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Table of contents 1 Introduction 2 Ecological regulation and cost effectiveness 2.1 Climate policy 2.2 Promotion of renewable energies 3 Ecological regulation and security of supply 3.1 Climate policy 3.2 Promotion of renewable energies 4 The German Renewable Energies Act (EEG) 4.1 Objectives 4.2 Design and mechanisms 5 The European emissions trading system (EETS) 5.1 Objectives 5.2 Framework 6 The EEG and the EETS: trade off between ecological objectivesand cost effectiveness, innovation and security of supply? 6.1 EEG 6.2 EETS 6.3 Comparison between the approaches of the EEG and the EETS 7 Conclusions and outlook
In the recent years there are many researchs discussing the effects of trade policy (tariffs, subsidies etc.) in international trade. The results are manifold. Some authors show that trade policy has negative effects on welfare, some spatial economists demonstrate that trade policy can have positive effects on welfare. This paper considers the effects of the trade policy made by both countries participating in international trade in a spatial economic model. It can be showed that trade policy of both trade partners (tariffs of one country and export subsidies of the other country) can improve the world welfare in comparison with free trade.
An exhaustive and disjoint decomposition of social choice situations is derived in a general set theoretical framework using the new tools of the Lifted Pareto relation on the power set of social states representing a pre-choice comparison of choice option sets. The main result is the classification of social choice situations which include three types of social choice problems. First, we usually observe the common incompleteness of the Pareto relation. Second, a kind of non-compactness problem of a choice set of social states can be generated. Finally, both can be combined. The first problem root can be regarded as natural everyday dilemma of social choice theory whereas the second may probably be much more due to modeling technique implications. The distinction is enabled at a very general set theoretical level. Hence, the derived classification of social choice situations is applicable on almost every relevant economic model.
Existing theoretical literature fails to explain the differences between the pay of workers that are covered by union agreements and others who are not. This study aims at closing this gap by a single general- equilibrium approach that integrates a dual labor market and a two- sector product market. Our results suggest that the so called 'union wage gap' is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods.
(De)regulatory interventions frequently have unintended cross- market effects, which may or may not be desirable. We assess the effects of three policies on aggregate variables, in particular real income, from a theoretical perspective. Our results suggest that instruments acting upon wages have only a weak impact on real income, whereas the distribution of income is affected strongly. In contrast, a policy that enhances product market competition is fostering real income, but also impacts strongly on union wages and the distribution of income.
This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
We examine the effects of regionalising the budget of unemployment insurance (UI) on wages, employment, and on UI parameters, which, for their part, determine the agents’ preferences concerning such a reform. A numerical example shows that, under reasonable assumptions, the intuition that the reform would enhance efficiency and improve the economic situation of agents from the low- unemployment region to the disadvantage of agents from the high- unemployment region is not valid in general.
Our analysis is concerned with the impact of a regionalisation of unemployment insurance (UI) on workers’ preferences, on firms’ profits, and on effciency. The existence and the extent of UI are endogenously derived by maximising an objective function of the state. Three different types of regionalisation are considered which differ with respect to the area the UI objective function is related to, and with respect to the policy variable used to maximise it. It comes to light that workers are always in favour of central UI, while it depends on the type of regionalisation whether or not firms are better off with regional or with central UI. The same somewhat surprising result applies for efficiency.