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Üblicherweise vermeiden deutsche Parteien Kampfkandidaturen um den Vorsitz. Dennoch kam es auf dem Mannheimer SPD-Parteitag 1995 zu einer unerwarteten offenen Konkurrenz um das Spitzenamt. Das unbeabsichtigte Scheitern der Inszenierung der „Geschlossenheit“ der Partei führte zum Ausbruch der bis dahin unterdrückten Kämpfe um den Parteivorsitz. Der Mannheimer Parteitag steht exemplarisch für den Zusammenhang zwischen Inszenierung, Disziplin und den informellen Regeln innerparteilicher Machtkonstruktion. Am Beispiel dieses Parteitages zeigt die vorliegende Arbeit, wie umstrittenen Parteivorsitzenden sich gegen Widerstände im Amt behaupten können bzw. woran diese Strategie scheitern kann. Aus figurationstheoretischer Perspektive wird die Inszenierung als Notwendigkeit medienvermittelter Parteienkonkurrenz um Wählerstimmen gefasst. Inszenierung erfordert Selbstdisziplin und das koordinierte Handeln der Parteimitglieder. Innerparteilich wird so wechselseitige Abhängigkeit erzeugt. Diese wird gesteigert durch die Medien-Konzentration auf wenige Spitzenpolitiker. Die Mehrheit der Mandatsträger und Funktionäre ist angewiesen auf das medienwirksame Auftreten der Führung. Für den Medienerfolg braucht die Führung ihrerseits die Unterstützung der Mitglieder. Diese wechselseitige Abhängigkeit erzeugt sowohl typische Relevanzen als auch Möglichkeiten, die jeweils andere Interessengruppe unter Zugzwang zu setzen. Imageprobleme des Vorsitzenden sind als verletzte Erwartungen Anlass für innerparteiliche Machtkämpfe, in denen die Parteiführung insbesondere die Inszenierung der „Geschlossenheit“ nutzen kann, um offene Personaldiskussionen zu verhindern. Da Handlungsoptionen und -grenzen durch das Handeln der Akteure immer wieder neu geschaffen werden, besteht stets das Risiko des Scheiterns innerparteilicher Disziplinierung. Mit dem Nachvollzug von Disziplinierung und den Gründen ihrer Kontingenz versteht sich die vorliegende Arbeit als Beitrag zu einer Theorie informeller Machtregeln in Organisationen mit schwach ausgeprägten Herrschaftsstrukturen. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Inszenierung und Macht durch die Konzepte Theatralität und Figuration entwickelt. Im zweiten Teil werden typische Konstellationen der gegenwärtigen parlamentarischen Demokratie auf typische beziehungsvermittelte Situationsdeutungen, Handlungsmöglichkeiten und -grenzen untersucht. Im dritten Teil wird der kontingente Prozess des innerparteilichen Machtkampfes am Beispiel des Mannheimer Parteitages 1995 nachvollzogen.
This study follows the debate in comparative public administration research on the role of advisory arrangements in central governments. The aim of this study is to explain the mechanisms by which these actors gain their alleged role in government decision-making. Hence, it analyses advisory arrangements that are proactively involved in executive decision-making and may compete with the permanent bureaucracy by offering policy advice to political executives. The study argues that these advisory arrangements influence government policy-making by "institutional politics", i.e. by shaping the institutional underpinnings to govern or rather the "rules of the executive game" in order to strengthen their own position or that of their clients. The theoretical argument of this study follows the neo-institutionalist turn in organization theory and defines institutional politics as gradual institutionalization processes between institutions and organizational actors. It applies a broader definition of institutions as sets of regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. Following the "power-distributional approach" such gradual institutionalization processes are influenced by structure-oriented characteristics, i.e. the nature of the objects of institutional politics, in particular the freedom of interpretation in their application, as well as the distinct constraints of the institutional context. In addition, institutional politics are influenced by agency-oriented characteristics, i.e. the ambitions of actors to act as "would-be change agents". These two explanatory dimensions result in four ideal-typical mechanisms of institutional politics: layering, displacement, drift, and conversion, which correspond to four ideal-types of would-be change agents. The study examines the ambitions of advisory arrangements in institutional politics in an exploratory manner, the relevance of the institutional context is analyzed via expectation hypotheses on the effects of four institutional context features that are regarded as relevant in the scholarly debate: (1) the party composition of governments, (2) the structuring principles in cabinet, (3) the administrative tradition, and (4) the formal politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy. The study follows a "most similar systems design" and conducts qualitative case studies on the role of advisory arrangements at the center of German and British governments, i.e. the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, for a longer period (1969/1970-2005). Three time periods are scrutinized per country; the British case studies examine the role of advisory arrangements at the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Finance under Prime Ministers Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) and Blair (1997-2005). The German case studies study the role of advisory arrangements at the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Finance during the Brandt government (1969-74), the Kohl government (1982-1987) and the Schröder government (1998-2005). For the empirical analysis, the results of a document analysis and the findings of 75 semi-structured expert interviews have been triangulated. The comparative analysis reveals different patterns of institutional politics. The German advisory arrangements engaged initially in displacement but turned soon towards layering and drift, i.e. after an initial displacement of the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern they laid increasingly new elements onto existing ones and took the non-deliberative decision to neglect the adaption of existing rules of the executive game towards changing environmental demands. The British advisory arrangements were mostly involved in displacement and conversion, despite occasional layering, i.e. they displaced the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern with new rules of the executive game and transformed and realigned them, sometimes also layering new elements onto pre-existing ones. The structure- and agency-oriented characteristics explain these patterns of institutional politics. First, the study shows that the institutional context limits the institutional politics in Germany and facilitates the institutional politics in the UK. Second, the freedom of interpreting the application of institutional targets is relevant and could be observed via the different ambitions of advisory arrangements across countries and over time, confirming, third, that the interests of such would-be change agents are likewise important to understand the patterns of institutional politics. The study concludes that the role of advisory arrangements in government policy-making rests not only upon their policy-related, party-political or media-advisory role for political executives, but especially upon their activities in institutional politics, resulting in distinct institutional constraints on all actors in government policy-making – including their own role in these processes.