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This article contributes to the politics of policy‐making in executive government. It introduces the analytical distinction between generalists and specialists as antagonistic players in executive politics and develops the claim that policy specialists are in a structurally advantaged position to succeed in executive politics and to fend off attempts by generalists to influence policy choices through cross‐cutting reform measures. Contrary to traditional textbook public administration, we explain the views of generalists and specialists not through their training but their positions within an organization. We combine established approaches from public policy and organization theory to substantiate this claim and to define the dilemma that generalists face when developing government‐wide reform policies (‘meta‐policies’) as well as strategies to address this problem. The article suggests that the conceptual distinction between generalists and specialists allows for a more precise analysis of the challenges for policy‐making across government organizations than established approaches.
Das verbreitete Stereotyp Deutschlands als übermäßig bürokratisierter Staat kann einer nüchternen empirischen Bestandsaufnahme kaum standhalten. Im internationalen Vergleich zeigt sich vielmehr ein unterschiedliches Ausmaß der „Bürokratisierung“ entlang von drei zentralen Dimensionen der häufig undifferenziert betrachteten Bürokratieproblematik. Einer intelligenten Strategie der Entbürokratisierung muss daher eine systematische Analyse der Mechanismen der Bürokratisierung in einzelnen Dimensionen der Bürokratiekritik – zu viel Staat, zu viel Regulierung, zu bürokratische Organisation – zugrunde liegen. Der Beitrag stellt einen zentralen Mechanismus für die Regulierungsproblematik als derzeit besonders intensiv diskutiertes Bürokratieproblem dar: Das relative politische Kräfteverhältnis von „Generalisten“ und „Spezialisten“ wird als entscheidend für den Erfolg von Initiativen zur Deregulierung und „besseren Regulierung“ identifiziert. Diskutiert wird der Beitrag unterschiedlicher theoretischer Perspektiven zur konzeptionellen Begründung dieser Generalisten-Spezialisten-These. Hieraus ergeben sich schließlich handlungsrelevante Hypothesen zur Wirksamkeit von verbreiteten Ansätzen der „besseren Regulierung“.
Although German bureaucracy is typically categorised as Weberian, a clear distinction between politics and administration has never been a defining characteristic of the German political-administrative system. Many close interrelations and interactions between elected politicians and appointed civil servants can be observed at all levels of administration. Higher-ranking civil servants in Germany are used to and generally appreciate the functional politicisation of their jobs, that is their close involvement in all stages of the policy process, from policy formation, goal definition, negotiation within and outside government to the implementation and evaluation of policies. For top positions, therefore, a class of ‘political civil servants’ is a special feature of the German system, and obtaining ‘political craft’ has become an important part of the learning and job experience of higher-ranking civil servants.
Switches between political and administrative positions seem to be quite common in today’s politics, or at least not so unusual any longer. Nevertheless, up-to-date empirical studies on this issue are lacking. This paper investigates the presumption, that in recent years top bureaucrats have become more politicised, while at the same time more politicians stem from a bureaucratic background, by looking at the career paths of both. For this purpose, we present new empirical evidence on career patterns of top bureaucrats and executive politicians both at Federal and at Länder level. The data was collected from authorized biographies published at the websites of the Federal and Länder ministries for all Ministers, Parliamentary State Secretaries and Administrative State Secretaries who held office in June 2009.