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- Berlin Potsdam Research Group "The International Rule of Law - Rise or Decline?" (46) (remove)
In its Burmych and Others v. Ukraine judgment of October 2017 the European Court of Human Rights has dismissed more than 12.000 applications due to the fact that given that they were not only repetitive in nature, but also mutatis mutandis identical to applications covered by a previous pilot judgment rendered against Ukraine. This raises fundamental issues as to the role of the Court within the human rights protection system established by the ECHR, as well as those concerning the interrelationship between the Court and the Committee of Ministers.
German international legal scholarship has been known for its practice-oriented, doctrinal approach to international law. On the basis of archival material, this article tracks how this methodological take on international law developed in Germany between the 1920s and the 1980s. In 1924, as a reaction to the establishment of judicial institutions in the Treaty of Versailles, the German Reich founded the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. Director Viktor Bruns institutionalized the practice-oriented method to advance the idea of international law as a legal order as well as to safeguard the interests of the Weimar government before the various courts. Under National Socialism, members of the Institute provided legal justifications for Hitler’s increasingly radical foreign policy. At the same time, some of them did not engage with völkisch-racist theories, but systematized the existing ius in bello. After 1945, Hermann Mosler, as director of the renamed Max Planck Institute, took the view that the practice-oriented approach was not as discredited as the more theoretical approach of völkisch international law. Furthermore, he regarded the method as a promising vehicle to support the policy of Westintegration of Konrad Adenauer. Also, he tried to promote the idea of ‘international society as a legal community’ by analysing international practice.
This paper narrates the changes in the Indian policy towards foreign investment and analyses them in the backdrop of overall changes in the field of international law and particularly within the framework of the international rule of law. The policy changes that have taken place in India can be categorised into three periods. The first period commences after independence from colonial rule. This period is intriguing. At the international level, India insisted on national treatment for foreign investment and supported the New International Economic Order. Domestically, however, nationalisation was not pursued, and even when pursued, was not applied to foreign investors. This period continued until the 1990s when India faced serious economic problems and this coincided with the high point of the Washington consensus, often seen as the rise of the international rule of law. During this time, national treatment was abandoned and innumerable investment treaties granting liberal protection were entered into. This process ended abruptly after India lost the first investment case. This turn of events comments the third period, where efforts were made towards balancing between investor protection and conserving regulatory freedom. Although this period may appear to be a decline of the international rule of law, a nuanced approach shows that it is rather a rise. India has not withdrawn from the system of investor protection, as has been done by some other States. This period is characterised by extensive and detailed treaties to replace the prior sketchy treaty provisions. This is a move towards a more rule based investment protection.
Berlin – New York
(2018)
Beginning in January 2019, the new German government will face a particular new responsibility for world affairs: provided the elections in June 2018 lead to the desired result, Germany will be an elected member of the UN Security Council for two years from January 2019 until December 2020. However, Germany has been a respected and highly relevant member of the United Nations not only during its terms on the Security Council but also in “normal” times. The present article attempts to shed light on a few aspects of Germany’s role in the UN during Merkel’s chancellorship with an emphasis on her third term (2014-2017), such as the cooperative relationship between Germany and the UN Secretary-General in important policy fields, Germany’s financial contributions to the UN, the impact of Germany’s EU membership on its UN membership and the country’s efforts with regard to the reform of the Security Council. The paper further provides context for Germany’s abstention in the vote on Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011. It concludes by ascertaining that Germany with its approach of active multilateralism has taken its place as one of the leading nations in Europe and is ready to take on responsibility with its partners to achieve a peaceful and stable world order.
This paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of the problematic features of the appointment of arbitrators in ISDS.
A growing demand for natural resources embedded in current changes of the international order will put pressure on states to secure the future availability of these resources. Some political discourses suggest that states might respond by challenging the foundations of international law. Whereas the UN Charter was inter alia aimed at eliminating uses of force for economic reasons, one may observe an on-going trend of securitization of matters of resource supply resulting into the revival of self-preservation doctrines. The chapter will show that those claims lack a normative foundation in the current framework of the prohibition of the use of force. Moreover, international law has sufficient instruments to cope with disputes over access to resources by other means than the use of force. The international community, therefore, must oppose claims that may contribute to normative uncertainties and strengthen already existing instruments of pacific settlement of disputes.
Once the “popular plaything of Realpolitiker” the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus post the 1969 VCLT is often described as an objective rule by which, on grounds of equity and justice, a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for termination. Yet recent practice from States such as Ecuador, Russia, Denmark and the United Kingdom suggests that it is returning with a new livery. They point to an understanding based on vital States’ interests––a view popular among scholars such as Erich Kaufmann at the beginning of the last century.
