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Process-based integrated assessment models (IAMs) project long-term transformation pathways in energy and land-use systems under what-if assumptions. IAM evaluation is necessary to improve the models’ usefulness as scientific tools applicable in the complex and contested domain of climate change mitigation. We contribute the first comprehensive synthesis of process-based IAM evaluation research, drawing on a wide range of examples across six different evaluation methods including historical simulations, stylised facts, and model diagnostics. For each evaluation method, we identify progress and milestones to date, and draw out lessons learnt as well as challenges remaining. We find that each evaluation method has distinctive strengths, as well as constraints on its application. We use these insights to propose a systematic evaluation framework combining multiple methods to establish the appropriateness, interpretability, credibility, and relevance of process-based IAMs as useful scientific tools for informing climate policy. We also set out a programme of evaluation research to be mainstreamed both within and outside the IAM community.
Many phenomena of high relevance for economic development such as human capital, geography and climate vary considerably within countries as well as between them. Yet, global data sets of economic output are typically available at the national level only, thereby limiting the accuracy and precision of insights gained through empirical analyses. Recent work has used interpolation and downscaling to yield estimates of sub-national economic output at a global scale, but respective data sets based on official, reported values only are lacking. We here present DOSE — the MCC-PIK Database Of Sub-national Economic Output. DOSE contains harmonised data on reported economic output from 1,661 sub-national regions across 83 countries from 1960 to 2020. To avoid interpolation, values are assembled from numerous statistical agencies, yearbooks and the literature and harmonised for both aggregate and sectoral output. Moreover, we provide temporally- and spatially-consistent data for regional boundaries, enabling matching with geo-spatial data such as climate observations. DOSE provides the opportunity for detailed analyses of economic development at the subnational level, consistent with reported values.
Climate science provides strong evidence of the necessity of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, in line with the Paris Climate Agreement. The IPCC 1.5 °C special report (SR1.5) presents 414 emissions scenarios modelled for the report, of which around 50 are classified as '1.5 °C scenarios', with no or low temperature overshoot. These emission scenarios differ in their reliance on individual mitigation levers, including reduction of global energy demand, decarbonisation of energy production, development of land-management systems, and the pace and scale of deploying carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. The reliance of 1.5 °C scenarios on these levers needs to be critically assessed in light of the potentials of the relevant technologies and roll-out plans. We use a set of five parameters to bundle and characterise the mitigation levers employed in the SR1.5 1.5 °C scenarios. For each of these levers, we draw on the literature to define 'medium' and 'high' upper bounds that delineate between their 'reasonable', 'challenging' and 'speculative' use by mid century. We do not find any 1.5 °C scenarios that stay within all medium upper bounds on the five mitigation levers. Scenarios most frequently 'over use' CDR with geological storage as a mitigation lever, whilst reductions of energy demand and carbon intensity of energy production are 'over used' less frequently. If we allow mitigation levers to be employed up to our high upper bounds, we are left with 22 of the SR1.5 1.5 °C scenarios with no or low overshoot. The scenarios that fulfil these criteria are characterised by greater coverage of the available mitigation levers than those scenarios that exceed at least one of the high upper bounds. When excluding the two scenarios that exceed the SR1.5 carbon budget for limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, this subset of 1.5 °C scenarios shows a range of 15–22 Gt CO2 (16–22 Gt CO2 interquartile range) for emissions in 2030. For the year of reaching net zero CO2 emissions the range is 2039–2061 (2049–2057 interquartile range).
Closing the emissions gap between Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the global emissions levels needed to achieve the Paris Agreement’s climate goals will require a comprehensive package of policy measures. National and sectoral policies can help fill the gap, but success stories in one country cannot be automatically replicated in other countries. They need to be adapted to the local context. Here, we develop a new Bridge scenario based on nationally relevant, short-term measures informed by interactions with country experts. These good practice policies are rolled out globally between now and 2030 and combined with carbon pricing thereafter. We implement this scenario with an ensemble of global integrated assessment models. We show that the Bridge scenario closes two-thirds of the emissions gap between NDC and 2 °C scenarios by 2030 and enables a pathway in line with the 2 °C goal when combined with the necessary long-term changes, i.e. more comprehensive pricing measures after 2030. The Bridge scenario leads to a scale-up of renewable energy (reaching 52%–88% of global electricity supply by 2050), electrification of end-uses, efficiency improvements in energy demand sectors, and enhanced afforestation and reforestation. Our analysis suggests that early action via good-practice policies is less costly than a delay in global climate cooperation.
