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Institute
- Institut für Philosophie (64) (remove)
In Quest of Subjectivity
(2009)
Lebenswissen nach Cavell
(2009)
Wiederholte Wiederholung
(2009)
Critical Anthropology? To the Relationship between Philosophical Anthropology and Critical Theory
(2016)
This article compares Max Horkheimer’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner’s foundation of Philosophical Anthropology. While Horkheimer’s and Plessner’s paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno’s „negative dialectics“ and Plessner’s „negative anthropology“ (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another. Jürgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner’s philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the „life power“ in „high capitalism“ (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a „critical anthropology“ (H. Schnädelbach).
In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor makes clear that both hypergoods and moral sources are essential to the moral life. Although hypergoods and moral sources are not the same thing, Taylor’s descriptions of these concepts are quite similar, and so their distinction requires interpretation. I propose that we interpret the difference on the basis of another distinction that is central to Taylor’s thinking: that between immanence and transcendence. Whereas a moral source transcends us, a hypergood is the value of our immanent way of relating to that moral source. This interpretation requires that we first differentiate between a narrow and a wide sense of “moral source.”
critique of neuroscience
(2016)
Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors’ view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker’s diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical–anthropological foundation.
On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.
Analytic Kantianism
(2017)
Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars’s account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars’s position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy.
On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.
Martin Heideggers Hölderlin-Lesungen – im Zeichen von Norbert von Hellingrath and Stefan George
(2017)
Martin Heidegger hat Anfang der 1960er Jahre 10 Gedichte Hölderlins für eine Sprechschallplatte des Günther Neske-Verlags in Pfullingen eingesprochen. Die insgesamt rund 50 Minuten dauernde Langspiel-Schallplatte wurde seit 1964 gewerblich vertrieben. Was hat einen Philosophen dazu bewogen, hinter dem Dichter zurückzutreten, um nur noch dessen Sprachrohr zu sein? Heidegger knüpfte mit seinem Hölderlin-Verständnis an Norbert von Hellingraths Auffassung vom Dichterpropheten und der Dichtung als heiligem Wort an. Seine rhythmischen Rezitationen in monoton psalmodierendem Stil leiten sich vortragsgeschichtlich von Hellingrath und der George-Schule her.
The final end of imagination
(2017)
One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant’s moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively.
Most of the longer worldly fictional Middle High German first-person narrations are allegorical. The article discusses the reasons for this interdependence between allegory and the first-person narrative form, which is observable not only in Middle High German literature, but also in texts belonging to other European vernacular literatures of the time. In my article I develop two main thesis: The first is that the use of allegoric forms marks on the one hand a highbrow literary level and serves as a stylistic ornament of texts, which tend to present themselves mainly as author-speech. This is also the reason why in these texts the ›I‹ is often not only a narrating ›I‹, but also takes over the role of an author on the narrative level of the histoire. The other reason for this interdependence is that among all kinds of narrators, only the first-person narrator is able to cross the border between the extradiegetic and the diegetic world, in which personifications like Frau Minne, Frau Triuwe, or Frau Âventiure have the knowledge about Minne, Triuwe, and Âventiure and wait for the first-person narrator to approach and to be taught. Only he can experience the encounter with the personifications and their instruction himself and only he can pass this knowledge to the recipients as an experience he made himself.
Institutional logics in inter-departmental coordination: Why actors agree on a joint policy output
(2017)
By investigating two German inter-departmental committees, this article shows that the policy output of these coordination bodies depends on the specific institutional logic evoked throughout the coordination process. While in one of the groups a policy logic prevailed and a joint coordination output was achieved, the other was dominated by a political logic and proved unable to achieve agreement. The article contributes to research on government coordination by showing that actor orientations are crucial for explaining inter-organizational coordination. The results direct attention to the behavioural implications of coordination structures.
Practical Philosophy
(2017)
Who Can We Laugh At?
(2018)
Make English Sweet Again!
(2018)