This paper – which is based on the Thomas Franck Lecture held by the author at Humboldt University Berlin on 13 May 2019 – argues that the most likely development of international to be expected will be the coexistence of two “legal worlds”. On the one hand, an inter-State law brutally regulating political relations between human groups whitewashed by nationalism; on the other hand, a transnational or “a-national” law regulating economic relations between private as well as public interests. Further, the paper argues that there are two obvious victims – of very different nature – of this foreseeable evolution: the human being on the one hand, the certainty and effectiveness of the rule of law itself on the other hand.
This article explores, whether domestic judges might be held accountable under international criminal law (ICL). To date, international criminal justice has almost entirely focused on prosecuting political or military leaders. The Justice Case tried before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in 1946 marks the most prominent exception. Prior to it, the judiciary – otherwise considered the epitome of justice – had mutated into a murderous machinery under Nazi rule. Judicial decisions do have far-reaching implications possibly constituting or contributing to international crimes. This holds true in a wide range of cases, for instance on practices of warfare and torture, on the use of certain weapon technologies, or on policies relating to minorities or racial segregation. I argue that domestic judges are accountable when engaging in international crimes. The article delves into technical aspects of criminal law; as well as the notions of judicial independence and immunity. While guaranteeing the rule of law, these two notions challenge the core idea of ICL: its equal application vis-à-vis all perpetrators of international crimes irrespective of official capacity. In order to differentiate due judicial conduct and its abuse in violation of ICL, I suggest a threshold a judicial act needs to exceed for entailing accountability for an international crime.
Modern rule of law and post-war constitutionalism are both anchored in rights-based limitations on state authority. Rule-of-law norms and principles, at both domestic and international levels, are designed to protect the freedom and dignity of the person. Given this “thick” conception of the rule of law, authoritarian practices that remove constraints on domestic political leaders and weaken mechanisms for holding them accountable necessarily erode both domestic and international rule of law. Drawing on political science research on authoritarian politics, this study identifies three core elements of authoritarian political strategies: subordination of the judiciary, suppression of independent news media and freedom of expression, and restrictions on the ability of civil society groups to organize and participate in public life. According to available data, each of these three practices has become increasingly common in recent years. This study offers a composite measure of the core authoritarian practices and uses it to identify the countries that have shown the most marked increases in authoritarianism. The spread and deepening of these authoritarian practices in diverse regimes around the world diminishes international rule of law. The conclusion argues that resurgent authoritarianism degrades international rule of law even if this is defined as the specifically post-Cold War international legal order.
International courts regularly cite each other, in part as a means of building legitimacy. Such international, cross-court use of precedent (or “judicial dialogue”) among the regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee has an additional purpose and effect: the construction of a rights-based global constitutionalism. Judicial dialogue among the human rights courts is purposeful in that the courts see themselves as embedded in, and contributing to, a global human rights legal system. Cross-citation among the human rights courts advances the construction of rights-based global constitutionalism in that it provides a basic degree of coordination among the regional courts. The jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), as an authoritative interpreter of core international human rights norms, plays the role of a central focal point for the decentralized coordination of jurisprudence. The network of regional courts and the HRC is building an emergent institutional structure for global rights-based constitutionalism.
How to identify customary international law is an important question of international law. The International Law Commission has in 2018 adopted a set of sixteen conclusions, together with commentaries, on this topic. The paper consists of three parts: First, the reasons are discussed why the Commission came to work on the topic “Identification of customary international law”. Then, some of its conclusions are highlighted. Finally, the outcome of the work of the Commission is placed in a general context, before concluding.
This paper assesses the rise and decline of international rule of law in the case of non-state armed actors. Both signs of rise and signs of decline of international rule of law show in the case of non- state armed actors. Signs of rise include the expansion of coverage of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law, as well as international legal argumentation and rhetoric made by non-state armed groups. Some non-state armed actors express that they are governed by IHL in public statements or bilateral agreements with international actors, partly acknowledging universality of international humanitarian norms, and sometimes act as such. Signs of decline in the international rule of law also show – although some of them can be seen as business-as-usual – privileging of military advantage, instrumental use of international law (as justification and local interpretations), as well as conflicting understanding of IHL between local and global norms. The multiplicity of non-state actors also portends the decline of international rule of law, with the proliferation of many non-organized groups without legitimacy-seeking motivations.
The worldwide populist wave has contributed to a perception that international law is currently in a state of crisis. This article examines in how far populist governments have challenged prevailing interpretations of international law. The article links structural features of populism with an analysis of populist governmental strategies and argumentative practices. It demonstrates that, in their rhetoric, populist governments promote an understanding of international law as a mere law of coordination. This is, however, not entirely reflected in their legal practices where an instrumental, cherry-picking approach prevails. The article concludes that policies of populist governments affect the current state of international law on two different levels: In the political sphere their practices alter the general environment in which legal rules are interpreted. In the legal sphere populist governments push for changes in the interpretation of established international legal rules. The article substantiates these propositions by focusing on the principle of nonintervention and foreign funding for NGOs.
