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Process-based integrated assessment models (IAMs) project long-term transformation pathways in energy and land-use systems under what-if assumptions. IAM evaluation is necessary to improve the models’ usefulness as scientific tools applicable in the complex and contested domain of climate change mitigation. We contribute the first comprehensive synthesis of process-based IAM evaluation research, drawing on a wide range of examples across six different evaluation methods including historical simulations, stylised facts, and model diagnostics. For each evaluation method, we identify progress and milestones to date, and draw out lessons learnt as well as challenges remaining. We find that each evaluation method has distinctive strengths, as well as constraints on its application. We use these insights to propose a systematic evaluation framework combining multiple methods to establish the appropriateness, interpretability, credibility, and relevance of process-based IAMs as useful scientific tools for informing climate policy. We also set out a programme of evaluation research to be mainstreamed both within and outside the IAM community.
Many phenomena of high relevance for economic development such as human capital, geography and climate vary considerably within countries as well as between them. Yet, global data sets of economic output are typically available at the national level only, thereby limiting the accuracy and precision of insights gained through empirical analyses. Recent work has used interpolation and downscaling to yield estimates of sub-national economic output at a global scale, but respective data sets based on official, reported values only are lacking. We here present DOSE — the MCC-PIK Database Of Sub-national Economic Output. DOSE contains harmonised data on reported economic output from 1,661 sub-national regions across 83 countries from 1960 to 2020. To avoid interpolation, values are assembled from numerous statistical agencies, yearbooks and the literature and harmonised for both aggregate and sectoral output. Moreover, we provide temporally- and spatially-consistent data for regional boundaries, enabling matching with geo-spatial data such as climate observations. DOSE provides the opportunity for detailed analyses of economic development at the subnational level, consistent with reported values.
Climate science provides strong evidence of the necessity of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, in line with the Paris Climate Agreement. The IPCC 1.5 °C special report (SR1.5) presents 414 emissions scenarios modelled for the report, of which around 50 are classified as '1.5 °C scenarios', with no or low temperature overshoot. These emission scenarios differ in their reliance on individual mitigation levers, including reduction of global energy demand, decarbonisation of energy production, development of land-management systems, and the pace and scale of deploying carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. The reliance of 1.5 °C scenarios on these levers needs to be critically assessed in light of the potentials of the relevant technologies and roll-out plans. We use a set of five parameters to bundle and characterise the mitigation levers employed in the SR1.5 1.5 °C scenarios. For each of these levers, we draw on the literature to define 'medium' and 'high' upper bounds that delineate between their 'reasonable', 'challenging' and 'speculative' use by mid century. We do not find any 1.5 °C scenarios that stay within all medium upper bounds on the five mitigation levers. Scenarios most frequently 'over use' CDR with geological storage as a mitigation lever, whilst reductions of energy demand and carbon intensity of energy production are 'over used' less frequently. If we allow mitigation levers to be employed up to our high upper bounds, we are left with 22 of the SR1.5 1.5 °C scenarios with no or low overshoot. The scenarios that fulfil these criteria are characterised by greater coverage of the available mitigation levers than those scenarios that exceed at least one of the high upper bounds. When excluding the two scenarios that exceed the SR1.5 carbon budget for limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, this subset of 1.5 °C scenarios shows a range of 15–22 Gt CO2 (16–22 Gt CO2 interquartile range) for emissions in 2030. For the year of reaching net zero CO2 emissions the range is 2039–2061 (2049–2057 interquartile range).
Closing the emissions gap between Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the global emissions levels needed to achieve the Paris Agreement’s climate goals will require a comprehensive package of policy measures. National and sectoral policies can help fill the gap, but success stories in one country cannot be automatically replicated in other countries. They need to be adapted to the local context. Here, we develop a new Bridge scenario based on nationally relevant, short-term measures informed by interactions with country experts. These good practice policies are rolled out globally between now and 2030 and combined with carbon pricing thereafter. We implement this scenario with an ensemble of global integrated assessment models. We show that the Bridge scenario closes two-thirds of the emissions gap between NDC and 2 °C scenarios by 2030 and enables a pathway in line with the 2 °C goal when combined with the necessary long-term changes, i.e. more comprehensive pricing measures after 2030. The Bridge scenario leads to a scale-up of renewable energy (reaching 52%–88% of global electricity supply by 2050), electrification of end-uses, efficiency improvements in energy demand sectors, and enhanced afforestation and reforestation. Our analysis suggests that early action via good-practice policies is less costly than a delay in global climate cooperation.
