Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (182) (remove)
Language
- English (182) (remove)
Keywords
- experiment (12)
- communication (6)
- COVID-19 (4)
- Entrepreneurship (4)
- Innovation (4)
- cartel (4)
- entrepreneurship (4)
- gender (4)
- machine learning (4)
- E-DSGE (3)
Institute
- Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA) (79)
- Fachgruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre (65)
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (50)
- Berlin Potsdam Research Group "The International Rule of Law - Rise or Decline?" (44)
- Extern (39)
- Fachgruppe Politik- & Verwaltungswissenschaft (5)
- Öffentliches Recht (5)
- MenschenRechtsZentrum (3)
- Fachgruppe Betriebswirtschaftslehre (1)
- Fachgruppe Soziologie (1)
Existing theoretical literature fails to explain the differences between the pay of workers that are covered by union agreements and others who are not. This study aims at closing this gap by a single general- equilibrium approach that integrates a dual labor market and a two- sector product market. Our results suggest that the so called 'union wage gap' is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods.
Our analysis is concerned with the impact of a regionalisation of unemployment insurance (UI) on workers’ preferences, on firms’ profits, and on effciency. The existence and the extent of UI are endogenously derived by maximising an objective function of the state. Three different types of regionalisation are considered which differ with respect to the area the UI objective function is related to, and with respect to the policy variable used to maximise it. It comes to light that workers are always in favour of central UI, while it depends on the type of regionalisation whether or not firms are better off with regional or with central UI. The same somewhat surprising result applies for efficiency.
We examine the effects of regionalising the budget of unemployment insurance (UI) on wages, employment, and on UI parameters, which, for their part, determine the agents’ preferences concerning such a reform. A numerical example shows that, under reasonable assumptions, the intuition that the reform would enhance efficiency and improve the economic situation of agents from the low- unemployment region to the disadvantage of agents from the high- unemployment region is not valid in general.
This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
Public pensions in the U.S.
(2005)
Contents: The Public Old Age Insurance of the U.S. -Historical overview -Technical details -Individual equity and social adequacy The Economic Problem of Old Age -Risks and economic security -Old age, retirement, and idividual precaution -Insurance markets, market failures, and social insurance -Options for public pension systems The Problems of Social Security -The financial balance of OASDI -Causes of the long-run problems -Rates of return -Conclusion - The case for Social Security reform Proposed Remedies -Full, partial, or no privatization? -The President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security -Kotlikoff's Personal Security System -The Diamond-Orszag Three-Part plan
Many European countries have experienced a significant increase of unemployment in recent years. This paper reviews several theoretical models that try to explain this phenomenon. Predominantly, these models claim a link between the poor performance of European labor markets and the high level of market regulation. Commonly referred to as the Eurosclerosis debate, prominent approaches consider insider-outsider relationships, search-models, and the influence of hiring and firing costs on equilibrium employment. The paper presents empirical evidence of each model and studies the relevance of the identified rigidities as a determinant of high unemployment in Europe. Furthermore, a case study analyzes the unemployment problem in Germany and critically discusses new reform efforts. In particular this section analyzes whether the recently enacted Hartz reforms can induce higher employment.
Revisiting public investment
(2004)
The consumption equivalence method is the theoretical basis of public cost-benefit analysis. Consumption equivalence public capital prices are explicitly introduces in order to sufficiently care for the opportunity cost of public expenditure. This can solve the dispute about the social rate of discount within public cost-benefit analysis witch was generated on a criterion looking similar to the capital value formula, known as Lind’s approach. The social rate of discount is liberated from opportunity costs considerations and the discounting away of the effects for future welfare vanishes. The corresponding question whether one should accept a positive value of the pure rate of social time preference is an old issue. Its current state between the prescriptive and descriptive view can also be interpreted as a consequence of the oversimplification of standard cost– benefit analysis. But apart from an economic self-process the pure rate of social time preference is also defined as a business-as-usual value of social distance discounting. Hence, a political choice has to be made about this rate which is free in principal.
An exhaustive and disjoint decomposition of social choice situations is derived in a general set theoretical framework using the new tools of the Lifted Pareto relation on the power set of social states representing a pre-choice comparison of choice option sets. The main result is the classification of social choice situations which include three types of social choice problems. First, we usually observe the common incompleteness of the Pareto relation. Second, a kind of non-compactness problem of a choice set of social states can be generated. Finally, both can be combined. The first problem root can be regarded as natural everyday dilemma of social choice theory whereas the second may probably be much more due to modeling technique implications. The distinction is enabled at a very general set theoretical level. Hence, the derived classification of social choice situations is applicable on almost every relevant economic model.
Contents: Actors, Markets and Interest Groups in Health Services Private and Social Health Insurance in a Simple Model Misallocation and Malpractice in Social Health Care and Insurances -The UK Health Care System -The German Social Health Insurance System -Current Discussions: Intertemporal Perspective and Fundamental Change Interplay of Public and Private Health Insurance: Lessons for Countries in Transition Summary: The Necessary Steps to a Fundamental Reform