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Whereas the US President signed the Kyoto Protocol, the failure of the US Congress to ratify it seriously hampered subsequent international climate cooperation. This recent US trend, of signing environmental treaties but failing to ratify them, could thwart attempts to come to a future climate agreement. Two complementary explanations of this trend are proposed. First, the political system of the US has distinct institutional features that make it difficult for presidents to predict whether the Senate will give its advice and consent to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and whether Congress will pass the required enabling legislation. Second, elected for a fixed term, US presidents might benefit politically from supporting MEAs even when knowing that legislative support is not forthcoming. Four policy implications are explored, concerning the scope for unilateral presidential action, the potential for bipartisan congressional support, the effectiveness of a treaty without the US, and the prospects for a deep, new climate treaty.
Policy relevance
Why does the failure of US ratification of multilateral environmental treaties occur? This article analyses the domestic political mechanisms involved in cases of failed US ratification. US non-participation in global environmental institutions often has serious ramifications. For example, it sharply limited Kyoto's effectiveness and seriously hampered international climate negotiations for years. Although at COP 17 in Durban the parties agreed to negotiate a new agreement by 2015, a new global climate treaty may well trigger a situation resembling the one President Clinton faced in 1997 when he signed Kyoto but never obtained support for it in the Senate. US failure to ratify could thwart future climate agreements.
Einleitung
(2012)
Einleitung
(2012)
Die vorliegende Arbeit enthält eine statistische Analyse der Gesamtheit öffentlicher Unternehmen in Deutschland und ihrer wirtschaftlichen Lage. Für diese Untersuchung stand eine Datenbank für etwa 9000 öffentliche Unternehmen mit knapp 500 Merkmalen zur Verfügung, die im Wesentlichen den Posten der Jahresabschlüsse und verschiedenen Identifikationsmerkmalen (wie u. a. Unternehmenssitz, Wirtschaftszweig und Rechtsform) entsprechen. Die Analyse umfasst den Zeitraum von 1998 bis 2006. Die extrem umfangreiche Datengrundlage – Jahresabschlussstatistiken öffentlicher Unternehmen – ist für einen Statistiker eine große Versuchung. In der Arbeit wurden Methoden der beschreibenden Statistik und der Jahresabschlussanalyse mit Bilanzkennzahlen angewandt. Vor allem in den letzten zwanzig Jahren wurde die Entwicklung der Gesamtheit öffentlicher Unternehmen durch Wandelprozesse geprägt und von Diskussionen über ihre Leistungsfähigkeit begleitet. Die Dynamik der Gesamtheit öffentlicher Unternehmen zeigt sich v. a. an der Vielfalt ihrer Aufgabenbereiche und Organisationsformen. Daher wurde in dieser Arbeit versucht, zunächst eine Bestandsaufnahme des öffentlichen Unternehmensbereichs durchzuführen. Ein weiteres Ziel war die Beschreibung der Wirtschaftslage öffentlicher Unternehmen im letzten Jahrzehnt, wobei ihre Leistungsfähigkeit in den Vordergrund gestellt wird. Die Leistungsfähigkeit öffentlicher Unternehmen nur über die betriebswirtschaftliche Effizienz zu messen, ist gewiss einseitig und nicht ausreichend. Diese ließ sich aber im Vergleich zur volkswirtschaftlichen oder sozialen Effizienz leichter operationalisieren: Die betriebswirtschaftlichen Effizienzkriterien können gut aus den Jahresabschlüssen abgeleitet werden. Dadurch wird auch ein Vergleich mit privaten Unternehmen in gewissen Grenzen möglich. Die Beschreibung der Wirtschaftslage öffentlicher Unternehmen wurde als Analyse ihrer einzelnen Teillagen (Vermögens-, Finanz- und Ertragslage) strukturiert. Insgesamt unterstreicht die Analyse der Teillagen die enge Verflechtung zwischen öffentlichen Unternehmen und öffentlichen Haushalten. Die vorliegende Untersuchung soll die Forschung auf dem Gebiet der datengetriebenen Statistik, die im Universitätsbereich in letzten Jahren im Vergleich zur modellgetriebenen Statistik oft vernachlässigt wurde, ausweiten.