The crises of both the climate and the biosphere are manifestations of the imbalance between human extractive, and polluting activities and the Earth’s regenerative capacity. Planetary boundaries define limits for biophysical systems and processes that regulate the stability and life support capacity of the Earth system, and thereby also define a safe operating space for humanity on Earth. Budgets associated to planetary boundaries can be understood as global commons: common pool resources that can be utilized within finite limits. Despite the analytical interpretation of planetary boundaries as global commons, the planetary boundaries framework is missing a thorough integration into economic theory. We aim to bridge the gap between welfare economic theory and planetary boundaries as derived in the natural sciences by presenting a unified theory of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. Our pragmatic approach aims to overcome shortcomings of the practical applications of CEA and CBA to environmental problems of a planetary scale. To do so, we develop a model framework and explore decision paradigms that give guidance to setting limits on human activities. This conceptual framework is then applied to planetary boundaries. We conclude by using the realized insights to derive a research agenda that builds on the understanding of planetary boundaries as global commons.
The large majority of climate change mitigation scenarios that hold warming below 2 °C show high deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), resulting in a peak-and-decline behavior in global temperature. This is driven by the assumption of an exponentially increasing carbon price trajectory which is perceived to be economically optimal for meeting a carbon budget. However, this optimality relies on the assumption that a finite carbon budget associated with a temperature target is filled up steadily over time. The availability of net carbon removals invalidates this assumption and therefore a different carbon price trajectory should be chosen. We show how the optimal carbon price path for remaining well below 2 °C limits CDR demand and analyze requirements for constructing alternatives, which may be easier to implement in reality. We show that warming can be held at well below 2 °C at much lower long-term economic effort and lower CDR deployment and therefore lower risks if carbon prices are high enough in the beginning to ensure target compliance, but increase at a lower rate after carbon neutrality has been reached.
Beyond good faith
(2021)
The ambitious climate targets set by industrialized nations worldwide cannot be met without decarbonizing the building stock. Using Germany as a case study, this paper takes stock of the extensive set of energy efficiency policies that are already in place and clarifies that they have been designed “in good faith” but lack in overall effectiveness as well as cost-efficiency in achieving these climate targets. We map out the market failures and behavioural considerations that are potential reasons for why realized energy savings fall below expectations and why the household adoption of energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies has remained low. We highlight the pressing need for data and modern empirical research to develop targeted and cost-effective policies seeking to correct these market failures. To this end, we identify some key research questions and identify gaps in the data required for evidence-based policy.
Climate-related costs and benefits may not be evenly distributed across the population. We study distributional implications of seasonal weather and climate on within-country inequality in rural India. Utilizing a first difference approach, we find that the poor are more sensitive to weather variations than the non-poor. The poor respond more strongly to (seasonal) temperature changes: negatively in the (warm) spring season, more positively in the (cold) rabi season. Less precipitation is harmful to the poor in the monsoon kharif season and beneficial in the winter and spring seasons. We show that adverse weather aggravates inequality by reducing consumption of the poor farming households. Future global warming predicted under RCP8.5 is likely to exacerbate these effects, reducing consumption of poor farming households by one third until the year 2100. We also find inequality in consumption across seasons with higher consumption during the harvest and lower consumption during the sowing seasons.
Pathways toward limiting global warming to well below 2 ∘C, as used by the IPCC in the Fifth Assessment Report, do not consider the climate impacts already occurring below 2 ∘C. Here we show that accounting for such damages significantly increases the near-term ambition of transformation pathways. We use econometric estimates of climate damages on GDP growth and explicitly model the uncertainty in the persistence time of damages. The Integrated Assessment Model we use includes the climate system and mitigation technology detail required to derive near-term policies. We find an optimal carbon price of $115 per tonne of CO2 in 2030. The long-term persistence of damages, while highly uncertain, is a main driver of the near-term carbon price. Accounting for damages on economic growth increases the gap between the currently pledged nationally determined contributions and the welfare-optimal 2030 emissions by two thirds, compared to pathways considering the 2 ∘C limit only.
Global emissions scenarios play a critical role in the assessment of strategies to mitigate climate change. The current scenarios, however, are criticized because they feature strategies with pronounced overshoot of the global temperature goal, requiring a long-term repair phase to draw temperatures down again through net-negative emissions. Some impacts might not be reversible. Hence, we explore a new set of net-zero CO2 emissions scenarios with limited overshoot. We show that upfront investments are needed in the near term for limiting temperature overshoot but that these would bring long-term economic gains. Our study further identifies alternative configurations of net-zero CO2 emissions systems and the roles of different sectors and regions for balancing sources and sinks. Even without net-negative emissions, CO2 removal is important for accelerating near-term reductions and for providing an anthropogenic sink that can offset the residual emissions in sectors that are hard to abate.
