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Institute
Blutige Enthaltung
(2021)
Die Militärhistoriker Sönke Neitzel und Matteo Scianna legen die erste historische Darstellung und Analyse der deutschen Syrienpolitik seit 2011 vor. Sie legen die Probleme einer Außenpolitik offen, die für die katastrophale Lage in Syrien und die großen Flüchtlingsbewegungen von dort mit verantwortlich ist. Neitzel und Scianna konstatieren eine Diskrepanz zwischen der wirtschaftlichen Macht und der Bereitschaft, einer gewachsenen politischen Verantwortung im internationalen Krisenmanagement gerecht zu werden – zumal in Fällen, in denen ein militärisches Eingreifen gefragt wäre. Die Autoren betrachten den Syrienkrieg als ein Beispiel, um die Haltung Deutschlands in internationalen Krisen und seine Rolle bei deren Bewältigung kritisch zu beleuchten. Ihr Fazit: Es fehlt hierzulande eine strategische Kultur im Umgang mit den wachsenden internationalen Konflikten. Stattdessen versucht sich die deutsche Außenpolititk möglichst aus der Affäre zu ziehen.
A prelude to total war?
(2018)
The conflict between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935–36 has been framed as a prelude to the Second World War and as a watershed towards ‘Total War’. One perspective has so far been neglected: the assessments of foreign military observers. This article examines American, British, German, and Austrian views on the operations and thereby also analyses the mindset of European officers at the time. The core argument emerging from these reports is that the war was perceived as a rather ‘normal’ colonial conflict. Neither the use of gas, nor the employment of aircraft against civilians was seen as a taboo or created significant outrage among the military observers. Instead, they lauded the Italians’ steady logistical efforts and employment of artillery and airpower to overcome nature and the enemy’s resistance.
The German Sonderweg thesis has been discarded in most research fields. Yet in regards to the military, things differ: all conflicts before the Second World War are interpreted as prelude to the war of extermination between 1939-1945. This article specifically looks at the Franco-Prussian War 1870-71 and German behaviour vis-a-vis regular combatants, civilians and irregular guerrilla fighters, the so-called francs-tireurs. The author argues that the counter-measures were not exceptional for nineteenth century warfare and also shows how selective reading of the existing secondary literature has distorted our view on the war.
On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February 1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with the bombing of US Marines’ barracks. However, an analysis of the Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality, respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a qualified success of the Italian efforts.