The crises of both the climate and the biosphere are manifestations of the imbalance between human extractive, and polluting activities and the Earth’s regenerative capacity. Planetary boundaries define limits for biophysical systems and processes that regulate the stability and life support capacity of the Earth system, and thereby also define a safe operating space for humanity on Earth. Budgets associated to planetary boundaries can be understood as global commons: common pool resources that can be utilized within finite limits. Despite the analytical interpretation of planetary boundaries as global commons, the planetary boundaries framework is missing a thorough integration into economic theory. We aim to bridge the gap between welfare economic theory and planetary boundaries as derived in the natural sciences by presenting a unified theory of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. Our pragmatic approach aims to overcome shortcomings of the practical applications of CEA and CBA to environmental problems of a planetary scale. To do so, we develop a model framework and explore decision paradigms that give guidance to setting limits on human activities. This conceptual framework is then applied to planetary boundaries. We conclude by using the realized insights to derive a research agenda that builds on the understanding of planetary boundaries as global commons.
The large majority of climate change mitigation scenarios that hold warming below 2 °C show high deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), resulting in a peak-and-decline behavior in global temperature. This is driven by the assumption of an exponentially increasing carbon price trajectory which is perceived to be economically optimal for meeting a carbon budget. However, this optimality relies on the assumption that a finite carbon budget associated with a temperature target is filled up steadily over time. The availability of net carbon removals invalidates this assumption and therefore a different carbon price trajectory should be chosen. We show how the optimal carbon price path for remaining well below 2 °C limits CDR demand and analyze requirements for constructing alternatives, which may be easier to implement in reality. We show that warming can be held at well below 2 °C at much lower long-term economic effort and lower CDR deployment and therefore lower risks if carbon prices are high enough in the beginning to ensure target compliance, but increase at a lower rate after carbon neutrality has been reached.
Beyond good faith
(2021)
The ambitious climate targets set by industrialized nations worldwide cannot be met without decarbonizing the building stock. Using Germany as a case study, this paper takes stock of the extensive set of energy efficiency policies that are already in place and clarifies that they have been designed “in good faith” but lack in overall effectiveness as well as cost-efficiency in achieving these climate targets. We map out the market failures and behavioural considerations that are potential reasons for why realized energy savings fall below expectations and why the household adoption of energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies has remained low. We highlight the pressing need for data and modern empirical research to develop targeted and cost-effective policies seeking to correct these market failures. To this end, we identify some key research questions and identify gaps in the data required for evidence-based policy.
Climate-related costs and benefits may not be evenly distributed across the population. We study distributional implications of seasonal weather and climate on within-country inequality in rural India. Utilizing a first difference approach, we find that the poor are more sensitive to weather variations than the non-poor. The poor respond more strongly to (seasonal) temperature changes: negatively in the (warm) spring season, more positively in the (cold) rabi season. Less precipitation is harmful to the poor in the monsoon kharif season and beneficial in the winter and spring seasons. We show that adverse weather aggravates inequality by reducing consumption of the poor farming households. Future global warming predicted under RCP8.5 is likely to exacerbate these effects, reducing consumption of poor farming households by one third until the year 2100. We also find inequality in consumption across seasons with higher consumption during the harvest and lower consumption during the sowing seasons.
Pathways toward limiting global warming to well below 2 ∘C, as used by the IPCC in the Fifth Assessment Report, do not consider the climate impacts already occurring below 2 ∘C. Here we show that accounting for such damages significantly increases the near-term ambition of transformation pathways. We use econometric estimates of climate damages on GDP growth and explicitly model the uncertainty in the persistence time of damages. The Integrated Assessment Model we use includes the climate system and mitigation technology detail required to derive near-term policies. We find an optimal carbon price of $115 per tonne of CO2 in 2030. The long-term persistence of damages, while highly uncertain, is a main driver of the near-term carbon price. Accounting for damages on economic growth increases the gap between the currently pledged nationally determined contributions and the welfare-optimal 2030 emissions by two thirds, compared to pathways considering the 2 ∘C limit only.
Global emissions scenarios play a critical role in the assessment of strategies to mitigate climate change. The current scenarios, however, are criticized because they feature strategies with pronounced overshoot of the global temperature goal, requiring a long-term repair phase to draw temperatures down again through net-negative emissions. Some impacts might not be reversible. Hence, we explore a new set of net-zero CO2 emissions scenarios with limited overshoot. We show that upfront investments are needed in the near term for limiting temperature overshoot but that these would bring long-term economic gains. Our study further identifies alternative configurations of net-zero CO2 emissions systems and the roles of different sectors and regions for balancing sources and sinks. Even without net-negative emissions, CO2 removal is important for accelerating near-term reductions and for providing an anthropogenic sink that can offset the residual emissions in sectors that are hard to abate.
