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A mathematical model of working-memory capacity limits is proposed on the key assumption of mutual interference between items in working memory. Interference is assumed to arise from overwriting of features shared by these items. The model was fit to time-accuracy data of memory-updating tasks from four experiments using nonlinear mixed effect (NLME) models as a framework. The model gave a good account of the data from a numerical and a spatial task version. The performance pattern in a combination of numerical and spatial updating could be explained by variations in the interference parameter: assuming less feature overlap between contents from different domains than between contents from the same domain, the model can account for double dissociations of content domains in dual-task experiments. Experiment 3 extended this idea to similarity within the verbal domain. The decline of memory accuracy with increasing memory load was steeper with phonologically similar than with dissimilar material, although processing speed was faster for the similar material. The model captured the similarity effects with a higher estimated interference parameter for the similar than for the dissimilar condition. The results are difficult to explain with alternative models, in particular models incorporating time-based decay and models assuming limited resource pools.
The article presents a mathematical model of short-term recognition based on dual-process models and the three- component theory of working memory [Oberauer, K. (2002). Access to information in working memory: Exploring the focus of attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 28, 411-421]. Familiarity arises from activated representations in long-term memory, ignoring their relations; recollection retrieves bindings in the capacity- limited component of working memory. In three experiments participants encoded two short lists of nonwords for immediate recognition, one of which was then cued as irrelevant. Probes from the irrelevant list were rejected more slowly than new probes; this was also found with probes recombining letters of irrelevant nonwords, suggesting that familiarity arises from individual letters independent of their relations. When asked to accept probes whose letters were all in the relevant list, regardless of their conjunction, participants accepted probes preserving the original conjunctions faster than recombinations, showing that recollection accessed feature bindings automatically. The model fit the data best when familiarity depended only on matching letters, whereas recollection used binding information.
This study investigated whether older adults could acquire the ability to perform 2 cognitive operations in parallel in a paradigm in which young adults had been shown to be able to do so (K. Oberauer & R. Kliegl, 2004). Twelve young and 12 older adults practiced a numerical and a visuospatial continuous memory updating task in single-task and dual-task conditions for 16 to 24 sessions. After practice, 9 young adults were able to process the 2 tasks without dual- task costs, but none of the older adults had reached the criterion of parallel processing. The results suggest a qualitative difference between young and older adults in how they approach dual-task situations.
Between reasoning
(2006)
In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog](referent)_(expression) is to the left of [the frog](relatum)_(expression); [the snake](referent)_(expression) is between [the donkey and the deer](relatum)_(expression)). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given - new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise.
Binding and inhibition in working memory : individual and age differences in short-term recognition
(2005)
Two studies investigated the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC), adult age, and the resolution of conflict between familiarity and recollection in short-term recognition tasks. Experiment 1 showed a specific deficit of young adults with low WMC in rejecting intrusion probes (i.e., highly familiar probes) in a modified Sternberg task, which was similar to the deficit found in old adults in a parallel experiment (K. Oberauer, 2001). Experiment 2 generalized these results to 3 recognition paradigms (modified Sternberg, local recognition, and n back tasks). Old adults showed disproportional performance deficits on intrusion probes only in terms of reaction times, whereas young adults with low WMC showed them only in terms of errors. The generality of the effect across paradigms is more compatible with a deficit in content-context bindings subserving recollection than with a deficit in inhibition of irrelevant information in working memory. Structural equation models showed that WMC is related to the efficiency of recollection but not of familiarity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved)
We present an integrated model for the understanding of and the reasoning from conditional statements. Central assumptions from several approaches are integrated into a causal path model. According to the model, the cognitive availability of exceptions to a conditional reduces the subjective conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent. This conditional probability determines people's degree of belief in the conditional, which in turn affects their willingness to accept logically valid inferences. In addition to this indirect pathway, the model contains a direct pathway: Availability of exceptional situations directly reduces the endorsement of valid inferences. We tested the integrated model with three experiments using conditional statements embedded in pseudonaturalistic cover stories. An explicitly mentioned causal link between antecedent and consequent was either present (causal conditionals) or absent (arbitrary conditionals). The model was supported for the causal but not for the arbitrary conditional statements
Two experiments investigated whether young and old adults can temporarily remove information from a capacity- limited central component of working memory (WM) into another component, the activated part of long-term memory (LTM). Experiment I used a modified Sternberg recognition task (S. Sternberg, 1969); Experiment 2 used an arithmetic memory- updating task. In both paradigms, participants memorized 2 lists, one of which was cued as temporarily irrelevant. Removal of the irrelevant list from capacity-limited WM was indexed by the disappearance of list-length effects of that list on latencies for concurrent processing tasks. Young adults could oursource the irrelevant list within 2-3 s and retrieve it back into the central part of WM later. Old adults showed the same flexibility in the arithmetic updating task but seemed somewhat less able or inclined to temporarily move information into the activated part of LTM in the modified Sternberg task
Dissociating retention and access in working memory : an age-comparative study of mental arithmetic
(2001)