Despite increasing empirical evidence of strong links between climate and economic growth, there is no established model to describe the dynamics of how different types of climate shocks affect growth patterns. Here we present the first comprehensive, comparative analysis of the long-term dynamics of one-time, temporary climate shocks on production factors, and factor productivity, respectively, in a Ramsey-type growth model. Damages acting directly on production factors allow us to study dynamic effects on factor allocation, savings and economic growth. We find that the persistence of impacts on economic activity is smallest for climate shocks directly impacting output, and successively increases for direct damages on capital, loss of labor and productivity shocks, related to different responses in savings rates and factor-specific growth. Recurring shocks lead to large welfare effects and long-term growth effects, directly linked to the persistence of individual shocks. Endogenous savings and shock anticipation both have adaptive effects but do not eliminate differences between impact channels or significantly lower the dissipation time. Accounting for endogenous growth mechanisms increases the effects. We also find strong effects on income shares, important for distributional implications. This work fosters conceptual understanding of impact dynamics in growth models, opening options for links to empirics.
Does loss aversion apply to social image concerns? In a laboratory experiment, we first induce social image in a relevant domain, intelligence, through public ranking. In a second stage, subjects experience a change in rank and are offered scope for lying to improve their final, also publicly reported rank. Subjects who care about social image and experience a decline in rank lie more than those experiencing gains. Moreover, we document a discontinuity in lying behavior when moving from rank losses to gains. Our results are in line with loss aversion in social image concerns.
Is trade a promoter of peace? Adam Smith, one of the earliest defenders of trade, worries that commerce may instigate some perverse incentives, encouraging wars. The wealth that commerce generates decreases the relative cost of wars, increases the ability to finance wars through debts, which decreases their perceived cost, and increases the willingness of commercial interests to use wars to extend their markets, increasing the number and prolonging the length of wars. Smith, therefore, cannot assume that trade would yield a peaceful world. While defending and promoting trade, Smith warns us not to take peace for granted.
In the past years, work-time in many industries has become more flexible, opening up a new channel for intertemporal substitution: workers might, instead of saving, adjust their work-time to smooth consumption. To study this channel, we set up a two-period consumption/saving model with wage uncertainty. This extends the standard saving model by also allowing a worker to allocate a fixed time budget between two work-shifts. To test the comparative statics implied by these two different channels, we conduct a laboratory experiment. A novel feature of our experiments is that we tie income to a real-effort style task. In four treatments, we turn on and off the two channels for consumption smoothing: saving and time allocation. Our main finding is that savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects. We find that a majority of subjects also uses time allocation to smooth consumption and use saving and time shifting as substitutes, though not perfect substitutes. Part of the observed heterogeneity of precautionary behavior can be explained by risk preferences and motivations different from expected utility maximization. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
We test the price-setting behavior of firms using the Rotemberg (1982) model in order to explain puzzles in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). For our tests, we conducted experiments that adapt the model into an individual decision-making problem. We find systematic deviations in price-setting according to the subjects’ degree of information acquisition. Subjects rarely make use of past information. On the other hand, subjects that decide to acquire relatively little information about future desired prices tend to overweight their own past set price when they set prices. We study the impact of this heterogeneous price-setting behavior for theoretically derived forward-looking Phillips curves. Our estimated NKPCs are in line with the empirical literature. The deviations from theoretical predictions in our NKPCs are driven by the less-informed subjects.
We examine the relationship between different types of power investments and regional economic dynamics. We construct a novel panel dataset combining data on regional GDP and power capacity additions for different technologies between 1960 and 2015, which covers 65% of the global power capacity that has been installed in this period. We use an event study design to identify the effect of power capacity addition on GDP per capita, exploiting the fact that the exact amount of power capacity coming online each year is determined by random construction delays. We find evidence that GDP per capita increases by 0.2% in the 6 years around the coming online of 100 MW coal-fired power capacity. We find similar effects for hydropower capacity, but not for any other type of power capacity. The positive effects are regionally bounded and stronger for projects on new sites (green-field). The magnitude of this effect might not be comparable to the total external costs of building new coal-fired power capacity, yet our results help to explain why policymakers favor coal investments for spurring regional growth.