The paper aims to lay out a framework for evaluating value shifts in the international legal order for the purposes of a forthcoming book. In view of current contestations it asks whether we are observing yet another period of norm change (Wandel) or even a more fundamental transformation of international law – a metamorphosis (Verwandlung). For this purpose it suggests to look into the mechanisms of how norms change from the perspective of legal and political science and also to approximate a reference point where change turns into metamorphosis. It submits that such a point may be reached where specific legally protected values are indeed changing (change of legal values) or where the very idea of protecting certain values through law is renounced (delegalizing of values). The paper discusses the benefits of such an interdisciplinary exchange and tries to identify differences and commonalities among both disciplinary perspectives.
While some pronouncements of expert treaty bodies have been considered ‘key catalysts’ for the development of international human rights law, others are only selectively referred to in legal practice. This article argues that the varying normative impact is due to the informal character of pronouncements. In the absence of treaty provisions specifying their legal effect, practitioners tend to rely on different factors and arguments when either drawing on or rejecting certain pronouncements. Scholars in turn face difficulties when trying to identify explanatory patterns within this diverging practice as the informal character confronts both international lawyers and international relations scholars with their respective methodological ‘blind spots’. In light of these intradisciplinary challenges, this article explores the extent as to which an interdisciplinary approach helps to assess the reasons for the varying impact of pronouncements. After analysing the factors determining their legal significance on the basis of State practice and the academic debate, this article identifies the drafting process as a factor which promises to be particularly insightful when explored from an interdisciplinary perspective and sketches out a framework for future research.
How does the international Rule of Law apply to constrain the conduct of the Executive within a constitutional State that adopts a dualist approach to the reception of international law? This paper argues that, so far from being inconsistent with the concept of the Rule of Law, the Executive within a dualist constitution has a self-enforcing obligation to abide by the obligations of the State under international law. This is not dependent on Parliament’s incorporation of treaty obligations into domestic law. It is the correlative consequence of the allocation to the Executive of the power to conduct foreign relations. The paper develops this argument in response to recent debate in the United Kingdom on whether Ministers have an obligation to comply with international law–a reference that the Government removed from the Ministerial Code. It shows that such an obligation is consistent with both four centuries of the practice of the British State and with principle.
International adjudication is currently under assault, encouraging a number of States to withdraw, or to consider withdrawing, from treaties providing for international dispute settlement. This Working Paper argues that the act of treaty withdrawal is not merely as the unilateral executive exercise of the individual sovereign prerogative of a State. International law places checks upon the exercise of withdrawal, recognising that it is an act that of its nature affects the interests of other States parties, which have a collective interest in constraining withdrawal. National courts have a complementary function in restraining unilateral withdrawal in order to support the domestic constitution. The arguments advanced against international adjudication in the name of popular democracy at the national level can serve as a cloak for the exercise of executive power unrestrained by law. The submission by States of their disputes to peaceful settlement through international adjudication is central, not incidental, to the successful operation of the international legal system.
Underpinning a legal system with certain values and helping to resolve norm conflicts is in domestic legal systems usually achieved through hierarchical superiority of certain norms of a constitutional nature. The present paper examines the question whether jus cogens can discharge this function within the traditionally horizontal and decentralized international legal order. In so doing, it commences with an overview of the historical origins of peremptory norms in legal scholarship, followed by its endorsement by positive law and courts and tribunals. This analysis illustrates that there are lingering uncertainties pertaining to the process of identification of peremptory norms. Even so, the concept has been invoked in State executive practice (although infrequently) and has been endorsed by various courts. However, such invocation thus far has had a limited impact from a legal perspective. It was mainly confined to a strengthened moral appeal and did in particular not facilitate the resolution of norm conflicts. The contribution further suggests that this limited impact results from the fact that the content of peremptory obligations is either very narrow or very vague. This, in turn, implies a lack of consensus amongst States regarding the content (scope) of jus cogens, including the values underlying these norms. As a result, it is questionable whether the construct of jus cogens is able to provide meaningful legal protection against the erosion of legal norms. It is too rudimentary in character to entrench and stabilize core human rights values as the moral foundation of the international legal order.
International women’s rights
(2019)
This paper explores current contestations of women’s rights and the implications thereof for international legislation. While contestation over women’s rights is a far from new phenomenon, over the past two decades opposition to gender equality has become better organized at the transnational level, mobilizing a dispersed set of state and non-state actors, and is becoming more successful in halting the progress of women’s rights. I argue that the position of oppositional actors vis-à-vis women rights activism appears to be strengthened by two recent political developments: democratic backsliding and the closure of civic space. Some preliminary findings show how these interrelated developments lead to an erosion of women’s rights at the national level. Governments use low key tactics to dismantle institutional and implementation arrangements and sideline women’s organisations. Next, I explore the implications of these developments for gender equality norms at the national and international level. The active strategy of counter norming adopted by conservative and religious state and non-state actors, designed to circumvent and also undermine Western norms, is increasingly successful. In addition to this, the threatened position of domestic actors monitoring compliance of international treaties, makes the chances of backsliding on international commitments much higher.