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The German Sonderweg thesis has been discarded in most research fields. Yet in regards to the military, things differ: all conflicts before the Second World War are interpreted as prelude to the war of extermination between 1939–1945. This article specifically looks at the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71 and German behaviour vis-à-vis regular combatants, civilians and irregular guerrilla fighters, the so-called francs-tireurs. The author argues that the counter-measures were not exceptional for nineteenth century warfare and also shows how selective reading of the existing secondary literature has distorted our view on the war.
Stuck in the past?
(2018)
After the Civil War the Spanish army functioned as a guardian of domestic order, but suffered from antiquated material and little financial means. These factors have been described as fundamental reasons for the army’s low potential wartime capability. This article draws on British and German sources to demonstrate how Spanish military culture prevented an augmented effectiveness and organisational change. Claiming that the army merely lacked funding and modern equipment, falls considerably short in grasping the complexities of military effectiveness and organisational cultures, and might prove fatal for current attempts to develop foreign armed forces in conflict or post-conflict zones.
On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February
1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational
Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to
bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The
mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with
the bombing of US Marines’ barracks. However, an analysis of the
Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and
could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts
were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco
Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality,
respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a
qualified success of the Italian efforts.
Forging an Italian hero?
(2018)
Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909–2010) has been turned into a public and military hero. His exploits as a guerrilla leader in Italian East Africa in 1941 have been exaggerated to forge a narrative of an honourable resistance against overwhelming odds. Thereby, Guillet has been showcased as a romanticized colonial explorer who was an apolitical and timeless Italian officer. He has been compared to Lawrence of Arabia in order to raise his international visibility, while his genuine Italian brand is perpetuated domestically. By elevating him to an official role model, the Italian Army has gained a focal point for military heroism that was also acceptable in the public memory as the embodiment of a ‘glorious’ defeat narrative.