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We conduct experiments based on the oligopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to assess the impact of demand side concentration on market outcomes. Both buyers and sellers in our markets are humans. The number of firms is fixed at three in all treatments. Only the number of buyers is varied and total demand is split equally among them. We observe that firms set lower prices in markets with only few buyers, namely one or two. Price dispersion is higher in markets with few buyers. Aggregate demand withholding decreases with the number of buyers. This results in lower profits for firms and higher profits for buyers in markets with few buyers. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.
Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.
Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people’s payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person’s payoff, an individual’s envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people’s payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant’s payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.
We collect a network dataset of tenured economics faculty in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. We rank the 100 institutions included with a minimum violation ranking. This ranking is positively and significantly correlated with the Times Higher Education ranking of economics institutions. According to the network ranking, individuals on average go down about 23 ranks from their doctoral institution to their employing institution. While the share of females in our dataset is only 15%, we do not observe a significant gender hiring gap (a difference in rank changes between male and female faculty). We conduct a robustness check with the Handelsblatt and the Times Higher Education ranking. According to these rankings, individuals on average go down only about two ranks. We do not observe a significant gender hiring gap using these two rankings (although the dataset underlying this analysis is small and these estimates are likely to be noisy). Finally, we discuss the limitations of the network ranking in our context.
We collect a network dataset of tenured economics faculty in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. We rank the 100 institutions included with a minimum violation ranking. This ranking is positively and significantly correlated with the Times Higher Education ranking of economics institutions. According to the network ranking, individuals on average go down about 23 ranks from their doctoral institution to their employing institution. While the share of females in our dataset is only 15%, we do not observe a significant gender hiring gap (a difference in rank changes between male and female faculty). We conduct a robustness check with the Handelsblatt and the Times Higher Education ranking. According to these rankings, individuals on average go down only about two ranks. We do not observe a significant gender hiring gap using these two rankings (although the dataset underlying this analysis is small and these estimates are likely to be noisy). Finally, we discuss the limitations of the network ranking in our context.
We collect a network dataset of tenured economics faculty in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. We rank the 100 institutions included with a minimum violation ranking. This ranking is positively and significantly correlated with the Times Higher Education ranking of economics institutions. According to the network ranking, individuals on average go down about 23 ranks from their doctoral institution to their employing institution. While the share of females in our dataset is only 15%, we do not observe a significant gender hiring gap (a difference in rank changes between male and female faculty). We conduct a robustness check with the Handelsblatt and the Times Higher Education ranking. According to these rankings, individuals on average go down only about two ranks. We do not observe a significant gender hiring gap using these two rankings (although the dataset underlying this analysis is small and these estimates are likely to be noisy). Finally, we discuss the limitations of the network ranking in our context.
I examine the determinants of both perceived inflation and unemployment in one single survey and include Big Five traits in the analysis. This is the first survey on this topic in Germany. My sample consists of 1771 students from different fields and levels. Using PhD students’ estimates as a reference, I create categories for underestimation and overestimation of both variables. Multinomial logit regressions show that females overestimate both variables. Education and news consumption reduce misestimation. A higher level of Neuroticism is related with a higher probability to overestimate unemployment. Overstating (understating) one indicator is associated with overstating (understating) the other.