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Da Sparkassen einen öffentlichen Auftrag erfüllen müssen, der ihr Bestehen gesetzlich legitimiert, zeichnet sich ihr Corporate-Governance-System durch Besonderheiten aus. Diese Besonderheiten wirken sich nicht nur auf die Vorstandstätigkeit, sondern auch auf die Tätigkeit der Kontrollorgane aus, welche eine nachhaltige Erfüllung des öffentlichen Auftrags prüfen und gewährleisten sollen. Nach einer Vorstellung des Corporate-Governance-Systems beschäftigt sich der Beitrag daher mit der Frage, ob und wie allgemeine Herausforderungen, die durch das System bedingt sind, sowie besondere Herausforderungen, die sich aus der langanhaltenden Niedrigzinspolitik ergeben, die Effektivität der Kontrollen beeinflussen.
This paper investigates whether and how social-psychological mechanisms, namely reciprocity, demographic similarity, and similar experiences, affect CEO compensation packages with respect to the levels of total, fixed, and short- and mid-term compensation and the variable proportion of the compensation package. We use evidence from Germany as it is considered a prototype of a two-tier board system. Given the primary roles of both the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, we especially highlight social-psychological mechanisms in the process leading to the final compensation package. Using a hand-collected sample of non-financial constituents of the German HDAX, we find that reciprocity can lead to a compensation package that is more favorable for the CEO. Results on similarity are ambivalent such that the effects of similarity on CEO compensation—both positive and negative—may depend on the dimension of similarity. Finally, the chair’s CEO experience, both inside and outside the focal company, also plays an essential role in shaping CEO compensation. More specifically, CEO experience in general is associated with more favorable compensation. However, having a chair that has been CEO at the focal company correlates with less favorable compensation packages except for when the CEO has also been recruited internally.
Durch den Deutschen Rechnungslegungs Standard 20 und die sog. CorporateSocial Responsibility-Richtlinie sind nichtfinanzielle Kennzahlen im Rahmen der Unternehmenssteuerung zunehmend in den Fokus gerückt. Trotz dieser regulatorischen Signale etabliert sich deren Nutzung in der Praxis nur langsam. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird daher ein Überblick über die Bedeutung, die Hintergründeund den Stand der Implementierung nicht finanzieller Kennzahlen in der Unternehmenssteuerung im Allgemeinen und insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Steuerungssystem der Vorstandsvergütung gegeben.
Organizations frequently try to incentivize employees to develop highly creative solutions. In this study, we examine self-set salaries as a specific type of incentive design. We investigate whether self-set salaries affect employees’ motivation and overall (creative) performance. Moreover, because self-set salaries potentially risk opportunistic employee behavior, we consider the effect of the observability of peer performance on employees’ level of self-set salaries. Using a laboratory experiment, we hold the average employee compensation constant and demonstrate that, in comparison with fixed-pay contracts, self-set salaries increase the quantitative performance in creative tasks without affecting the average creativity. However, we do not find significant differences between the amount of individuals’ self-set salaries with observability of peer performance and the amount for individuals without the chance to observe peer performance. Our findings are important for firms that rely on the development of creative ideas but are unsure about the effects of the introduction of self-set salaries
We investigate how the design of audit processes influences employees’ reporting decisions. We focus specifically on detective employee audits for which several employees are randomly selected after a defined period to audit their ex-post behavior. We investigate two design features of the audit process, namely, employee anonymity and process transparency, and analyze their impact on misreporting. Overall, we find that both components influence the extent of individuals’ misreporting. A nonanonymous audit decreases performance misreporting more than an audit in which the employee remains anonymous. Furthermore, the high incidence of performance misreporting in the case of anonymous audits can be decreased when the process transparency is low. Thus, our study informs accountants about how the two design features of employee anonymity and transparency of the audit process can be used to constrain performance misreporting to increase the efficiency of audits
Aufgrund ihrer komplexitätsreduzierenden Eigenschaften sind Management-Control-Systeme (MCS) ein wichtiges Instrument für die Professionalisierung vonStart-ups. MCS können helfen, Unsicherheit zu vermeiden und das Insolvenzri-siko reduzieren. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Einblick in die Verwendung von MCS indeutschen Start-ups und untersucht ausgewählte Einflussfaktoren auf die Einfüh-rung von MCS.
Doing good by doing bad
(2022)
This study investigates how tone at the top, implemented by top management, and tone at the bottom, in an employee’s immediate work environment, determine noncompliance. We focus on the disallowed actions of employees that improve their own and, in turn, the company’s performance, referred to as performance-improving noncompliant behavior (PINC behavior). We conduct a survey of German sales employees to investigate specifically how, on the one hand, (1) corporate rules and (2) performance pressure, both implemented by top management, and, on the other hand, (3) others’ PINC expectations and (4) others’ PINC behavior, both arising from the employee’s immediate work environment, influence PINC behavior. When considered in isolation, we find that corporate rules, as top management’s main instrument to guide employee behavior, decrease employee PINC behavior. However, this effect is negatively influenced by the employees’ immediate work environment when employees are expected to engage in PINC or when others engage in PINC. In contrast, even though top management places great performance pressure on employees, that by itself does not increase PINC behavior. Overall, our study informs practitioners and researchers about whether and how the four determinants increase or decrease employees’ PINC behavior, which is important to comprehend triggers and to counteract such misconduct.
Doing good by doing bad
(2022)
This study investigates how tone at the top, implemented by top management, and tone at the bottom, in an employee's immediate work environment, determine noncompliance. We focus on the disallowed actions of employees that improve their own and, in turn, the company's performance, referred to as performance-improving noncompliant behavior (PINC behavior). We conduct a survey of German sales employees to investigate specifically how, on the one hand, (1) corporate rules and (2) performance pressure, both implemented by top management, and, on the other hand, (3) others' PINC expectations and (4) others' PINC behavior, both arising from the employee's immediate work environment, influence PINC behavior. When considered in isolation, we find that corporate rules, as top management's main instrument to guide employee behavior, decrease employee PINC behavior. However, this effect is negatively influenced by the employees' immediate work environment when employees are expected to engage in PINC or when others engage in PINC. In contrast, even though top management places great performance pressure on employees, that by itself does not increase PINC behavior. Overall, our study informs practitioners and researchers about whether and how the four determinants increase or decrease employees' PINC behavior, which is important to comprehend triggers and to counteract such misconduct.
We examine the determinants of the disclosure of value-based (VB) performance measures in Germany. We argue that firms are more likely to disclose VB performance measures when information asymmetry is greater, as greater information asymmetry means firms have a greater need to credibly signal a shareholder value orientation. Using a hand-collected dataset of German listed firms covering 1,528 firm-years from 2004 to 2011, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to disclose a VB performance measure if the free float is larger than the blocking minority and also, when firms are large, if they have high foreign sales to total sales ratios and are not cross-listed internationally. Our results indicate that German firms use VB performance measures to improve investor communication and to substantiate their shareholder value orientation. Our results should be interpreted against a background of increased shareholder value orientation and sophisticated cost accounting in German firms.
Im Zuge der Digitalisierung bietet Business Analytics das Potenzial, die Budgetierung insbesondere durch eine Automatisierung von Prozessschritten der Budgetierung maßgeblich weiterzuentwickeln. Dieser Beitrag zeigt mittels einer empirischen Untersuchung den Status quo des Einsatzes von Business Analytics im Rahmen der Budgetierung in Deutschland und geht auf die Beurteilung einer Automatisierung der Budgetierung durch Unternehmen ein.