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This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
We examine the effects of regionalising the budget of unemployment insurance (UI) on wages, employment, and on UI parameters, which, for their part, determine the agents’ preferences concerning such a reform. A numerical example shows that, under reasonable assumptions, the intuition that the reform would enhance efficiency and improve the economic situation of agents from the low- unemployment region to the disadvantage of agents from the high- unemployment region is not valid in general.
Our analysis is concerned with the impact of a regionalisation of unemployment insurance (UI) on workers’ preferences, on firms’ profits, and on effciency. The existence and the extent of UI are endogenously derived by maximising an objective function of the state. Three different types of regionalisation are considered which differ with respect to the area the UI objective function is related to, and with respect to the policy variable used to maximise it. It comes to light that workers are always in favour of central UI, while it depends on the type of regionalisation whether or not firms are better off with regional or with central UI. The same somewhat surprising result applies for efficiency.
Economy vs. history
(2004)
The aim of this study is to examine in which cases economic forces or historical singularities prevail in the determination of the long-run distribution of firms. We develop a relatively general model of heterogenous firms' location choice in discrete space. The main force towards an agglomerated structure is the reduction of transaction costs for consumers if firms are located closely, whilst competition and transport costs work towards a more disperse structure. We then assess the importance of the initial conditions by simulating and comparing the resulting distribution of firms for identical economic parameters but varying initial settings. If the equilibrium distributions of firms are similar we conclude that economic forces have prevailed, while differences in the resulting distributions indicate that 'history' is more important. The (dis)similarity of distributions of firms is calculated by means of a measure, which exhibits a number of desirable features.
Existing theoretical literature fails to explain the differences between the pay of workers that are covered by union agreements and others who are not. This study aims at closing this gap by a single general- equilibrium approach that integrates a dual labor market and a two- sector product market. Our results suggest that the so called 'union wage gap' is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods.
(De)regulatory interventions frequently have unintended cross- market effects, which may or may not be desirable. We assess the effects of three policies on aggregate variables, in particular real income, from a theoretical perspective. Our results suggest that instruments acting upon wages have only a weak impact on real income, whereas the distribution of income is affected strongly. In contrast, a policy that enhances product market competition is fostering real income, but also impacts strongly on union wages and the distribution of income.
Existing theoretical literature fails to explain satisfactorily the differences between the pay of workers who are covered by collective agreements and others who are not. This study aims at providing a model framework that is amenable to an analysis of this issue. Our general-equilibrium approach integrates a dual labor market and a two-sector product market. The results suggest that the so-called "union wage gap" is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods
Economy vs. history : what does actually determine the distribution of shops' locations in cities?
(2009)
This study examines in which cases economic forces or historical singularities prevail in the determination of the spatial distribution of retail shops. We develop a model of location choice in discrete space. The main force towards an agglomerated structure is the reduction of transaction costs for consumers if retailers are located closely, whilst competition and transport costs work towards a disperse structure. We assess the importance of the initial conditions by simulating the resulting distribution of shops for identical economic parameters but varying initial settings. If the equilibrium distributions are similar we conclude that economic forces have prevailed, while dissimilarity indicates that 'history' is more important. The (dis)similarity of distributions of shops is calculated by means of a metric measure.