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Organizing immigration
(2020)
Immigration constitutes a dynamic policy field with – often quite unpredictable – dynamics. This is based on immigration constituting a ‘wicked problem’ meaning that it is characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. Due to the dynamics in the policy field, expectations towards public administrations often change. Following neo-institutionalist theory, public administrations depend on meeting the expectations in the organizational field in order to maintain legitimacy as the basis for, e.g., resources and compliance of stakeholders. With the dynamics in the policy field, expectations might change and public administrations consequently need to adapt in order to maintain or repair the then threatened legitimacy. If their organizational legitimacy is threatened by a perception of structures and processes being inadequate for changed expectations, an ‘institutional crisis’ unfolds. However, we know little about ministerial bureaucracies’ structural reactions to such crucial momentums and how this effects the quest for coordination within policy-making. Overall, the dissertation thus links to both policy analysis and public administration research and consists of five publications. It asks: How do structures in ministerial bureaucracies change in the context of institutional crises? And what effect do these changes have on ministerial coordination? The dissertation hereby focusses on the above described dynamic policy field of immigration in Germany in the period from 2005 to 2017 and pursues three objectives: 1) to identify the context and impulse for changes in the structures of ministerial bureaucracies, 2) to describe respective changes with regard to their organizational structures, and 3) to identify their effect on coordination. It hereby compares and contrasts institutional crises by incremental change and shock as well as changes and effects at federal and Länder level which allows a comprehensive answer to both of the research questions. Theoretically, the dissertation follows neo-institutionalist theory with a particular focus on changes in organizational structures, coordination and crisis management. Methodologically, it follows a comparative design. Each article (except for the literature review), focusses on ministerial bureaucracies at one governmental level (federal or Länder) and on an institutional crisis induced by either an incremental process or a shock. Thus, responses and effects can be compared and contrasted across impulses for institutional crises and governmental levels. Overall, the dissertation follows a mixed methods approach with a majority of qualitative single and small-n case studies based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Additionally, two articles use quantitative methods as they best suited the respective research question. The rather explorative nature of these two articles however fits to the overall interpretivist approach of the dissertation. Overall, the dissertation’s core argument is: Within the investigation period, varying dynamics and thus impulses for institutional crises took place in the German policy field of immigration. Respectively, expectations by stakeholders on how the politico-administrative system should address the policy problem changed. Ministerial administrations at both the federal and Länder level adapted to these expectations in order to maintain, or regain respectively, organizational legitimacy. The administration hereby referred to well-known recipes of structural changes. Institutional crises do not constitute fields of experimentation. The new structures had an immediate effect on ministerial coordination, with respect to both the horizontal and vertical dimension. Yet, they did not mean a comprehensive change of the system in place. The dissertation thus challenges the idea of the toppling effect of crises and rather shows that adaptability and persistence of public administrations constitute two sides of the same coin.
This study follows the debate in comparative public administration research on the role of advisory arrangements in central governments. The aim of this study is to explain the mechanisms by which these actors gain their alleged role in government decision-making. Hence, it analyses advisory arrangements that are proactively involved in executive decision-making and may compete with the permanent bureaucracy by offering policy advice to political executives. The study argues that these advisory arrangements influence government policy-making by "institutional politics", i.e. by shaping the institutional underpinnings to govern or rather the "rules of the executive game" in order to strengthen their own position or that of their clients. The theoretical argument of this study follows the neo-institutionalist turn in organization theory and defines institutional politics as gradual institutionalization processes between institutions and organizational actors. It applies a broader definition of institutions as sets of regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. Following the "power-distributional approach" such gradual institutionalization processes are influenced by structure-oriented characteristics, i.e. the nature of the objects of institutional politics, in particular the freedom of interpretation in their application, as well as the distinct constraints of the institutional context. In addition, institutional politics are influenced by agency-oriented characteristics, i.e. the ambitions of actors to act as "would-be change agents". These two explanatory dimensions result in four ideal-typical mechanisms of institutional politics: layering, displacement, drift, and conversion, which correspond to four ideal-types of would-be change agents. The study examines the ambitions of advisory arrangements in institutional politics in an exploratory manner, the relevance of the institutional context is analyzed via expectation hypotheses on the effects of four institutional context features that are regarded as relevant in the scholarly debate: (1) the party composition of governments, (2) the structuring principles in cabinet, (3) the administrative tradition, and (4) the formal politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy. The study follows a "most similar systems design" and conducts qualitative case studies on the role of advisory arrangements at the center of German and British governments, i.e. the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, for a longer period (1969/1970-2005). Three time periods are scrutinized per country; the British case studies examine the role of advisory arrangements at the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Finance under Prime Ministers Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) and Blair (1997-2005). The German case studies study the role of advisory arrangements at the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Finance during the Brandt government (1969-74), the Kohl government (1982-1987) and the Schröder government (1998-2005). For the empirical analysis, the results of a document analysis and the findings of 75 semi-structured expert interviews have been triangulated. The comparative analysis reveals different patterns of institutional politics. The German advisory arrangements engaged initially in displacement but turned soon towards layering and drift, i.e. after an initial displacement of the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern they laid increasingly new elements onto existing ones and took the non-deliberative decision to neglect the adaption of existing rules of the executive game towards changing environmental demands. The British advisory arrangements were mostly involved in displacement and conversion, despite occasional layering, i.e. they displaced the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern with new rules of the executive game and transformed and realigned them, sometimes also layering new elements onto pre-existing ones. The structure- and agency-oriented characteristics explain these patterns of institutional politics. First, the study shows that the institutional context limits the institutional politics in Germany and facilitates the institutional politics in the UK. Second, the freedom of interpreting the application of institutional targets is relevant and could be observed via the different ambitions of advisory arrangements across countries and over time, confirming, third, that the interests of such would-be change agents are likewise important to understand the patterns of institutional politics. The study concludes that the role of advisory arrangements in government policy-making rests not only upon their policy-related, party-political or media-advisory role for political executives, but especially upon their activities in institutional politics, resulting in distinct institutional constraints on all actors in government policy-making – including their own role in these processes.