Controlling bioenergy-induced land-use-change emissions is key to exploiting bioenergy for climate change mitigation. However, the effect of different land-use and energy sector policies on specific bioenergy emissions has not been studied so far. Using the global integrated assessment model REMIND-MAgPIE, we derive a biofuel emission factor (EF) for different policy frameworks. We find that a uniform price on emissions from both sectors keeps biofuel emissions at 12 kg CO2 GJ−1. However, without land-use regulation, the EF increases substantially (64 kg CO2 GJ−1 over 80 years, 92 kg CO2 GJ−1 over 30 years). We also find that comprehensive coverage (>90%) of carbon-rich land areas worldwide is key to containing land-use emissions. Pricing emissions indirectly on the level of bioenergy consumption reduces total emissions by cutting bioenergy demand but fails to reduce the average EF. In the absence of comprehensive and timely land-use regulation, bioenergy thus may contribute less to climate change mitigation than assumed previously.
Under current land-use regulation, carbon dioxide emissions from biofuel production exceed those from fossil diesel combustion. Therefore, international agreements need to ensure the effective and globally comprehensive protection of natural land before modern bioenergy can effectively contribute to achieving carbon neutrality.
Labor unions’ greatest potential for political influence likely arises from their direct connection to millions of individuals at the workplace. There, they may change the ideological positions of both unionizing workers and their non-unionizing management. In this paper, we analyze the workplace-level impact of unionization on workers’ and managers’ political campaign contributions over the 1980-2016 period in the United States. To do so, we link establishment-level union election data with transaction-level campaign contributions to federal and local candidates. In a difference-in-differences design that we validate with regression discontinuity tests and a novel instrumental variables approach, we find that unionization leads to a leftward shift of campaign contributions. Unionization increases the support for Democrats relative to Republicans not only among workers but also among managers, which speaks against an increase in political cleavages between the two groups. We provide evidence that our results are not driven by compositional changes of the workforce and are weaker in states with Right-to-Work laws where unions can invest fewer resources in political activities.
SOEP-LEE2
(2023)
This article presents the new linked employee-employer study of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP-LEE2), which offers new research opportunities for various academic fields. In particular, the study contains two waves of an employer survey for persons in dependent work that is also linkable to the SOEP, a large representative German annual household panel (SOEP-LEE2-Core). Moreover, SOEP-LEE2 includes two waves of self-employed surveys based on self-employed in the SOEP-Core (SOEP-LEE2-Self-employed) and three additional representative employer surveys, independent of the SOEP in terms of sampling employers (SOEP-LEE2-Compare). Survey topics include digitalisation and cybersecurity, human capital formation, COVID-19, and human resource management. Here, we describe the content, survey design, and comparability of the different datasets in the SOEP-LEE2 to potential users in different disciplines of research.
Do internships pay off?
(2022)
We study the causal effect of student internship experience in firms on earnings later in life. We use mandatory firm internships at German universities as an instrument for doing a firm internship while attending university. Employing longitudinal data from graduate surveys, we find positive and significant earnings returns of about 6 percent in both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) regressions. The positive returns are particularly pronounced for individuals and areas of study that are characterized by a weak labor market orientation. The empirical findings show that graduates who completed a firm internship face a lower risk of unemployment during the first year of their careers, suggesting a smoother transition to the labor market.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and exploiting the staggered implementation of a compulsory schooling reform in West Germany, this article finds that an additional year of schooling lowers the probability of being very concerned about immigration to Germany by around six percentage points (20 percent). Furthermore, our findings imply significant spillovers from maternal education to immigration attitudes of her offspring. While we find no evidence for returns to education within a range of labor market outcomes, higher social trust appears to be an important mechanism behind our findings.
Childhood obesity is one of the most serious public health challenges of the twenty-first century. While small-scale experiments change behaviors among adults in the short run, we know little about the effectiveness of large-scale policies or the longer-run impacts. To nudge primary school children into a long-term habit of exercising, the German state of Saxony distributed sports club membership vouchers among all 33,000 third graders in 2009. In 2018, we carried out a register-based survey to evaluate the policy. Even after a decade, awareness of the voucher program was significantly higher in the treatment group. We also find that youth received and redeemed the vouchers. However, we do not find significant short- or long-term effects on sports club membership, physical activity, overweightness, or motor skills. Apparently, membership vouchers for children are not a strong enough policy tool to overcome barriers to exercise regularly.
