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Die Neue Ökonomische Geographie (NEG) erklärt Agglomerationen aus einem mikroökonomischen Totalmodell heraus. Zur Vereinfachung werden verschiedene Symmetrieannahmen getätigt. So wird davon ausgegangen, dass die betrachteten Regionen die gleiche Größe haben, die Ausgabenanteile für verschiedene Gütergruppen identisch sind und die Transportkosten für alle Industrieprodukte die selben sind. Eine Folge dieser Annahmen ist es, dass zwar erklärt werden kann, unter welchen Bedingungen es zur Agglomerationsbildung kommt, nicht aber wo dies geschieht. In dieser Arbeit werden drei Standardmodelle der NEG um verschiedene Asymmetrien erweitert und die Veränderung der Ergebnisse im Vergleich zum jeweiligen Basismodell dargestellt. Dabei wird neben der Theorie auf die Methoden der Simulation eingegangen, die sich grundsätzlich auf andere Modelle übertragen lassen. Darauf aufbauend wird eine asymmetrische Modellvariante auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Deutschlands angewandt. So lässt sich das Ausbleiben eines flächendeckenden Aufschwungs in den neuen Ländern, die starken Wanderungsbewegungen in die alten Länder und das dauerhafte Lohnsatzgefälle in einem Totalmodell erklären.
Persistence of stock returns is an extensively studied and discussed theme in the analysis of financial markets. Antipersistence is usually attributed to volatilities. However, not only volatilities but also stock returns can exhibit antipersistence. Antipersistent noise has a somewhat rougher appearance than Gaussian noise. Heuristically spoken, price movements are more likely followed by movements in the opposite direction than in the same direction. The pertaining integrated process exhibits a smaller range – prices seem to stay in the vicinity of the initial value. We apply a widely used test based upon the modified R/S-Method by Lo [1991] to daily returns of 21 German stocks from 1960 to 2008. Combining this test with the concept of moving windows by Carbone et al. [2004], we are able to determine periods of antipersistence for some of the series under examination. Our results suggest that antipersistence can be found for stocks and periods where extraordinary corporate actions such as mergers & acquisitions or financial distress are present. These effects should be properly accounted for when choosing and designing models for inference.
Although Germany does not figure among the 'forerunners' of managerial reforms of the public sector, it has a long tradition of agencies and non-departmental bodies at the federal level. Over time, the federal administration has developed into a highly differentiated 'administrative zoo' with a large number of species, questioning the image of a well-ordered German bureaucracy. The article addresses organizational changes among non-ministerial agencies during the past 20 years and ministry-agency relations, drawing on data from a comprehensive survey of the federal administration. The structural changes we observe are neither comprehensive nor planned; they are much more evolutionary than revolutionary, driven by sectoral policies and not by any overall agency policy, supported more by regulatory than by managerial reforms, and most of the changes are horizontal mergers or successions of existing organizations, while we find almost no evidence for hiving-off from ministries to agencies. At the same time, federal agencies report a lot of bureaucratic discretion, whereas they perceive substantial levels of 'red tape' due to administrative regulations. We also find that traditional, hierarchical modes of ministerial oversight are still dominating; only few agencies have performance agreements with measurable goals.