international and supranational law can fulfil these potential functions is different. Accordingly, this paper argues that an awareness with regard to the particularities and challenges that the potential functions of law encounter in the international and supranational context is needed. Moreover, it suggests an analytical lens to conceptually frame and locate current developments, offering a broader perspective on, or even an element of explication for, the apparent crisis that law is currently facing on the international and supranational scale. After describing the potential functions of law on an abstract scale and grouping them into analytical categories, the paper uses these categories as a lens in order to assess in which way international law can fulfil these potential functions, where priorities regarding certain functions might differ and where some aspects of these functions are challenged when law is made and applied in the international and supranational sphere.
In challenging times for international law, there might be a heightened need for both analysis and prescription. The international rule of law as a connecting thread that goes through the global legal order is a particularly salient topic. By providing a working understanding of the content and contexts of the international rule of law, and by taking the regime of international investment law as a case study, this paper argues that assessing 'rise' or 'decline' motions in this sphere warrants a nuanced approach that should recognise parallel positive and negative developments. Whilst prominent procedural and substantive aspects of international investment law strongly align with the international rule of law requirements, numerous challenges threaten the future existence of the regime and appeal of international rule of law more broadly. At the same time, opportunities exist to adapt the substantive decision-making processes in investor-State disputes so to pursue parallel goals of enhancing rule of law at both international and national levels. Through recognising the specificities of interaction between international and national sphere, arbitrators can further reinvigorate the legitimacy of international rule of law through international investment law - benefitting thus the future of both.
The German-Italian dispute over the scope of sovereign immunities and claims of reparations for war crimes committed by German armed forces during World War II in Italy is in many ways specific and historically contingent. At the same time, it touches upon a number of fundamental challenges which the international community has to address in the interest of furthering the international rule of law. In this working paper both authors address the question whether the current law of sovereign immunities should be changed or interpreted in a manner as to allow for exceptions from State immunities in cases of grave violations of human rights. While the first part of the paper focusses on the perspective of general international law the second part addresses the question through the lense of European law. Both authors agree that unilateral efforts to push for what many consider a progressive development of international law actually may entail adverse effects for the international rule of law and thus may even contribute to a broader crisis of the international legal order.
During its sessions in 2016 and 2017 the UN International Law Commission (ILC) debated the question whether the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction is subject to exceptions for international crimes and provisionally adopted a Draft Article 7 on immunity ratione materiae. The following analytical presentation classifies and documents the reactions of States to draft article 7, paragraph 1, as they have been expressed in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly in 2017.
In its Burmych and Others v. Ukraine judgment of October 2017 the European Court of Human Rights has dismissed more than 12.000 applications due to the fact that given that they were not only repetitive in nature, but also mutatis mutandis identical to applications covered by a previous pilot judgment rendered against Ukraine. This raises fundamental issues as to the role of the Court within the human rights protection system established by the ECHR, as well as those concerning the interrelationship between the Court and the Committee of Ministers.
Draft Art. 15 CCAH attempts to strike a balance between State autonomy and robust judicial supervision. It largely follows Article 22 CERD conditioning the jurisdiction of the ICJ on prior negotiations. Hence, the substance of the clause is interpreted in light of the Court’s recent case law, especially Georgia v. Russia. Besides, several issues regarding the scope ratione temporis of the compromissory clause are discussed. The article advances several proposals to further improve the current draft, addressing the missing explicit reference to State responsibility, as well as the relationship between the Court and a possible treaty body, It also proposes to recalibrate the interplay of a requirement of prior negotiations respectively the seizing of a future treaty body on the one hand and provisional measures to be indicated by the Court on the other.
Berlin – New York
(2018)
Beginning in January 2019, the new German government will face a particular new responsibility for world affairs: provided the elections in June 2018 lead to the desired result, Germany will be an elected member of the UN Security Council for two years from January 2019 until December 2020. However, Germany has been a respected and highly relevant member of the United Nations not only during its terms on the Security Council but also in “normal” times. The present article attempts to shed light on a few aspects of Germany’s role in the UN during Merkel’s chancellorship with an emphasis on her third term (2014-2017), such as the cooperative relationship between Germany and the UN Secretary-General in important policy fields, Germany’s financial contributions to the UN, the impact of Germany’s EU membership on its UN membership and the country’s efforts with regard to the reform of the Security Council. The paper further provides context for Germany’s abstention in the vote on Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011. It concludes by ascertaining that Germany with its approach of active multilateralism has taken its place as one of the leading nations in Europe and is ready to take on responsibility with its partners to achieve a peaceful and stable world order.