The employment implications of decarbonizing the energy sector have received far less attention than the technology dimension of the transition, although being of critical importance to policymakers. In this work, we adapt a methodology based on employment factors to project future changes in quantity and composition of direct energy supply jobs for two scenarios - (1) relatively weak emissions reductions as pledged in the nationally determined contributions (NDC) and (2) stringent reductions compatible with the 1.5 °C target. We find that in the near-term the 1.5°C-compatible scenario results in a net increase in jobs through gains in solar and wind jobs in construction, installation, and manufacturing, despite significant losses in coal fuel supply; eventually leading to a peak in total direct energy jobs in 2025. In the long run, improvements in labour productivity lead to a decrease of total direct energy employment compared to today, however, total jobs are still higher in a 1.5 °C than in an NDC scenario. Operation and maintenance jobs dominate future jobs, replacing fuel supply jobs. The results point to the need for active policies aimed at retraining, both inside and outside the renewable energy sector, to complement climate policies within the concept of a “just transition”.
Cost degression in photovoltaics, wind-power and battery storage has been faster than previously anticipated. In the future, climate policy to limit global warming to 1.5–2 °C will make carbon-based fuels increasingly scarce and expensive. Here we show that further progress in solar- and wind-power technology along with carbon pricing to reach the Paris Climate targets could make electricity cheaper than carbon-based fuels. In combination with demand-side innovation, for instance in e-mobility and heat pumps, this is likely to induce a fundamental transformation of energy systems towards a dominance of electricity-based end uses. In a 1.5 °C scenario with limited availability of bioenergy and carbon dioxide removal, electricity could account for 66% of final energy by mid-century, three times the current levels and substantially higher than in previous climate policy scenarios assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The lower production of bioenergy in our high-electrification scenarios markedly reduces energy-related land and water requirements.
Interest rates are central determinants of saving and investment decisions. Costly financial intermediation distorts these price signals by creating a spread between deposit and loan rates. This study investigates how bank spreads affect climate policy in its ambition to redirect capital. We identify various channels through which interest spreads affect carbon emissions in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Interest rate spreads increase abatement costs due to the higher relative price for capital-intensive carbon-free energy, but they also tend to reduce emissions due to lower overall economic growth. For the global average interest rate spread of 5.1 percentage points, global warming increases by 0.2°C compared to the frictionless economy. For a given temperature target to be achieved, interest rate spreads necessitate substantially higher carbon taxes. When spreads arise from imperfect competition in the intermediation sector, the associated welfare costs can be reduced by clean energy subsidies or even eliminated by economy-wide investment subsidies.
In Germany, the productivity of professional services, a sector dominated by SME, declined by 40 percent between 1995 and 2014. Similar developments can be observed in several other European economies. Using a German dataset with 700,000 firm-level observations, we analyze this largely undiscovered phenomenon in professional services, the fourth largest sector of the business economy in the EU-15, which provides important inputs to the economy and has experienced substantial growth in both output and employment since the turn of the millennium. We find that changes in the value chain explain about half of the decline and that increases in part-time employment account for another small part. Contrary to expectations, the entry of micro and small firms is not responsible for the decline, despite their lower productivity levels. Further, we cannot confirm the conjecture that weakening competition has led to an increase in the number of unproductive firms remaining in the markets and that this has led to a lower average productivity.
Does personality matter? Is an individual who is open to experience more or less likely to become an entrepreneur? Is it better to score low or high in agreeableness for surviving as an entrepreneur? To the extent that personality captures one part of entrepreneurial abilities, which are usually unobservable, the analysis of traits and personality characteristics helps better understanding such abilities. This chapter reviews research on the relationship between personality and entrepreneurship since 2000 and shows that possessing certain personality characteristics will make it more likely that an individual will start an own business and hire staff. More specifically, with respect to the entry decision, research finds that nearly all so-called Big Five factors as well as several specific personality characteristics influence the entry probability into entrepreneurship. Further, entrepreneurs are more likely to hire, the higher they score in risk tolerance, trust, openness to experience, and conscientiousness. However, different factors such as low scores in agreeableness, the only Big Factor that does not affect entrepreneurial entry, influence entrepreneurial survival. And for some of characteristics that influence entrepreneurial entry, like high scores in the factor openness for experience or in risk tolerance, “revolving door effects” are found, explaining why some entrepreneurs subsequently exit again the market.
