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Die Begrenzung systemischer Risiken ist essentieller Bestandteil der neuen internationalen Finanzmarktordnung. Dabei galt es nicht nur die Verflechtung der Banken untereinander, sondern auch die Verbindung zwischen den Staatsfinanzen und der Solvenz der nationalen Bankensysteme (dem sog. Risikoverbund zwischen Staat und Banken) zu durchbrechen. Der Beitrag beleuchtet die Entwicklung der Forderungen gegenüber Staaten in den Bankbilanzen der Euroländer und des Eurosystems im Zeitverlauf sowie den daraus erwachsenden Risiken für die Finanzstabilität. Hierzu werden die Determinanten des Risikoverbunds theoretisch wie empirisch analysiert. Die fiskalische Kapazität der Eurostaaten wird anhand verschiedener Faktoren wie der Verschuldungsquote, dem Leistungsbilanzsaldo und der Kredit-BIP Lücke aufgezeigt; anschließend werden die Strukturen der Bankensysteme im Euroraum untersucht. Im Einzelnen werden die private und staatliche Gesamtverschuldung, die konsolidierte Bankenbilanzsumme und die darin enthaltenen Verbindlichkeiten sowie der Anteil des Bankensektors an der Bruttowertschöpfung in Relation zur Wirtschaftsleistung betrachtet. Außerdem finden NPE-Bestände in den Bankbilanzen sowie die Renditen der emittierten Staatsanleihen und damit in Verbindung stehenden CDS-Spreads Betrachtung. Zusätzlich werden die Konzentration, der Verschuldungsgrad, Liquiditätsziffern sowie länderspezifische Unterschiede in Art und Fristigkeit der Refinanzierung der Bankensektoren abgebildet. Auf Basis der empirischen Befunde werden im Hinblick auf die wechselseitigen Ansteckungseffekte zwischen Banken und Staaten Implikationen für die Finanzmarktregulierung diskutiert.
Revisiting public investment
(2004)
The consumption equivalence method is the theoretical basis of public cost-benefit analysis. Consumption equivalence public capital prices are explicitly introduces in order to sufficiently care for the opportunity cost of public expenditure. This can solve the dispute about the social rate of discount within public cost-benefit analysis witch was generated on a criterion looking similar to the capital value formula, known as Lind’s approach. The social rate of discount is liberated from opportunity costs considerations and the discounting away of the effects for future welfare vanishes. The corresponding question whether one should accept a positive value of the pure rate of social time preference is an old issue. Its current state between the prescriptive and descriptive view can also be interpreted as a consequence of the oversimplification of standard cost– benefit analysis. But apart from an economic self-process the pure rate of social time preference is also defined as a business-as-usual value of social distance discounting. Hence, a political choice has to be made about this rate which is free in principal.
Public pensions in the U.S.
(2005)
Contents: The Public Old Age Insurance of the U.S. -Historical overview -Technical details -Individual equity and social adequacy The Economic Problem of Old Age -Risks and economic security -Old age, retirement, and idividual precaution -Insurance markets, market failures, and social insurance -Options for public pension systems The Problems of Social Security -The financial balance of OASDI -Causes of the long-run problems -Rates of return -Conclusion - The case for Social Security reform Proposed Remedies -Full, partial, or no privatization? -The President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security -Kotlikoff's Personal Security System -The Diamond-Orszag Three-Part plan
Property tax competition
(2022)
We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxa-tion regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and “rent seeking” regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high tax rates, whereas centralized taxation yields a common optimal tax rate, and tax rates in the rent-seeking regime can be either inefficiently high or low. We quantify the effects of switching from the observed tax system to the three regimes for Japan and Germany. The decentralized or rent-seeking regime best describes the Japanese tax system, whereas the centralized regime does so for Germany. We also quantify the welfare effects of regime changes.
Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a “good” leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader’s first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader’s statements.
Carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere is becoming an important option to achieve net zero climate targets. This paper develops a welfare and public economics perspective on optimal policies for carbon removal and storage in non-permanent sinks like forests, soil, oceans, wood products or chemical products. We derive a new metric for the valuation of non-permanent carbon storage, the social cost of carbon removal (SCC-R), which embeds also the conventional social cost of carbon emissions. We show that the contribution of CDR is to create new carbon sinks that should be used to reduce transition costs, even if the stored carbon is released to the atmosphere eventually. Importantly, CDR does not raise the ambition of optimal temperature levels unless initial atmospheric carbon stocks are excessively high. For high initial atmospheric carbon stocks, CDR allows to reduce the optimal temperature below initial levels. Finally, we characterize three different policy regimes that ensure an optimal deployment of carbon removal: downstream carbon pricing, upstream carbon pricing, and carbon storage pricing. The policy regimes differ in their informational and institutional requirements regarding monitoring, liability and financing.
We investigate the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on self-employed people’s mental health. Using representative longitudinal survey data from Germany, we reveal differential effects by gender: whereas self-employed women experienced a substantial deterioration in their mental health, self-employed men displayed no significant changes up to early 2021. Financial losses are important in explaining these differences. In addition, we find larger mental health responses among self-employed women who were directly affected by government-imposed restrictions and bore an increased childcare burden due to school and daycare closures. We also find that self-employed individuals who are more resilient coped better with the crisis.
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) moves atmospheric carbon to geological or land-based sinks. In a first-best setting, the optimal use of CDR is achieved by a removal subsidy that equals the optimal carbon tax and marginal damages. We derive second-best subsidies for CDR when no global carbon price exists but a national government implements a unilateral climate policy. We find that the optimal carbon tax differs from an optimal CDR subsidy because of carbon leakage, terms-of-trade and fossil resource rent dynamics. First, the optimal removal subsidy tends to be larger than the carbon tax because of lower supply-side leakage on fossil resource markets. Second, terms-of-trade effects exacerbate this wedge for net resource exporters, implying even larger removal subsidies. Third, the optimal removal subsidy may fall below the carbon tax for resource-poor countries when marginal environmental damages are small.
We develop a model of optimal carbon taxation and redistribution taking into account horizontal equity concerns by considering heterogeneous energy efficiencies. By deriving first- and second-best rules for policy instruments including carbon taxes, transfers and energy subsidies, we then investigate analytically how horizontal equity is considered in the social welfare maximizing tax structure. We calibrate the model to German household data and a 30 percent emission reduction goal. Our results show that energy-intensive households should receive more redistributive resources than energy-efficient households if and only if social inequality aversion is sufficiently high. We further find that redistribution of carbon tax revenue via household-specific transfers is the first-best policy. Equal per-capita transfers do not suffer from informational problems, but increase mitigation costs by around 15 percent compared to the first- best for unity inequality aversion. Adding renewable energy subsidies or non-linear energy subsidies, reduces mitigation costs further without relying on observability of households’ energy efficiency.
On Track to Success?
(2022)
Many countries consider expanding vocational curricula in secondary education to boost skills and labour market outcomes among non-university-bound students. However, critics fear this could divert other students from more profitable academic education. We study labour market returns to vocational education in England, where until recently students chose between a vocational track, an academic track and quitting education at age 16. Identification is challenging because self-selection is strong and because students’ next-best alternatives are unknown. Against this back- drop, we leverage multiple instrumental variables to estimate margin-specific treatment effects, i.e., causal returns to vocational education for students at the margin with academic education and, separately, for students at the margin with quitting education. Identification comes from variation in distance to the nearest vocational provider conditional on distance to the nearest academic provider (and vice-versa), while controlling for granular student, school and neighbourhood characteristics. The analysis is based on population-wide administrative education data linked to tax records. We find that the vast majority of marginal vocational students are indifferent be- tween vocational and academic education. For them, vocational enrolment substantially decreases earnings at age 30. This earnings penalty grows with age and is due to wages, not employment. However, consistent with comparative advantage, the penalty is smaller for students with higher revealed preferences for the vocational track. For the few students at the margin with no further education, we find merely tentative evidence of increased employment and earnings from vocational enrolment.