This paper narrates the changes in the Indian policy towards foreign investment and analyses them in the backdrop of overall changes in the field of international law and particularly within the framework of the international rule of law. The policy changes that have taken place in India can be categorised into three periods. The first period commences after independence from colonial rule. This period is intriguing. At the international level, India insisted on national treatment for foreign investment and supported the New International Economic Order. Domestically, however, nationalisation was not pursued, and even when pursued, was not applied to foreign investors. This period continued until the 1990s when India faced serious economic problems and this coincided with the high point of the Washington consensus, often seen as the rise of the international rule of law. During this time, national treatment was abandoned and innumerable investment treaties granting liberal protection were entered into. This process ended abruptly after India lost the first investment case. This turn of events comments the third period, where efforts were made towards balancing between investor protection and conserving regulatory freedom. Although this period may appear to be a decline of the international rule of law, a nuanced approach shows that it is rather a rise. India has not withdrawn from the system of investor protection, as has been done by some other States. This period is characterised by extensive and detailed treaties to replace the prior sketchy treaty provisions. This is a move towards a more rule based investment protection.
The rule of law is the cornerstone of the international legal system. This paper shows, through analysis of intergovernmental instruments, statements made by representatives of States, and negotiation records, that the rule of law at the United Nations has become increasingly contested in the past years. More precisely, the argument builds on the process of integrating the notion of the rule of law into the Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in September 2015 in the document Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The main sections set out the background of the rule of law debate at the UN, the elements of the rule of law at the goal- and target-levels in the 2030 Agenda – especially in the SDG 16 –, and evaluate whether the rule of law in this context may be viewed as a normative and universal foundation of international law. The paper concludes, with reflections drawn from the process leading up to the 2030 Agenda and the final outcome document that the rule of law – or at least strong and precise formulations of the concept – may be in decline in institutional and normative settings. This can be perceived as symptomatic of a broader crisis of the international legal order.
German international legal scholarship has been known for its practice-oriented, doctrinal approach to international law. On the basis of archival material, this article tracks how this methodological take on international law developed in Germany between the 1920s and the 1980s. In 1924, as a reaction to the establishment of judicial institutions in the Treaty of Versailles, the German Reich founded the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. Director Viktor Bruns institutionalized the practice-oriented method to advance the idea of international law as a legal order as well as to safeguard the interests of the Weimar government before the various courts. Under National Socialism, members of the Institute provided legal justifications for Hitler’s increasingly radical foreign policy. At the same time, some of them did not engage with völkisch-racist theories, but systematized the existing ius in bello. After 1945, Hermann Mosler, as director of the renamed Max Planck Institute, took the view that the practice-oriented approach was not as discredited as the more theoretical approach of völkisch international law. Furthermore, he regarded the method as a promising vehicle to support the policy of Westintegration of Konrad Adenauer. Also, he tried to promote the idea of ‘international society as a legal community’ by analysing international practice.
The paper looks at community interests in international law from the perspective of the International Law Commission. As the topics of the Commission are diverse, the outcome of its work is often seen as providing a sense of direction regarding general aspects of international law. After defining what he understands by “community interests”, the author looks at both secondary and primary rules of international law, as they have been articulated by the Commission, as well as their relevance for the recognition and implementation of community interests. The picture which emerges only partly fits the widespread narrative of “from self-interest to community interest”. Whereas the Commission has recognized, or developed, certain primary rules which more fully articulate community interests, it has been reluctant to reformulate secondary rules of international law, with the exception of jus cogens. The Commission has more recently rather insisted that the traditional State-consent-oriented secondary rules concerning the formation of customary international law and regarding the interpretation of treaties continue to be valid in the face of other actors and forms of action which push towards the recognition of more and thicker community interests.
Over the last few decades, the methodology for the identification of customary international law (CIL) has been changing. Both elements of CIL – practice and opinio juris – have assumed novel and broader forms, as noted in the Reports of the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). This paper discusses these Reports and the draft conclusions, and reaction by States in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), highlighting the areas of consensus and contestation. This ties to the analysis of the main doctrinal positions, with special attention being given to the two elements of CIL, and the role of the UNGA resolutions. The underlying motivation is to assess the real or perceived crisis of CIL, and the author develops the broader argument maintaining that in order to retain unity within international law, the internal limits of CIL must be carefully asserted.
This paper will turn into a contribution to a book on community obligations. It focusses on third parties' rights and obligations in armed conflict.