Elevated annual average temperature has been found to impact macro-economic growth. However, various fundamental elements of the economy are affected by deviations of daily temperature from seasonal expectations which are not well reflected in annual averages. Here we show that increases in seasonally adjusted day-to-day temperature variability reduce macro-economic growth independent of and in addition to changes in annual average temperature. Combining observed day-to-day temperature variability with subnational economic data for 1,537 regions worldwide over 40 years in fixed-effects panel models, we find that an extra degree of variability results in a five percentage-point reduction in regional growth rates on average. The impact of day-to-day variability is modulated by seasonal temperature difference and income, resulting in highest vulnerability in low-latitude, low-income regions (12 percentage-point reduction). These findings illuminate a new, global-impact channel in the climate–economy relationship that demands a more comprehensive assessment in both climate and integrated assessment models.
With the onset of the global food crisis, the discussion about the use and misuse of agricultural market interventions regained academic attention. As a result of economies of scale, centralized policy implementation at the regional level has the potential to reduce the budgetary costs of policies. Borrowing from the literature on international unions and international policy coordination, we develop a conceptual framework to analyze when regional policy implementation makes sense. This is the case whenever spill-overs from centralization are large and policy preferences, driven by country-specific characteristics, are homogeneous. Subsequently, we examine the advantageousness of centralized policy implementation for the West African region regarding the most common food security policies. We show that centralization of trade policies and emergency food reserves is beneficial, while buffer stocks, safety net policies, and producer support policies should be implemented at the national level.
While the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) physical science reports usually assess a handful of future scenarios, the Working Group III contribution on climate mitigation to the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6 WGIII) assesses hundreds to thousands of future emissions scenarios. A key task in WGIII is to assess the global mean temperature outcomes of these scenarios in a consistent manner, given the challenge that the emissions scenarios from different integrated assessment models (IAMs) come with different sectoral and gas-to-gas coverage and cannot all be assessed consistently by complex Earth system models. In this work, we describe the “climate-assessment” workflow and its methods, including infilling of missing emissions and emissions harmonisation as applied to 1202 mitigation scenarios in AR6 WGIII. We evaluate the global mean temperature projections and effective radiative forcing (ERF) characteristics of climate emulators FaIRv1.6.2 and MAGICCv7.5.3 and use the CICERO simple climate model (CICERO-SCM) for sensitivity analysis. We discuss the implied overshoot severity of the mitigation pathways using overshoot degree years and look at emissions and temperature characteristics of scenarios compatible with one possible interpretation of the Paris Agreement. We find that the lowest class of emissions scenarios that limit global warming to “1.5 ∘C (with a probability of greater than 50 %) with no or limited overshoot” includes 97 scenarios for MAGICCv7.5.3 and 203 for FaIRv1.6.2. For the MAGICCv7.5.3 results, “limited overshoot” typically implies exceedance of median temperature projections of up to about 0.1 ∘C for up to a few decades before returning to below 1.5 ∘C by or before the year 2100. For more than half of the scenarios in this category that comply with three criteria for being “Paris-compatible”, including net-zero or net-negative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, median temperatures decline by about 0.3–0.4 ∘C after peaking at 1.5–1.6 ∘C in 2035–2055. We compare the methods applied in AR6 with the methods used for SR1.5 and discuss their implications. This article also introduces a “climate-assessment” Python package which allows for fully reproducing the IPCC AR6 WGIII temperature assessment. This work provides a community tool for assessing the temperature outcomes of emissions pathways and provides a basis for further work such as extending the workflow to include downscaling of climate characteristics to a regional level and calculating impacts.
Charitable giving
(2023)
We investigate how different levels of information influence the allocation decisions of donors who are entitled to freely distribute a fixed monetary endowment between themselves and a charitable organization in both giving and taking frames. Participants donate significantly higher amounts, when the decision is described as taking rather than giving. This framing effect becomes smaller if more information about the charity is provided.
We present a novel data set of subnational economic output, Gross Regional Product (GRP), for more than 1500 regions in 77 countries that allows us to empirically estimate historic climate impacts at different time scales. Employing annual panel models, long-difference regressions and cross-sectional regressions, we identify effects on productivity levels and productivity growth. We do not find evidence for permanent growth rate impacts but we find robust evidence that temperature affects productivity levels considerably. An increase in global mean surface temperature by about 3.5°C until the end of the century would reduce global output by 7–14% in 2100, with even higher damages in tropical and poor regions. Updating the DICE damage function with our estimates suggests that the social cost of carbon from temperature-induced productivity losses is on the order of 73–142$/tCO2 in 2020, rising to 92–181$/tCO2 in 2030. These numbers exclude non-market damages and damages from extreme weather events or sea-level rise.
