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Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) moves atmospheric carbon to geological or land-based sinks. In a first-best setting, the optimal use of CDR is achieved by a removal subsidy that equals the optimal carbon tax and marginal damages. We derive second-best policy rules for CDR subsidies and carbon taxes when no global carbon price exists but a national government implements a unilateral climate policy. We find that the optimal carbon tax differs from an optimal CDR subsidy because of carbon leakage and a balance of resource trade effect. First, the optimal removal subsidy tends to be larger than the carbon tax because of lower supply-side leakage on fossil resource markets. Second, net carbon exporters exacerbate this wedge to increase producer surplus of their carbon resource producers, implying even larger removal subsidies. Third, net carbon importers may set their removal subsidy even below their carbon tax when marginal environmental damages are small, to appropriate producer surplus from carbon exporters.
The crises of both the climate and the biosphere are manifestations of the imbalance between human extractive, and polluting activities and the Earth’s regenerative capacity. Planetary boundaries define limits for biophysical systems and processes that regulate the stability and life support capacity of the Earth system, and thereby also define a safe operating space for humanity on Earth. Budgets associated to planetary boundaries can be understood as global commons: common pool resources that can be utilized within finite limits. Despite the analytical interpretation of planetary boundaries as global commons, the planetary boundaries framework is missing a thorough integration into economic theory. We aim to bridge the gap between welfare economic theory and planetary boundaries as derived in the natural sciences by presenting a unified theory of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. Our pragmatic approach aims to overcome shortcomings of the practical applications of CEA and CBA to environmental problems of a planetary scale. To do so, we develop a model framework and explore decision paradigms that give guidance to setting limits on human activities. This conceptual framework is then applied to planetary boundaries. We conclude by using the realized insights to derive a research agenda that builds on the understanding of planetary boundaries as global commons.
Interest rates are central determinants of saving and investment decisions. Costly financial intermediation distorts these price signals by creating a spread between deposit and loan rates. This study investigates how bank spreads affect climate policy in its ambition to redirect capital. We identify various channels through which interest spreads affect carbon emissions in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Interest rate spreads increase abatement costs due to the higher relative price for capital-intensive carbon-free energy, but they also tend to reduce emissions due to lower overall economic growth. For the global average interest rate spread of 5.1 percentage points, global warming increases by 0.2°C compared to the frictionless economy. For a given temperature target to be achieved, interest rate spreads necessitate substantially higher carbon taxes. When spreads arise from imperfect competition in the intermediation sector, the associated welfare costs can be reduced by clean energy subsidies or even eliminated by economy-wide investment subsidies.
Many phenomena of high relevance for economic development such as human capital, geography and climate vary considerably within countries as well as between them. Yet, global data sets of economic output are typically available at the national level only, thereby limiting the accuracy and precision of insights gained through empirical analyses. Recent work has used interpolation and downscaling to yield estimates of sub-national economic output at a global scale, but respective data sets based on official, reported values only are lacking. We here present DOSE — the MCC-PIK Database Of Sub-national Economic Output. DOSE contains harmonised data on reported economic output from 1,661 sub-national regions across 83 countries from 1960 to 2020. To avoid interpolation, values are assembled from numerous statistical agencies, yearbooks and the literature and harmonised for both aggregate and sectoral output. Moreover, we provide temporally- and spatially-consistent data for regional boundaries, enabling matching with geo-spatial data such as climate observations. DOSE provides the opportunity for detailed analyses of economic development at the subnational level, consistent with reported values.
The effects of energy price increases are heterogeneous between households and firms. Financially constrained poorer households, who spend a larger relative share of their income on energy, are particularly affected. In this analysis, we examine the macroeconomic and welfare effects of energy price shocks in the presence of credit-constrained households that have subsistence-level energy demand. Within a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model calibrated for the German economy, we compare the performance of different policy measures (transfers and energy subsidies) and different financing schemes (income tax vs. debt). Our results show that credit-constrained households prefer debt over tax financing regardless of the compensation measure due to their difficulty to smooth consumption. On the contrary, rich households tend to prefer tax-financed measures as they increase the labor supply of poor households. From an aggregate perspective, tax-financed measures targeting firms effectively cushion aggregate output losses.
Carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere is becoming an important option to achieve net zero climate targets. This paper develops a welfare and public economics perspective on optimal policies for carbon removal and storage in non-permanent sinks like forests, soil, oceans, wood products or chemical products. We derive a new metric for the valuation of non-permanent carbon storage, the social cost of carbon removal (SCC-R), which embeds also the conventional social cost of carbon emissions. We show that the contribution of CDR is to create new carbon sinks that should be used to reduce transition costs, even if the stored carbon is released to the atmosphere eventually. Importantly, CDR does not raise the ambition of optimal temperature levels unless initial atmospheric carbon stocks are excessively high. For high initial atmospheric carbon stocks, CDR allows to reduce the optimal temperature below initial levels. Finally, we characterize three different policy regimes that ensure an optimal deployment of carbon removal: downstream carbon pricing, upstream carbon pricing, and carbon storage pricing. The policy regimes differ in their informational and institutional requirements regarding monitoring, liability and financing.
We examine the relationship between different types of power investments and regional economic dynamics. We construct a novel panel dataset combining data on regional GDP and power capacity additions for different technologies between 1960 and 2015, which covers 65% of the global power capacity that has been installed in this period. We use an event study design to identify the effect of power capacity addition on GDP per capita, exploiting the fact that the exact amount of power capacity coming online each year is determined by random construction delays. We find evidence that GDP per capita increases by 0.2% in the 6 years around the coming online of 100 MW coal-fired power capacity. We find similar effects for hydropower capacity, but not for any other type of power capacity. The positive effects are regionally bounded and stronger for projects on new sites (green-field). The magnitude of this effect might not be comparable to the total external costs of building new coal-fired power capacity, yet our results help to explain why policymakers favor coal investments for spurring regional growth.
Steuern und Abgaben auf Produkte oder Verbrauch mit gesellschaftlichen Folgekosten (externe Kosten) – sogenannte Pigou- oder Lenkungssteuern – sind ein gesellschaftliches „Win-Win-Instrument“. Sie verbessern die Wohlfahrt und schützen gleichzeitig die Umwelt und das Klima. Dies wird erreicht, indem umweltschädigende Aktivitäten einen Preis bekommen, der möglichst exakt der Höhe des Schadens entspricht. Eine konsequente Bepreisung der externen Kosten nach diesem Prinzip könnte in Deutschland erhebliche zusätzliche Einnahmen erbringen: Basierend auf bisherigen Studien zu externen Kosten wären zusätzliche Einnahmen in der Größenordnung von 348 bis 564 Milliarden Euro pro Jahr (44 bis 71 Prozent der gesamten Steuereinnahmen) möglich. Die Autoren warnen allerdings, dass die Bezifferung der externen Kosten mit erheblichen Unsicherheiten verbunden ist. Damit Lenkungssteuern und -abgaben ihre positiven Lenkungs- und Wohlstandseffekte voll entfalten können, seien zudem institutionelle Reformen notwendig.
We develop a model of optimal taxation and redistribution under an ambitious climate target. We take into account vertical income differences, but also explicitly capture horizontal equity concerns by considering heterogeneous energy efficiencies. By deriving first- and second-best rules for policy instruments including carbon and labor taxes, transfers and energy subsidies, we investigate analytically how vertical and horizontal inequality is considered in the welfare maximizing tax structure. We calibrate the model to German household data and a 30 percent emission reduction goal and show that redistribution of carbon tax revenues via household-specific transfers is the first-best policy. Under plausible assumptions on inequality aversion, transfers to energy-intensive households should be about five times higher than transfers to energy-efficient households. Equal per-capita transfers do not require to observe households’ efficiency type, but increase equity-weighted mitigation costs by around 5 percent compared to the first-best. Mitigation costs increase by less, if the government can implement a uniform clean energy subsidy or household-specific tax-subsidy schemes on energy consumption and labor income that target heterogeneous energy efficiencies. Horizontal equity concerns may therefore constitute a new second-best rationale for clean energy policies or differentiated energy taxes.