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Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target's misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument
When are international organizations (IOs) responsive to the policy problems that motivated their establishment? While it is a conventional assumption that IOs exist to address transnational challenges, the question of whether and when IO policy-making is responsive to shifts in underlying problems has not been systematically explored. This study investigates the responsiveness of IOs from a large-n, comparative approach. Theoretically, we develop three alternative models of IO responsiveness, emphasizing severeness, dependence, and power differentials. Empirically, we focus on the domain of security, examining the responsiveness of eight multi-issue IOs to armed conflict between 1980 and 2015, using a novel and expansive dataset on IO policy decisions. Our findings suggest, first, that IOs are responsive to security problems and, second, that responsiveness is not primarily driven by dependence or power differentials but by problem severity. An in-depth study of the responsiveness of the UN Security Council using more granular data confirms these findings. As the first comparative study of whether and when IO policy adapts to problem severity, the article has implications for debates about IO responsiveness, performance, and legitimacy.
In this article, we examine the effects of political change on name changes of units within central government ministries. We expect that changes regarding the policy position of a government will cause changes in the names of ministerial units. To this end we formulate hypotheses combining the politics of structural choice and theories of portfolio allocation to examine the effects of political changes at the cabinet level on the names of intra-ministerial units. We constructed a dataset containing more than 17,000 observations on name changes of ministerial units between 1980 and 2013 from the central governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and France. We regress a series of generalized estimating equations (GEE) with population averaging models for binary outcomes. Finding variations across the three political-bureaucratic systems, we overall report positive effects of governmental change and ideological positions on name changes within ministries.
Weï re here, weï re queer, and weï re not going shopping! : queering space : Interventionen im Raum
(2004)
Wertebilung in der Schule
(2019)
Der vorliegende Beitrag fasst die bisherige Forschung über die Wirkungen von Gebietsreformen zusammen und analysiert diese aus inhaltlicher und methodischer Perspektive. Basierend auf einer Auswertung von ausgewählten nationalen und europäischen Studien werden Wirkungsbefunde in drei zentralen Dimensionen dargestellt: (1) Leistungsfähigkeit, Verwaltungs- und Veranstaltungskraft, (2) Einsparungen, Skalenerträge und Wirtschaftlichkeit und (3) Partizipation und demokratische Kontrolle. Im Ergebnis kann festgestellt werden, dass die Leistungs- und Handlungsfähigkeit kommunaler Verwaltungen durch Gebietsreformen überwiegend positiv beeinflusst wird. Dagegen sind die empirischen Befunde bezüglich Wirtschaftlichkeit, Einsparungen und Skalenerträge sowie zur Partizipation und demokratischen Kontrolle nicht eindeutig.
Wachsende Rivalität
(1996)
Voting for Votes
(2022)
Scholars frequently expect parties to act strategically in parliament, hoping to affect their electoral fortunes. Voters assumingly assess parties by their activity and vote accordingly. However, the retrospective voting literature looks mostly at the government's outcomes, leaving the opposition understudied. We argue that, for opposition parties, legislative voting constitutes an effective vote-seeking activity as a signaling tool of their attitude toward the government. We suggest that conflictual voting behavior affects voters through two mechanisms: as a signal of opposition valence and as means of ideological differentiation from the government. We present both aggregate- and individual-level analyses, leveraging a dataset of 169 party observations from 10 democracies and linking it to the CSES survey data of 27,371 respondents. The findings provide support for the existence of both mechanisms. Parliamentary conflict on legislative votes has a general positive effect on opposition parties' electoral performance, conditional on systemic and party-specific factors.
Vorwort
(2002)
Vorwort
(2021)
Vorwort
(2011)
Vorwort
(2011)
Vorwort
(2013)
Von den Mühen des Gedenkens
(1997)