The COVID-19 pandemic and related closures of day care centres and schools significantly increased the amount of care work done by parents. There has been much speculation over whether the pandemic increased or decreased gender equality in parental care work. Based on representative data for Germany from spring 2020 and winter 2021 we present an empirical analysis that shows that although gender inequality in the division of care work increased to some extent in the beginning of the pandemic, it returned to the pre-pandemic level in the second lockdown almost nine months later. These results suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic neither aggravated nor lessened inequality in the division of unpaid care work among mothers and fathers in any persistent way in Germany.
The Rise of Populism
(2017)
Drawing on the recent political developments in Europe and the USA, and the public discourse since 2016, an analysis of the rise of populism on the left and the right is articulated with the aim to provide an understanding of the contemporary populist political landscape. The Trump phenomenon and his form of populism is analysed within the context of foreign policy and development aid. This is contrasted with the neoliberal view couched in Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ theorem, and the current popular sentiment towards anti-establishment and anti-globalisation in Western democracies.
We develop a model of optimal taxation and redistribution under an ambitious climate target. We take into account vertical income differences, but also explicitly capture horizontal equity concerns by considering heterogeneous energy efficiencies. By deriving first- and second-best rules for policy instruments including carbon and labor taxes, transfers and energy subsidies, we investigate analytically how vertical and horizontal inequality is considered in the welfare maximizing tax structure. We calibrate the model to German household data and a 30 percent emission reduction goal and show that redistribution of carbon tax revenues via household-specific transfers is the first-best policy. Under plausible assumptions on inequality aversion, transfers to energy-intensive households should be about five times higher than transfers to energy-efficient households. Equal per-capita transfers do not require to observe households’ efficiency type, but increase equity-weighted mitigation costs by around 5 percent compared to the first-best. Mitigation costs increase by less, if the government can implement a uniform clean energy subsidy or household-specific tax-subsidy schemes on energy consumption and labor income that target heterogeneous energy efficiencies. Horizontal equity concerns may therefore constitute a new second-best rationale for clean energy policies or differentiated energy taxes.
Faster, harder, greener?
(2022)
Against the background of the current "Speed-Up Society," which seems to foster a trade-off between economic success and climate change, we study whether the individual Pace of Life is associated with productivity and proenvironmental behavior on the micro-level. In a controlled laboratory environment with students in Germany, we measured the productivity of participants in a real effort task, quantified their pro-environmental behavior, and recorded their individual Pace of Life. We find that individuals with a fast Pace of Life are significantly more productive. However, individuals with a fast Pace of Life behave less pro-environmentally if they are men and more pro-environmentally if they are women.
Who has the future in mind?
(2022)
An individual's relation to time may be an important driver of pro-environmental behaviour. We studied whether young individual's gender and time-orientation are associated with pro-environmental behaviour. In a controlled laboratory environment with students in Germany, participants earned money by performing a real-effort task and were then offered the opportunity to invest their money into an environmental project that supports climate protection. Afterwards, we controlled for their time-orientation. In this consequential behavioural setting, we find that males who scored higher on future-negative orientation showed significantly more pro-environmental behaviour compared to females who scored higher on future-negative orientation and males who scored lower on future-negative orientation. Interestingly, our results are completely reversed when it comes to past-positive orientation. These findings have practical implications regarding the most appropriate way to address individuals in order to achieve more pro-environmental behaviour.
In a recent contribution to this journal, Esser and Seuring (2020) draw on data from the National Educational Panel Study to attack the widespread view that tracking in lower secondary education exacerbates inequalities in student outcomes without improving average student performance. Exploiting variation in the strictness of tracking across 13 of the 16 German federal states (e. g., whether teacher recommendations are binding), Esser and Seuring claim to demonstrate that stricter tracking after grade 4 results in better performance in grade 7 and that this can be attributed to the greater homogeneity of classrooms under strict tracking. We show these conclusions to be untenable: Esser and Seuring's measures of classroom composition are highly dubious because the number of observed students is very small for many classrooms. Even when we adopt their classroom composition measures, simple corrections and extensions of their analysis reveal that there is no meaningful evidence for a positive relationship between classroom homogeneity and student achievement - the channel supposed to mediate the alleged positive effect of strict tracking. We go on to show that students from more strictly tracking states perform better already at the start of tracking (grade 5), which casts further doubt on the alleged positive effect of strict tracking on learning progress and leaves selection or anticipation effects as more plausible explanations. On a conceptual level, we emphasize that Esser and Seuring's analysis is limited to states that implement different forms of early tracking and cannot inform us about the relative performance of comprehensive and tracked systems that is the focus of most prior research.