Despite increasing empirical evidence of strong links between climate and economic growth, there is no established model to describe the dynamics of how different types of climate shocks affect growth patterns. Here we present the first comprehensive, comparative analysis of the long-term dynamics of one-time, temporary climate shocks on production factors, and factor productivity, respectively, in a Ramsey-type growth model. Damages acting directly on production factors allow us to study dynamic effects on factor allocation, savings and economic growth. We find that the persistence of impacts on economic activity is smallest for climate shocks directly impacting output, and successively increases for direct damages on capital, loss of labor and productivity shocks, related to different responses in savings rates and factor-specific growth. Recurring shocks lead to large welfare effects and long-term growth effects, directly linked to the persistence of individual shocks. Endogenous savings and shock anticipation both have adaptive effects but do not eliminate differences between impact channels or significantly lower the dissipation time. Accounting for endogenous growth mechanisms increases the effects. We also find strong effects on income shares, important for distributional implications. This work fosters conceptual understanding of impact dynamics in growth models, opening options for links to empirics.
Does loss aversion apply to social image concerns? In a laboratory experiment, we first induce social image in a relevant domain, intelligence, through public ranking. In a second stage, subjects experience a change in rank and are offered scope for lying to improve their final, also publicly reported rank. Subjects who care about social image and experience a decline in rank lie more than those experiencing gains. Moreover, we document a discontinuity in lying behavior when moving from rank losses to gains. Our results are in line with loss aversion in social image concerns.
Is trade a promoter of peace? Adam Smith, one of the earliest defenders of trade, worries that commerce may instigate some perverse incentives, encouraging wars. The wealth that commerce generates decreases the relative cost of wars, increases the ability to finance wars through debts, which decreases their perceived cost, and increases the willingness of commercial interests to use wars to extend their markets, increasing the number and prolonging the length of wars. Smith, therefore, cannot assume that trade would yield a peaceful world. While defending and promoting trade, Smith warns us not to take peace for granted.
In the past years, work-time in many industries has become more flexible, opening up a new channel for intertemporal substitution: workers might, instead of saving, adjust their work-time to smooth consumption. To study this channel, we set up a two-period consumption/saving model with wage uncertainty. This extends the standard saving model by also allowing a worker to allocate a fixed time budget between two work-shifts. To test the comparative statics implied by these two different channels, we conduct a laboratory experiment. A novel feature of our experiments is that we tie income to a real-effort style task. In four treatments, we turn on and off the two channels for consumption smoothing: saving and time allocation. Our main finding is that savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects. We find that a majority of subjects also uses time allocation to smooth consumption and use saving and time shifting as substitutes, though not perfect substitutes. Part of the observed heterogeneity of precautionary behavior can be explained by risk preferences and motivations different from expected utility maximization. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
We test the price-setting behavior of firms using the Rotemberg (1982) model in order to explain puzzles in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). For our tests, we conducted experiments that adapt the model into an individual decision-making problem. We find systematic deviations in price-setting according to the subjects’ degree of information acquisition. Subjects rarely make use of past information. On the other hand, subjects that decide to acquire relatively little information about future desired prices tend to overweight their own past set price when they set prices. We study the impact of this heterogeneous price-setting behavior for theoretically derived forward-looking Phillips curves. Our estimated NKPCs are in line with the empirical literature. The deviations from theoretical predictions in our NKPCs are driven by the less-informed subjects.
We examine the relationship between different types of power investments and regional economic dynamics. We construct a novel panel dataset combining data on regional GDP and power capacity additions for different technologies between 1960 and 2015, which covers 65% of the global power capacity that has been installed in this period. We use an event study design to identify the effect of power capacity addition on GDP per capita, exploiting the fact that the exact amount of power capacity coming online each year is determined by random construction delays. We find evidence that GDP per capita increases by 0.2% in the 6 years around the coming online of 100 MW coal-fired power capacity. We find similar effects for hydropower capacity, but not for any other type of power capacity. The positive effects are regionally bounded and stronger for projects on new sites (green-field). The magnitude of this effect might not be comparable to the total external costs of building new coal-fired power capacity, yet our results help to explain why policymakers favor coal investments for spurring regional growth.
Controlling bioenergy-induced land-use-change emissions is key to exploiting bioenergy for climate change mitigation. However, the effect of different land-use and energy sector policies on specific bioenergy emissions has not been studied so far. Using the global integrated assessment model REMIND-MAgPIE, we derive a biofuel emission factor (EF) for different policy frameworks. We find that a uniform price on emissions from both sectors keeps biofuel emissions at 12 kg CO2 GJ−1. However, without land-use regulation, the EF increases substantially (64 kg CO2 GJ−1 over 80 years, 92 kg CO2 GJ−1 over 30 years). We also find that comprehensive coverage (>90%) of carbon-rich land areas worldwide is key to containing land-use emissions. Pricing emissions indirectly on the level of bioenergy consumption reduces total emissions by cutting bioenergy demand but fails to reduce the average EF. In the absence of comprehensive and timely land-use regulation, bioenergy thus may contribute less to climate change mitigation than assumed previously.