Two experiments with a working-memory updating task investigated dual-task interference between short-term storage of numerical and spatial material, between execution of a numerical and a spatial updating operation, and between storage and processing. Participants memorised a set of digits and a set of spatial positions, updated elements of both sets by a sequence of operations, and then recalled the final values. In Experiment 1, a single element in each memory set had to be updated several times. There was little interference between storage of the two sets, and between storage and processing, but parallel execution of the two operations was not possible. In Experiment 2, all elements in both memory sets were updated in random order. There was substantial interference between memory for the numerical and the spatial sets, and between storage and processing. Parallel execution of two operations was again not possible. Moreover, trying to do two operations simultaneously resulted in impaired memory of final results. The results support the distinction between the activated part of long-term memory that can hold elements currently not needed for processing, and a more central, capacity-limited part of working memory that provides access to its contents for processing
Effects of directionality in deductive reasoning : II. Premise integration and conclusion evaluation
(2005)
Previous research (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000) has shown an inherent directionality between the two terms linked in premises of typical deductive reasoning tasks. With three experiments we investigated the effect of inherent directionality on the time to integrate two premises and for the derivation of a conclusion. We varied figure (i.e., order of terms in the premises) and direction of inference (i.e., order of terms in the conclusion) in deduction tasks from various domains (propositional reasoning, syllogisms, spatial, temporal, and linear order reasoning). Effects of figure on premise reading times varied with the directionality of the relations. Effects of direction of inference reflected the same directionality for a subset of relations. We propose that two factors are jointly responsible for a large part of observed directionality effects in premise integration: the inherent directionality of relational statements and a general advantage for a given-new order of terms in the second premise. Difficulty of deriving a conclusion is affected by the directionality or relations if and only if the relation is semantically asymmetric, so that the directionality must be preserved in the integrated mental model
We tested the independent influences of two content-based factors on dual-task costs, and on the parallel processing ability: The pairing of S-R modalities and the pairing of relevant features between stimuli and responses of two tasks. The two pairing factors were realized across four dual-task groups. Within each group the two tasks comprised two different stimulus modalities (visual and auditory), two different relevant stimulus features (spatial and verbal) and two response modalities (manual and vocal). Pairings of S-R modalities (standard: visual-manual and auditory-vocal, non-standard: visual-vocal and auditory manual) and feature pairings (standard: spatial-manual and verbal-vocal, non-standard: spatial-vocal and verbal-manual) varied across groups. All participants practiced their respective dual-task combination in a paradigm with simultaneous stimulus onset before being transferred to a psychological refractory period paradigm varying stimulus-onset asynchrony. A comparison at the end of practice revealed similar dual-task costs and similar pairing effects in both paradigms. Dual-task costs depended on modality and feature pairings. Groups training with non-standard feature pairings (i.e., verbal stimulus features mapped to spatially separated response keys, or spatial stimulus features mapped to verbal responses) and non-standard modality pairings (i.e., auditory stimulus mapped to manual response, or visual stimulus mapped to vocal responses) had higher dual-task costs than respective standard pairings. In contrast, irrespective of modality pairing dual-task costs virtually disappeared with standard feature pairings after practice in both paradigms. The results can be explained by crosstalk between feature-binding processes for the two tasks. Crosstalk was present for non-standard but absent for standard feature pairings. Therefore, standard feature pairings enabled parallel processing at the end of practice. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
This article reinvestigates the claim by P. Verhaeghen, J. Cerella, and C. Basak (2004) that the focus of attention in working memory can be expanded from 1 to 4 items through practice. Using a modified version of Verhaeghen et al.'s n-back paradigm, Experiments 1 and 3 show that a signature of a one-item focus, the time cost for switching between items in working memory, persists over practice. Verhaeghen et al. reported a shift over practice from a step function to a linear slope of reaction times over set size and argued that it reflects the expansion of the focus. With an improved counterbalancing scheme, a continuously increasing slope was found even without practice in Experiment 2. The results question the hypothesis that the focus is expanded through practice. They are in line with predictions from a model that distinguishes a one-item focus from a direct-access region holding about 4 items
We report two experiments testing a central prediction of the probabilistic account of reasoning provided by Oaksford and Chater (2001): Acceptance of standard conditional inferences, card choices in the Wason selection task, and quantifiers chosen for conclusions from syllogisms should vary as a function of the frequency of the concepts involved. Frequency was manipulated by a probability-learning phase preceding the reasoning tasks to simulate natural sampling. The effects predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2001) were not obtained with any of the three paradigms
Media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War frequently contained corrections and retractions of earlier information. For example, claims that Iraqi forces executed coalition prisoners of war after they surrendered were retracted the day after the claims were made. Similarly, tentative initial reports about the discovery of weapons of mass destruction were all later disconfirmed. We investigated the effects of these retractions and disconfirmations on people's memory for and beliefs about war-related events in two coalition countries (Australia and the United States) and one country that opposed the war (Germany). Participants were queried about (a) true events, (b) events initially presented as fact but subsequently retracted, and (c) fictional events. Participants in the United States did not show sensitivity to the correction of misinformation, whereas participants in Australia and Germany discounted corrected misinformation. Our results are consistent with previous findings in that the differences between samples reflect greater suspicion about the motives underlying the war among people in Australia and Germany than among people in the United States