It is often said that international law has developed from a legal order which is designed to protect sovereignty to a system which also promotes community interests. This shift is said to be reflected in structural changes of the legal system. The creation of rights and obligations for third parties is generally seen as a part of this perceived paradigmatic shift. Community interests can be furthered either by negative duties of abstention, by an entitlement for third states, or even by duties to take positive measures. Since the shift towards protecting community interests apparently requires some form of cooperation, positive rights and duties to protect and to promote appear to be indispensable. Authors relying on a community perspective often dismiss duties of abstention as an expression of indifference in the face of a violation of a fundamental norm. Solidarity seems to require that third states take a more proactive role in actively enforcing community interests.
The paper aims to test this understanding on the basis of an analysis of rights and obligations of third states in armed conflict. In order to argue that duties of abstention of third states are a central instrument for promoting community interests in relation to armed conflicts, the paper will first trace pertinent structural changes in international law. In particular, it will question the extent to which positive rights and obligations of third states have been firmly established in international law. In a second step, this contribution will evaluate the overall tendencies in the ongoing lawmaking process for promoting community interests in relation to armed conflict.
Caribbean States organised in CARICOM recently brought forward reparation claims against several European States to compensate slavery and (native) genocides in the Caribbean and even threatened to approach the International Court of Justice. The paper provides for an analysis of the facts behind the CARICOM claim and asks whether the law of state responsibility is able to provide for the demanded compensation. As the intertemporal principle generally prohibits retroactive application of today’s international rules, the paper argues that the complete claim must be based on the law of state responsibility governing in the time of the respective conduct. An inquiry into the history of primary (prohibition of slavery and genocide) as well as secondary rules of State responsibility reveals that both sets of rules were underdeveloped or non-existent at the times of slavery and alleged (native) genocides. Therefore, the author concludes that the CARICOM claim is legally flawed but nevertheless worth the attention as it once again exposes imperial and colonial injustices of the past and their legitimization by historical international law and international/natural lawyers.
Das dritte Working Paper in der KFG Working Paper Series analysiert Zustand und Perspektiven völkerrechtlicher Abrüstungsverträge unter der Ägide der Vereinten Nationen. Während die dreißig Jahre zwischen der Kuba-Krise und dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs für die Abrüstung eine erfolgreiche Periode gewesen seien, seien in den Vereinten Nationen seither außer dem Waffenhandelsvertrag keine weiteren Abrüstungsverträge abgeschlossen worden. Die gegenwärtige Stimmung sei abwartend bis negativ, obwohl es ein Nachholbedürfnis gebe, Abrüstungsverträge an die heutigen politischen Gegebenheiten sowie an den Stand der Technik anzupassen. Die Verfasserin schlägt als Lösung vor, durch eine Politik der kleinen Schritte ein besseres Abrüstungsklima zu schaffen, indem dem Diskurs auf Grundlage zusätzlicher Protokolle zu bestehenden Verträgen und notfalls auch durch ein Ausweichen auf andere Gremien eine neue Richtung verliehen werde.
This article re-examines the relationship between Africa and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It traces the successive changes of the African attitude towards this Court, from states' euphoria, to hostility against its work, to regional counter-initiatives through the umbrella of the African Union (AU). The main argument goes beyond the idea of "the Court that Africa wants" in order to identify concrete reasons behind such a formal argument which may have fostered, if not enticed, the majority of African states to become ICC members and actively cooperate with it, when paradoxically some great powers have decided to stay outside its jurisdiction. It also seeks to understand, from a political and legal viewpoint, which parameters have changed since then to provoke that hostile attitude against the Court's work and the entrance of the AU into the debate through the African Common Position on the ICC. Lastly, this article explores African alternatives to the contested ICC justice system. It examines the need to reform the Rome Statute in order to give more independence, credibility and legitimacy to the ICC and its duplication to some extent by the new "Criminal Court of the African Union". Particular attention is paid to the resistance against this idea to reform the ICC justice system.
The paper undertakes a preliminary assessment of current developments of international law for the purpose of mapping the ground for a larger research project. The research project pursues the goal of determining whether public international law, as it has developed since the end of the Cold War, is continuing its progressive move towards a more human-rights- and multi-actor-oriented order, or whether we are seeing a renewed emphasis of more classical elements of international law. In this context the term “international rule of law” is chosen to designate the more recent and “thicker” understanding of international law. The paper discusses how it can be determined whether this form of international law continues to unfold, and whether we are witnessing challenges to this order which could give rise to more fundamental reassessments.