This study follows the debate in comparative public administration research on the role of advisory arrangements in central governments. The aim of this study is to explain the mechanisms by which these actors gain their alleged role in government decision-making. Hence, it analyses advisory arrangements that are proactively involved in executive decision-making and may compete with the permanent bureaucracy by offering policy advice to political executives. The study argues that these advisory arrangements influence government policy-making by "institutional politics", i.e. by shaping the institutional underpinnings to govern or rather the "rules of the executive game" in order to strengthen their own position or that of their clients. The theoretical argument of this study follows the neo-institutionalist turn in organization theory and defines institutional politics as gradual institutionalization processes between institutions and organizational actors. It applies a broader definition of institutions as sets of regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. Following the "power-distributional approach" such gradual institutionalization processes are influenced by structure-oriented characteristics, i.e. the nature of the objects of institutional politics, in particular the freedom of interpretation in their application, as well as the distinct constraints of the institutional context. In addition, institutional politics are influenced by agency-oriented characteristics, i.e. the ambitions of actors to act as "would-be change agents". These two explanatory dimensions result in four ideal-typical mechanisms of institutional politics: layering, displacement, drift, and conversion, which correspond to four ideal-types of would-be change agents. The study examines the ambitions of advisory arrangements in institutional politics in an exploratory manner, the relevance of the institutional context is analyzed via expectation hypotheses on the effects of four institutional context features that are regarded as relevant in the scholarly debate: (1) the party composition of governments, (2) the structuring principles in cabinet, (3) the administrative tradition, and (4) the formal politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy. The study follows a "most similar systems design" and conducts qualitative case studies on the role of advisory arrangements at the center of German and British governments, i.e. the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, for a longer period (1969/1970-2005). Three time periods are scrutinized per country; the British case studies examine the role of advisory arrangements at the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Finance under Prime Ministers Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) and Blair (1997-2005). The German case studies study the role of advisory arrangements at the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Finance during the Brandt government (1969-74), the Kohl government (1982-1987) and the Schröder government (1998-2005). For the empirical analysis, the results of a document analysis and the findings of 75 semi-structured expert interviews have been triangulated. The comparative analysis reveals different patterns of institutional politics. The German advisory arrangements engaged initially in displacement but turned soon towards layering and drift, i.e. after an initial displacement of the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern they laid increasingly new elements onto existing ones and took the non-deliberative decision to neglect the adaption of existing rules of the executive game towards changing environmental demands. The British advisory arrangements were mostly involved in displacement and conversion, despite occasional layering, i.e. they displaced the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern with new rules of the executive game and transformed and realigned them, sometimes also layering new elements onto pre-existing ones. The structure- and agency-oriented characteristics explain these patterns of institutional politics. First, the study shows that the institutional context limits the institutional politics in Germany and facilitates the institutional politics in the UK. Second, the freedom of interpreting the application of institutional targets is relevant and could be observed via the different ambitions of advisory arrangements across countries and over time, confirming, third, that the interests of such would-be change agents are likewise important to understand the patterns of institutional politics. The study concludes that the role of advisory arrangements in government policy-making rests not only upon their policy-related, party-political or media-advisory role for political executives, but especially upon their activities in institutional politics, resulting in distinct institutional constraints on all actors in government policy-making – including their own role in these processes.