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) form a prime tool in informing about climate mitigation strategies. Diagnostic indicators that allow comparison across these models can help describe and explain differences in model projections. This increases transparency and comparability. Earlier, the IAM community has developed an approach to diagnose models (Kriegler (2015 Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 90 45–61)). Here we build on this, by proposing a selected set of well-defined indicators as a community standard, to systematically and routinely assess IAM behaviour, similar to metrics used for other modeling communities such as climate models. These indicators are the relative abatement index, emission reduction type index, inertia timescale, fossil fuel reduction, transformation index and cost per abatement value. We apply the approach to 17 IAMs, assessing both older as well as their latest versions, as applied in the IPCC 6th Assessment Report. The study shows that the approach can be easily applied and used to indentify key differences between models and model versions. Moreover, we demonstrate that this comparison helps to link model behavior to model characteristics and assumptions. We show that together, the set of six indicators can provide useful indication of the main traits of the model and can roughly indicate the general model behavior. The results also show that there is often a considerable spread across the models. Interestingly, the diagnostic values often change for different model versions, but there does not seem to be a distinct trend.
Although the literature on the determinants of training has considered individual and firm-related characteristics, it has generally neglected regional factors. This is surprising, given the fact that labour markets differ by regions. Regional factors are often ignored because (both in Germany and abroad) many data sets covering training information do not include detailed geographical identifiers that would allow a merging of information on the regional level. The regional identifiers of the National Educational Panel Study (Starting Cohort 6) offer opportunities to advance research on several regional factors. This article summarizes the results from two studies that exploit these unique opportunities to investigate the relationship between training participation and (a) the local level of firm competition for workers within specific sectors of the economy and (b) the regional supply of training measured as the number of firms offering courses or seminars for potential training participants.
COVID-19
(2021)
We investigate how the economic consequences of the pandemic and the government-mandated measures to contain its spread affect the self-employed — particularly women — in Germany. For our analysis, we use representative, real-time survey data in which respondents were asked about their situation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our findings indicate that among the self-employed, who generally face a higher likelihood of income losses due to COVID-19 than employees, women are about one-third more likely to experience income losses than their male counterparts. We do not find a comparable gender gap among employees. Our results further suggest that the gender gap among the self-employed is largely explained by the fact that women disproportionately work in industries that are more severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Our analysis of potential mechanisms reveals that women are significantly more likely to be impacted by government-imposed restrictions, e.g., the regulation of opening hours. We conclude that future policy measures intending to mitigate the consequences of such shocks should account for this considerable variation in economic hardship.
This paper provides novel evidence on the impact of public transport subsidies on air pollution. We obtain causal estimates by leveraging a unique policy intervention in Germany that temporarily reduced nationwide prices for regional public transport to a monthly flat rate price of 9 Euros. Using DiD estimation strategies on air pollutant data, we show that this intervention causally reduced a benchmark air pollution index by more than eight percent and, after its termination, increased again. Our results illustrate that public transport subsidies – especially in the context of spatially constrained cities – offer a viable alternative for policymakers and city planers to improve air quality, which has been shown to crucially affect health outcomes.
House price expectations
(2023)
This study examines short-, medium-, and long-run price expectations in housing markets. At the heart of our analysis is the combination of data from a tailored in-person household survey, past sale offerings, satellite imagery on developable land, and an information treatment (RCT). As novel finding, we show that price expectations show no evidence for momentum-effects in the long run. We also do not find much evidence for behavioural biases in expectations related to individual housing tenure decisions. Confirming existing findings, we find momentum-effects in the short-run and that individuals, to a limited extend, use aggregate price information to update local expectations. Lastly, we provide suggestive evidence corroborating existing findings that expectations are relevant for portfolio choice.
We use the prolonged Greek crisis as a case study to understand how a lasting economic shock affects the innovation strategies of firms in economies with moderate innovation activities. Adopting the 3-stage CDM model, we explore the link between R&D, innovation, and productivity for different size groups of Greek manufacturing firms during the prolonged crisis. At the first stage, we find that the continuation of the crisis is harmful for the R&D engagement of smaller firms while it increased the willingness for R&D activities among the larger ones. At the second stage, among smaller firms the knowledge production remains unaffected by R&D investments, while among larger firms the R&D decision is positively correlated with the probability of producing innovation, albeit the relationship is weakened as the crisis continues. At the third stage, innovation output benefits only larger firms in terms of labor productivity, while the innovation-productivity nexus is insignificant for smaller firms during the lasting crisis.