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In Germany, the productivity of professional services, a sector dominated by micro and small firms, declined by 40 percent between 1995 and 2014. This productivity decline also holds true for professional services in other European countries. Using a German firm-level dataset of 700,000 observations between 2003 and 2017, we analyze this largely uncovered phenomenon among professional services, the 4th largest sector in the EU15 business economy, which provide important intermediate services for the rest of the economy. We show that changes in the value chain explain about half of the decline and the increase in part-time employment is a further minor part of the decline. In contrast to expectations, the entry of micro and small firms, despite their lower productivity levels, is not responsible for the decline. We also cannot confirm the conjecture that weakening competition allows unproductive firms to remain in the market.
The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.
The leniency rule revisited
(2021)
The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge the communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.
We investigate how inviting students to set task-based goals affects usage of an online learning platform and course performance. We design and implement a randomized field experiment in a large mandatory economics course with blended learning elements. The low-cost treatment induces students to use the online learning system more often, more intensively, and to begin earlier with exam preparation. Treated students perform better in the course than the control group: they are 18.8% (0.20 SD) more likely to pass the exam and earn 6.7% (0.19 SD) more points on the exam. There is no evidence that treated students spend significantly more time, rather they tend to shift to more productive learning methods. The heterogeneity analysis suggests that higher treatment effects are associated with higher levels of behavioral bias but also with poor early course behavior.
Promoting the decarbonization of economic activity through climate policies raises many questions. From a macroeconomic perspective, it is important to understand how these policies perform under uncertainty, how they affect short-run dynamics and to what extent they have distributional effects. In addition, uncertainties directly associated with climate policies, such as uncertainty about the carbon budget or emission intensities, become relevant aspects. We study the implications of emission reduction schemes within a Two-Agent New-Keynesian (TANK) model. This quantitative exercise, based on data for the German economy, provides various insights. In the light of frictions and fluctuations, compared to other instruments, a carbon price (i.e. tax) is associated with lower volatility in output and consumption. In terms of aggregate welfare, price instruments are found to be preferable. Conditional on the distribution of revenues from climate policies, quantity instruments can exert regressive effects, posing a larger economic loss on wealth-poor households, whereas price instruments are moderately progressive. Finally, we find that unexpected changes in climate policies can induce substantial aggregate adjustments. With uncertainty about the carbon budget, the costs of adjustment are larger under quantity instruments.
Internships during tertiary education have become substantially more common over the past decades in many industrialised countries. This study examines the impact of a voluntary intra-curricular internship experience during university studies on the probability of being invited to a job interview. To estimate a causal relationship, we conducted a randomised field experiment in which we sent 1248 fictitious, but realistic, resumes to real job openings. We find that applicants with internship experience have, on average, a 12.6% higher probability of being invited to a job interview.
We study the role and drivers of persistence in the extensive margin of bilateral trade. Motivated by a stylized heterogeneous firms model of international trade with market entry costs, we consider dynamic three-way fixed effects binary choice models and study the corresponding incidental parameter problem. The standard maximum likelihood estimator is consistent under asymptotics where all panel dimensions grow at a constant rate, but it has an asymptotic bias in its limiting distribution, invalidating inference even in situations where the bias appears to be small. Thus, we propose two different bias-corrected estimators. Monte Carlo simulations confirm their desirable statistical properties. We apply these estimators in a reassessment of the most commonly studied determinants of the extensive margin of trade. Both true state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity contribute considerably to trade persistence and taking this persistence into account matters significantly in identifying the effects of trade policies on the extensive margin.
Pigou in the 21st century
(2021)
The year 2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou's magnum opus The Economics of Welfare. Pigou's pricing principles have had an enduring influence on the academic debate, with a widespread consensus having emerged among economists that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are theoretically desirable, but politically infeasible. In this article, we revisit Pigou's contribution and argue that this consensus is somewhat spurious, particularly in two ways: (1) Economists are too quick to ignore the theoretical problems and subtleties that Pigouvian pricing still faces; (2) The wholesale skepticism concerning the political viability of Pigouvian pricing is at odds with its recent practical achievements. These two points are made by, first, outlining the theoretical and political challenges that include uncertainty about the social cost of carbon, the unclear relationship between the cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness approaches, distributional concerns, fragmented ministerial responsibilities, an unstable tax base, commitment problems, lack of acceptance and trust between government and citizens as well as incomplete international cooperation. Secondly, we discuss the recent political success of Pigouvian pricing, as evidenced by the German government's 2019 climate policy reform and the EU's Green Deal. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for addressing the remaining barriers that need to be overcome to make Pigouvian pricing a common political practice.
As the policy debate on entrepreneurship increasingly centers on firm growth in terms of job creation, it is important to understand whether the personality of entrepreneurs drives the first hiring in their firms. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we analyze to what extent personality traits influence the probability of becoming an employer. The results indicate that personality matters. Risk tolerance unfolds the strongest influence on hiring, shortening the time until entrepreneurs hire their first employee; the effect size of a one-standard-deviation increase in risk tolerance is similar to that of having a university degree. Moreover, individuals who are more open to experience, more conscientious, and more trustful are more likely to hire upon establishing their business.