Für den internationalen Vergleich von Gesellschaften wird ein System gesellschaftlicher Dauerbeobachtung vorgeschlagen, indem aufgrund einer Auseinandersetzung mit der sozialphilosophischen Diskussion acht Performanzkriterien für den internationalen Vergleich von Lebensbedingungen bzw. der „Wohlfahrt der Nationen“ entwickelt werden: Wohlstand und Wachstum; ökologische Nachhaltigkeit; Innovation; soziale Sicherung durch Unterstützungsleistungen im Risikofall sowie vorsorgend durch Bildungsinvestitionen; Anerkennung der Besonderheiten (Frauenfreundlichkeit und Migrantenfreundlichkeit); Gleichheit der Teilhabe; soziale Integration; Autonomie („freedom of choice and capabilities”). All dies betrachten wir als gesellschaftlich wünschenswerte Ziele. In unserem Ansatz gehen wir nicht von einem einheitlichen Pfad der Modernisierung in Richtung Wachstum, Partizipation und Inklusion aus, sondern unterscheiden in Erweiterung der „drei Welten des Wohlfahrtskapitalismus“ von Esping-Andersen (mindestens) fünf verschiedene institutionelle Entwicklungspfade der Modernisierung: Der sozialdemokratisch-universalistische Pfad, der wirtschaftsliberale Pfad, der Status-konservierende Pfad, der „familistische“ Pfad und die Entwicklung der Gruppe der ex-sozialistischen Länder, die sich in einem Prozess der Ausdifferenzierung befinden. Ab der 3. Auflage werden nun 36 Länder verglichen (incl. aller EU-Mitglieder) statt wie zuvor 28 Länder, in der 7. Auflage auf dem Stand von Januar 2012. Zur Analyse der Sozialstrukturen werden als Modelle sozialer Lagen berücksichtigt: Marx, Weber, Roemer/Wright; soziale Schichten, berufliche Lagen, Goldthorpe-Modell; Bourdieu, Vester, Hradil. Als Anwendungsbereiche werden behandelt: Dienstleistungsgesellschaften und Erwerbstätigkeit, Bildung; Wohlfahrtsregime und soziale Sicherung; Wohlstand, Einkommen, Vermögen und Armut; soziale Mobilität; soziale Ungleichheiten zwischen Frauen und Männern; Bevölkerungsstruktur und Lebensformen; Lebensstile; Individualisierung und ihre Gegenbewegungen; zusammenfassender Vergleich von Lebensbedingungen in verschiedenen Ländern und Wohlfahrtsregimen.
Over the last three decades, the German political economy can be characterized by both institutional continuity and change. Understanding the dynamics of institutional change therefore requires an examination of the interplay of changes in formal institutional rules and how organizations respond to these changes by strategic attempts to promote or hinder further change in institutions. The macro-level political story of institutional change shows a number of paradoxes resulting in unexpected and often incomplete forms of market liberalization shaped by continued support for some core features of Germany's social market economy. The resulting erosion of Germany's co-ordinated model of economic organization through networks and business associations has gone hand-in-hand with the attempts to preserve these institutions for core workers and sectors of the economy in the face of changing environments. The result is a more varied institutional landscape characterized by international diffusion of liberal policies and the politics of their variable re-embedding within a long-term path of institutional continuity.
Jorn Knobloch, Between Self-reference and Other-reference: Typology and Transformation of Authoritarianism within the World Society, pp. 35-59. The article offers a conceptual framework for the analysis of the interdependence of the world society and the new authoritarianism. At first the article criticizes existing conceptual approaches and develops a new approach, which will use the assumptions of the systems theory. In the next part we discuss different theoretical impacts of the world society and the possible reactions of the authoritarianism. The third part evaluates the theoretical reactions. Therefore we use the empirical case of Russia. The empirical investigation of the approach permits the development of a conceptual framework for the further empirical research of the new authoritarianism.
This article calls for a holistic perspective on parliamentary change through the analytical lens of parliamentary agenda powers. In addition to agenda control, the concept of agenda powers not only refers to the ability of parliamentary actors to directly influence parliamentary output through legislation (efficiency), but also to exert indirect influence through controlling the government (effectiveness) and through affecting public opinion (legitimacy). The concept of agenda powers comprises the formal institutional rules underlying the distribution of the parliamentary agenda, the factual application of these rules and the organisational powers enabling actors to make use of their time. The distribution of agenda powers can be explained by the sequencing of legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency reforms. Consequently, the concept of parliamentary agenda powers allows for a comparative long-term analysis of parliamentary change. Furthermore, the concept of parliamentary agenda powers enables us to operationalise normative scenarios of a de-parliamentarisation and the alleged transitions towards post- or neo-parliamentarian democracy.